

**LEIBNIZ'S MONADOLGISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF
SOCIAL ORDER**

JOSEPH OMOKAFE FASHOLA

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**BEING A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
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DEDICATION

To my father

CERTIFICATION

I certify that this research work was carried out by Joseph Omokafe FASHOLA under my supervision in the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

Supervisor

Prof. F. Offor

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Date

ABSTRACT

Monadologism, a philosophical idea depicting a non-communicative, self-actuating system of windowless, individualistic and deterministic beings, has implications for understanding the challenge of social order. Philosophical discourses on social order have focused mainly on the Cartesian mind-body interactionism and its implications for human society, to the neglect of insights from other perspectives like Leibniz's monads, which could improve the understanding of the challenge of social order. The study was, therefore, designed to examine Leibniz's idea of monadology, with a view to establishing the relationship between the metaphysical and the physical in the structure of the human society.

Thomas Aquinas' Principle of Participation, which advocates communication and inter-subjectivity, was adopted. Interpretive design was used. Texts examined in Metaphysics included Leibniz's *Monadology* and *Discourse on Metaphysics* (DM), Carr's *The Reform of the Leibnizian Monadology* (TRLM), and Russell's *Some Problems in the Philosophy of Leibniz* (SPPL). In Social Philosophy, Bhikhu's *Unity and Diversity in Multicultural Societies* (UDMS), Offor's *The Modern Leviathan and the Challenge of World Order* (TMLCWO), Oyeshile's *Reconciling the Self with the Order* (RSO), and Held's *Democracy and the Global Order* (DGO) were interrogated. These texts deal with critical issues relating to social order. The philosophical tools of conceptual elucidation, critical analysis and reconstruction were used.

Monadology, DM, and TRLM revealed that monadologism, which is a closed system that puts forward a platonic argument for the forms against the substantiality of bodies, excludes the notion of interactionism exhibited by gregarious beings, which inheres in Cartesianism. Beings, being monads, are metaphysically constituted, non-interactive and owe their harmony to a force external to them (*Monadology*, TRLM). This attempt to exclude monads from interactionism and to explain their harmony in relation to an external force further complicates the knowledge of humans as social beings possessing freewill (*Monadology*, SPPL, TRLM). The RSO and UDMS show the need for interaction, since there cannot be social order without the 'Other'. Social order requires a set of linked social structures and values which maintain patterns of relation, communication and participation between the physical self and the metaphysical other. Communication and participation encourage inclusiveness and inter-subjectivity in the system, where all the parts work in harmony towards achieving common objectives (DGO, TMLCWO). Critical intervention showed that establishing a proper relationship between the metaphysical and the physical, though a necessary condition for interaction and participation, is not sufficient for solidarity which is a *sine qua non* for social order.

Monadologism and Cartesianism, by appealing to principles like interactionism, participation and communication, could not adequately account for social order. A better account of a society derives from a framework of shared relations between the self and its others.

Keywords: Leibniz, Monadologism, Monads and social order, Cartesianism and the Other

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

The way we speak about the world reflects our worldview and knowledge of the world. Since this knowledge cannot be divorced from its metaphysical foundation, it presupposes that the reality of the social world cannot be divorced from metaphysics. Metaphysical beliefs or orientations have shaped how cultures and religions treat both fauna and flora life. This suggests that a people's metaphysical worldviews have far-reaching effects on the way they perceive the world and their place in it. The belief in ancestors acting as custodians of cultural and moral values influences the way people treat and care for each other. Likewise, Leibniz's metaphysics, especially his monadologism, represents his worldview and presents some social implications. In a number of Leibniz's writings especially 'The Monadology', it is evident there that the idea portrays strong elements of determinism and individualism and poses some concern for inter-subjectivity and social order.

It is worthy of note that there is no particular work among Leibniz's writings that can be described as his magnum opus. His basic philosophies could only be drafted from his numerous writings and from different opinions of philosophers on his core thoughts. In his 'Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays,' Leibniz opined, "the monads have no windows through which anything could come in or go out"¹ that means, they are windowless and they never interact with each other. This influenced Leibniz's denial of the possibility of any causal interaction between the mind and the body. For Leibniz, the monads are beings in such a way that a study of being is a study of the monads and a study of the hierarchy of being is a study of the hierarchy of monads.

In making a distinction among the monads, Leibniz established a hierarchy of monads, starting with the simple monads of the inorganic world which have a confused perception of all other monads, but no memory or reason, up to the monads of animals

¹ Leibniz. G. W. 1965. *Monadology and other philosophical essays*. P. Schrecker and A. M. Schrecker. eds. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company. 148.

which have simple reason, understanding, and memory and up again to human monads which have a developed sense of reflection, self-consciousness, memory, and reason. Finally, God who is the ultimate monad is at the apex of the hierarchy.² Since he conceives of some monads as individual souls, or humans, the implications of a non-relationship or non-interaction among humans in a society becomes very significant.

In order to have a proper view of Leibniz's metaphysics, it was necessary to take a look into his social milieu, that is, the factors which influenced his philosophy. This is important because, the thoughts of any thinker wittingly or unwittingly are influenced by his or her socio-cultural milieu. To divorce individuals from the prevailing circumstances of their time when considering the modes, objects and products of their thoughts would yield a distorted view of the meanings inherent in those thoughts.

Leibniz was a seventeenth century philosopher who was educated in Germany and according to Daniel Garber, during this period, Europe experienced great intellectual revolution as,

The older Aristotelian philosophy of the schools was being challenged by a new mechanist philosophy which rejected the form, matter, and qualities of the Aristotelian world, replacing them with a world in which everything was to be explained in terms of size, shape, and motion. In this new world, there was a special emphasis on mathematics, which was increasingly applied to problems in physics in a way quite foreign to Aristotelian philosophy.³

It was his interest in mathematics that led to his discovery of the infinitesimal calculus and also was pivotal to his metaphysical orientation which is logically hinged on

²Patrick Mooney, 1997. Voltaire's criticism of Leibniz. http://thewebsterweb.weebly.com/uploads/5/4/9/1/5491739/cand_leibniz_philosophy_edited.doc

³Craig, E. ed. 2005. *The shorter routledge encyclopedia of philosophy*. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. 553.

principles. These principles are; Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), Predicate-In-Notion principle (PIN), and Principle of Contradiction (PC). With these principles, Leibniz was able to give explanations for the rationale behind his metaphysical postulations. Some of which are; The Notion of Possible Worlds, The Best of All Possible Worlds and Pre-established Harmony.

Concerning The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, he posits that, for two indiscernible beings to exist in harmony in a particular world, some external forces or agents must be responsible for their harmony. In addition, for the possibility that these two beings in this particular world are indiscernibles, there must be another world where there are discernible beings. This idea is hinged on his Notion of Possible Worlds. Since there are other possible worlds, for God to have chosen the one over the other, he must have done so with sufficient reasons, following from his Principle of Sufficient Reason. Moreover, this is not far from the fact that the one is true or better than the other is, and is therefore the best of all possible worlds. A denial of this claim will lead to self-contradiction because the one world is predicated on the other. This is hinged on the Principle of Contradiction and the Predicate-In-Notion principle.

In other words, the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is a description of truth that cannot be denied without running into contradiction. This creates a connection between Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles and the Principle of Contradiction which, although, are not identical but are more similar than dissimilar. A further observation will show that these two principles serve as bedrock for the Predicate-In-Notion principle. The existence of a world of indiscernibles implies the existence of another world of discernibles. The one is predicated on the other in such a way that the notion of the predicate is implied in the subject. This is because to confidently affirm that a thing is good is to affirm a knowledge of that which is bad. One can say that the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed. So, discernibility is implied in indiscernibility. This is why we cannot affirm the one and deny the other without contradiction.

The very important concept of monads as conceived by Leibniz is implied in the notion of complete individual concept. A monad is complete and sufficiently contains within itself all the attributes of its beingness. This presupposes that it is closed and individuated. Knowledge of the monads is understandable when viewed alongside the materialists' view of substance as matter. Leibniz believes that the term substance is exclusively reserved for the monads which are real, un-extended, and indestructible and upon which the reality of phenomenal material things is predicated. Since Leibniz's monads are individuated and deterministic, there is a concern about how humans who possess freewill can be described as monads. This research employed Thomas Aquinas's principle of participation in interrogating this issue for the purpose of addressing the problem of social order.

For Aquinas, the metaphysical notion of participation expresses the ontological dependence of things in the world on spiritual or intellectual realities, and ultimately on God.⁴ The concept of participation involves all beings participating in existence in such a way that they share in ultimate beingness and its transcendental qualities. This sharing or participation is not in equal proportion with the Absolute, otherwise, there will be a creation of multiplicities of absolutes in a pantheistic sense. Rather, beings share either more perfectly or less so, since they are caused by the being that is first and most perfect.

For Aquinas, one important reason for which beings engage in inter-subjective activities is to seek a measure of perfection from beings that possess more perfection and intrinsic tendency to share this in some way. This communicative and inter-subjective activities form the basis of Aquinas' Principle of Participation which provided a springboard towards a proper conception of social order. This is because for the maintenance of order, there has to be a level of inter-subjectivity between modes of beings, an element that is absent from Leibniz's monadology.

⁴ David C. Schindler. 2005. What's the difference? On the metaphysics of participation in a Christian context. *The Saint Anselm Journal* 3.1: 1.

Literature Review

In the 'Philosophical Papers and Letters' translated and edited by Leroy Loemker, Leibniz wrote to Redmond, stating how he attempted to uncover the truth he perceived was buried and scattered in the opinions of different philosophical schools of thought. He talked about his interest in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, the Scholastics, and other ancient thinkers. In the course of his quest, he became doubtful of the idea of substantial forms and leaned towards mathematics only to return again to metaphysics which he believed proved more convincing. According to Leibniz;

But when I looked for the ultimate reasons for mechanism, and for the laws of motion themselves, I was very surprised to see that it was impossible to find them in mathematics, and that I should have to return to metaphysics. This is what led me back to entelechies, and from the material to the formal, and ultimately brought me to understand, after a number of corrections and improvements to my notions, that monads, or simple substances, are the only true substances, and that material things are only phenomena, albeit well-founded and well-connected.⁵

He described these Monads as the real atoms of nature and, in other words, the true elements of things.

In the 'Monadology' Leibniz emphasised that the Monads have no windows, through which anything could come in or go out, believing that accidents cannot separate themselves from substances nor go about outside of them, as the 'sensible species' of the Scholastics used to do. Thus, neither substance nor accident can come into a Monad from outside.⁶ It should be noted that Leibniz's 'Monadology' is a metaphysical treatise intended as a logical deduction of the nature of reality. The treatise itself was practically unknown to Leibniz's contemporaries. It was written by him in 1714, two years before

⁵ Leibniz, G. W. 1969. *Philosophical papers and letters*. Trans. and ed. L. Loemker. 2nd edn. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 654-5

⁶ Leibniz, G. W. 1714. *The monadology*. Trans. Robert Latta. 7

his death, in response to a request from one of his princely patrons, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and it was published in 1720, four years after his death. Leibniz is undoubtedly one of the three intellectual giants of the seventeenth century whose philosophical speculations were specifically determined by their interest in physical problem. That is, the problem of the nature of the reality of the external world. This dominated the philosophies of Descartes who was primarily interested in mathematics, Newton in physics, and Leibniz in metaphysics. If 'The Monadology' is to be summarised in just one sentence then, we will be saying that, as a metaphysical system it is distinguished by its claim to have carried logical deduction to a complete, self-consistent and self-contained conclusion.

Jonathan Edwards in 'A 21st Century Monadology or Principles of Philosophy' reiterated Leibniz's position on the lack of interaction and self-sufficiency of the monads. Stating that all simple substances or created monads might be called entelechies, or anticipations, for they have in them a certain perfection; that they have a certain self-sufficiency which makes them the sources of their internal activities and, so to speak, incorporeal automata. Thus, this metaphysic can accept that anything wonderful that might be called intelligence, understanding, animacy or spirit stems ultimately whether directly or indirectly from the internal principles of monads, which are, in a sense, Aristotle's final causes. Therefore, the conception of the interaction of material objects is no more than an aggregate account of the operation of the internal principles of simples. For Jonathan Edwards, Leibniz is here pointing out that the awesome order of the physical world is not something lightly to be accounted for in terms of interactions between inert objects. He points out that everything derives from the internal 'entelechies' of monads, which are indeed awesome, particularly in their reliability. Paraphrasing Einstein, he said, the most amazing thing about the universe is that every tiny element 'knows what to do'. And as Feynman emphasized, at the elemental level this involves both huge mathematical complexity and a sort of

‘anticipation’ in which the existence of the monad is determined as much by its outcome as by its origin, almost as if it ‘knows where it is going’.⁷

In the ‘Discourse on Metaphysics’, Leibniz remarks that “when we are concerned with the exactness of metaphysical truths, it is important to recognise the extent and independence of our soul, which goes infinitely further than is commonly thought.”⁸ This is because apprehension of metaphysical truths is the function of the soul and strictly speaking, Leibniz being an idealist denies that “we receive knowledge from the outside by way of the senses.”⁹ Therefore, Leibniz’s description of the relation of the soul and body is to be explained in terms of a harmony pre-established by God. This means that the successive states or activities of the soul are to be explained in terms of an intra-substantial and not an inter-substantial causality. This is because, for Leibniz, bodies are well-founded phenomena which he describes as the representational contents of certain perceptions.

In Leibniz’s essay titled ‘Leibniz-De Volder Correspondence’ he addressed a letter to Burchard De Volder and emphasised that matter and motion are not substances or things so much as they are the phenomena of perceivers (monadic souls), the reality of which is situated in the harmony of individual perceivers with themselves and in a pre-established manner with other perceivers.¹⁰ This, Leibniz believes is an indication that concrete matter is not real and therefore cannot be described as substance.

⁷ Jonathan Edwards. 2014. A 21st century Monadology or principles of philosophy. *Research Gate*. par. 18. Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260273368>. Accessed: 2nd February 2019.

⁸ Leibniz, G. W. 1902. *Discourse on metaphysics*. The Open Court Publishing Company. 27

⁹ Leibniz, G. W. 1902. *Discourse on metaphysics*. 27.

¹⁰ G.W Leibniz. 30 June 1704. Leibniz-De Volder correspondence. P. Lodge. Trans. 2013. London: New Haven. 306.

In Wildon Carr's 'The Reform of the Leibnizian Monadology', he made it clear that,

The monadology sets forth a logically consistent theory of the composition or constitution of a universe in which every constituent is an active subject of experience living its own life and in living its own life subserving the universal life, the life of the universe. The monadology rejects as self-contradiction and inconsistency the idea that dead, inert, material atoms or mass-units are or can be constituents of a universe. There is nothing dead, nothing purely inert in the universe. To be absolutely dead is not to be. The Democritean concept of the atoms and the void is rejected because mathematically the atom is not a unit, but divisible to infinity, and physically it is not simple. The reals are monads, simple substances, self-centred subjects of experience, whose activity consists in perception, and whose perceptions are the apprehension of the whole universe, limited in the degree of clearness or obscurity.¹¹

Against the description of matter as bodies, Al-Razi in Sharif's 'A History of Muslim Philosophy' offers a metaphysical argument to establish the eternity of matter which goes thus;

Creation is manifest; there must then be its Creator. What is created is nothing but formed matter. Why then do we prove from the created the anteriority of the Creator, and not the anteriority of the created being? If it is true that body is created from something by the force of an agent, then we should say that as this agent is eternal and immutable before His act, what received this act of force must also have been eternal before it received that act. This receiver is matter. Therefore, matter is eternal.¹²

In summary, what Al-Razi wants us to believe is that matter proceeded from an eternal being, therefore, matter is eternal. A counter analogy can be offered thus, matter proceeded from God therefore, matter is God. But, it is very unlikely that Leibniz would subscribe to this Al-Raziean description of matter because of its inherent Spinozistic and

¹¹ Wildon. H. Carr. 1926. The reform of the Leibnizian monadology. *The Journal of Philosophy* 23.3: 72. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2014378>. Accessed: 28-09-2017

¹² Sharif. M. M. 1963. A history of Muslim philosophy. *Pakistani Philosophical Congress* 1: 444.

pantheistic consequence. That is, it leads to the multiplicities of God. This is why Aquinas believes that the relationship between created beings and the Creator is simply in terms of an approximated participation. So, the term substance as used by Leibniz is different from how it is being used in the sciences or by materialists, where a substance is basically matter with concrete existence. For Leibniz, the term substance is exclusively reserved for real, un-extended, indestructible stuffs. Since matter or bodies are extended and destructible, they are not real entities and cannot be described as substances, rather, as phenomena. This is because their existence is predicated on real, simple substances. It is evident here that Leibniz advances a Platonic argument against the substantiality of bodies, where bodies are mere shadows of the archetypal Forms. This indicates that bodies are not monadic substances since they are aggregates, extended and have no unity. They are not real because they are capable of disintegrating and going out of existence.

Daniel Garber, in his 'Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics', is of the view that the world of Monadology;

Is a world of souls and souls alone, everything is ultimately grounded in the mental. It is made up of monads, non-extended, immaterial substances that are basically mental in nature. And strictly speaking, that is all that there is. The world of the Monadology is thus, a world of souls and the metaphysics a variety of idealism.¹³

There are a number of objections to Leibniz's conception of monads. Wildon Carr in 'The Reform of the Leibnizian Monadology,' acknowledged the logical consistencies employed by Leibniz but he criticised him on the ground that 'The Monadology' fails in the one essential requirement of a metaphysical system, which is that it should give intellectual satisfaction.¹⁴ His worry is that Leibniz's monadology

¹³ Daniel Garber. 1985. *Leibniz and the foundations of physics: the middle years*. In K. Okruhlik and J. R Brown ed. *The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz*. 37

¹⁴ Wildon. H. Carr. 1926. The reform of the Leibnizian monadology. *The Journal of Philosophy* 23. 3: 75-76. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2014378>. Accessed: 28-09-2017

presents a logical leap from the metaphysical to the physical but fails to provide concrete explanations for the process. For instance, that a metaphysically orchestrated harmony is pre-established in the monads does not give intellectual satisfaction as the reader is still left suspended in an idealised manner.

Michael Mendelson in his ‘Beyond the Revolutions of Matter: Mind, Body, and Pre-established Harmony in the Earlier Leibniz’ is of the opinion that Leibniz, like Spinoza, is at a loss as to how to explain the causal relation between an extended and a non-extended substance. He believes that it is precisely this explanatory impasse that prompted Leibniz to deny the causal interaction of bodies, proposing in its place a pre-established harmony which preserves appearance of interaction while denying the fact of it.¹⁵ Here, we see a close relationship between the objection of Wildon Carr and that of Michael Mendelson. Therefore, it is possible to say that as is the case with occasionalism, Leibniz’s pre-established harmony is easily viewed as an attempt at preserving Cartesian dualism while avoiding the problems of causal connections that are posed by interactionism.

Paul Carus is another thinker who is opposed to Leibniz’s monadology. In his ‘The Key to the Riddle of the Universe’ he is of the view that there is a problem with ‘The Monadology’ saying that it renders the facts for whose explanation it is invented more mysterious and complicated than they naturally are.¹⁶ This is not far from the fact that Leibniz denies the substantiality of bodies and appeals to a pre-established harmony as responsible for the supposed harmony in the world. This objection to ‘The Monadology’ as the previous objection from other scholars presupposes that the invocation of a Deum ex-machina is of paramount concern to Leibniz’s critics. This

¹⁵ Michael Mendelson. 1995. Beyond the revolutions of matter: mind, body, and pre-established harmony in the earlier Leibniz. *Studia Leibnitiana* Bd. 27, H. 1: 31. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40694281>. Accessed: 28-09-2017.

¹⁶ Paul Carus. 1895. The key to the riddle of the universe: a disquisition on Mr Edward Douglas Fawcett’s philosophy. *The Monist* 5. 3: 408.

means that Leibniz's justification for a pre-established harmony does not sufficiently explain the relationship between monads.

Nikolaj Plotnikov came up with a more radical response to the notion of monads explaining that Leibniz's metaphor of windowless monads is closed and that the doctrine that substances have no windows and no doors, which implies that they have no direct communication with one another has to be rejected as decisively as possible. This is because, he emphasised, "a person is a monad with windows."¹⁷ By asserting that the monads possess windows, Nikolaj Plotnikov removes individuality and introduces communication to the existence of the monads. His position is not far from the fact that it is difficult to conceive of a monadic human agent who acts from a measure of freewill to be windowless, closed and not interactive. This is why Leibniz's position is here challenged as an inaccurate representation of beings as monads since determinism is incompatible with social beings.

Patryk Zadarnowski in his essay titled 'On Monadology' puts forward a criticism on Leibniz's invocation of God in place of human freewill in 'The Monadology'. He believes that Leibniz complicates his discussion by introducing the concept of a perfect monad (God) together with two distinct definitions of perfection which are beyond reconciliation.¹⁸ He made reference to Leibniz's assertion that,

...God is absolutely perfect. Why? Because a thing's perfection is simply the total amount of positive reality it contains, using 'positive' in its precise sense, in which it doesn't apply to any of a thing's limitations or boundaries; so that where there are no boundaries at all, namely in God, perfection must be absolutely infinite.¹⁹

¹⁷ Nikolaj Plotnikov. 2012. The person is a monad with windows: sketch of a conceptual history of person in Russia. *Studies in East European Thought*. 64. 3 & 4: 292. retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/41818865 Accessed: 07-02-2017

¹⁸ Patryk Zadarnowski, Sydney 1998. On Monadology. Retrieve from <https://www.jantar.org/words/monadology.html> Accessed: 5th February, 2019.

¹⁹ Leibniz, G. W. 1714. *The monadology*. Trans. Robert Latta. 41

It follows that for Leibniz, perfection is nothing but the magnitude of positive reality but went on to retract from the view when he said,

...that one monad has distinct perceptions and another has confused ones, the former's states can explain the latter's, and not vice versa. And one created thing is more perfect than another to the extent that what happens in it serves to explain a priori what happens in the other; and that is what makes us say that it 'acted on' the other.²⁰

Patryk Zadarnowski believes that although Leibniz's formalised treatment of the concept of God in 'The Monadology' is interesting, it contributes little to the general theme of 'Monadology', and build on even less of it as seen in the expression that "For if there is a reality in essences or possibilities, or indeed in eternal truths, this reality must be founded on something existent or actual; and consequently on the existence of the Necessary Being in whom essence involves existence, or in whom it is enough to be possible in order to be actual."²¹ He is of the view that Leibniz, having just ventured into the modal philosophy, he fears to attribute too much reality to phenomena. Instead, being unable to actualise possibilities immediately, he invents an external agent actualising them indirectly. Patryk Zadarnowski submits that if indeed God is a logically necessary being, His necessity surely is not the factor necessitating the existence of the possible.²² Patryk Zadarnowski is here presenting his aversion for the introduction of God as Leibniz's explanation for harmony among beings. This is because he believes that lower beings may necessarily derive their existence from God but they do not live robotic lives. Humans for instance are driven by freewill and emotions.

Philippe Huneman's summary of Kant's interrogation and critique of Leibniz's Monadology is very instructive. In his essay titled, 'Kant's critique of the Leibnizian theory of organisms: An unnoticed cornerstone for criticism?' he states that Kant's

²⁰ Leibniz, G. W. 1714. *The monadology*. Trans. Robert Latta. 50

²¹ Leibniz, G. W. 1714. *The monadology*. Trans. Robert Latta. 44

²² Patryk Zadarnowski, Sydney 1998. On Monadology. Retrieve from

<https://www.jantar.org/words/monadology.html> Accessed: 5th February, 2019.

position inevitably relies on considerations of space and its divisibility. He believes that in the end, atomism and Monadology is the target of Kant's dialectics in his critique of the Leibnizian theory of organism. This, in his opinion is somehow legitimate, since monads are a kind of metaphysical atomism, as Leibniz claims. For Leibniz, there are only atoms of substances which are metaphysical points. They have something vital and some kind of perception, and mathematical points are their points of view to express the universe. Kant's point here is that the Monadology focuses on the metaphysical and says nothing about the empirical world.²³

Philippe Huneman further claims that, Kant is of the opinion that hylozoism, the principle that matter could be alive by itself, is a threat to natural science and that the threat contradicts the principle of inertia, which is a necessary principle of physics. However, Kant believes that Leibniz himself paved the way for hylozoism, because if substance is a force, and the monads a representative power, then everything which exists in nature is somehow alive, as Leibniz himself had recognized. But, since the two conceptions; the internal unity of organisms as a soul, and the infinite organisation, are correlative in Leibniz's conception, and since Kant has refuted the latter, then, from the critical point of view, the souls in substances are also refuted, and hylozoism is made impossible. This shows that there is only inert matter, or some articulated arrangements of matter, nothing more. Leibniz's monads, for Kant, are a firm ladder to hylozoism and should therefore be dismissed.²⁴

In Russell's 'Some Problems in the Philosophy of Leibniz', he is of the opinion that Leibniz's system is clearly connected with the problem of the sources of his metaphysical doctrine of the monad and that the problem is closely connected with how far this doctrine was due to his attention to the problem of the relation of mind and body.

²³ Philippe Huneman. Kant's critique of the Leibnizian theory of organisms: An unnoticed cornerstone for criticism? Paris: Rehseis, CNRS.13

²⁴ Philippe Huneman. Kant's critique of the Leibnizian theory of organisms: An unnoticed cornerstone for criticism? Paris: Rehseis, CNRS. 22

Russell believes that an epistemic emphasis on this problem presents a solipsistic monad but when thought of in relation to interaction, it presents a monad which is not necessarily solipsistic but which is causally shut off from the rest of the universe.²⁵

Jonathan Edwards opposes Leibniz's claim that every monad contains enough information for an all-seeing observer to find in it an account of the whole universe as it seems unjustifiable. In modern local physics, Jonathan Edwards believes that all relations to distant elements of the universe must be indirect and this does not negate the valid point that all modes in the universe are directly or indirectly dependent on the state of the universe as a whole. Therefore it follows that inter-communication of things extends to any distance, however great. Consequently, everybody feels the effect of all that takes place in the universe.²⁶

From the foregoing, it is observed that the grounds on which 'The Monadology' is generally being condemned is not that the logical argument is defective, but that the principle is only finally being reconciled by evoking in aid a *deus ex machina* who is the agent responsible for the pre-established harmony.²⁷

Therefore, in summary, an important challenge of the monadology is how the monads can enter into a community and be a part of it. This necessitates a consideration of the relationship between metaphysical and physical realities. This issue is not far removed from the Cartesian problem. Just as Descartes believes that, the mind influences the body and the body influences the mind, so is the view that the metaphysical and the

²⁵ Russell I. L. 1923. Some problems in the philosophy of Leibniz. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. New Series. 23: x.

²⁶ Jonathan Edwards. 2014. A 21st century Monadology or principles of philosophy. *Research Gate*. par. 61. Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260273368>. Accessed: 2nd February 2019.

²⁷ Wildon. H. Carr. 1926. The reform of the Leibnizian monadology. *The Journal of Philosophy* 23. 3: 68-69. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2014378>. Accessed: 28-09-2017

social have inter-subjective relations but he encountered a problem trying to show where this interaction takes place.

In 'The Crisis of European Sciences', Husserl took no particular position on the mind-body problem because his aim is not to construct an explanatory theory but merely to describe 'the things themselves.' When he does refer explicitly to metaphysical debates about the mind, it is usually to dismiss the views as fatally compromised by naturalistic presuppositions.²⁸ Husserl's criticism of the dualist and monist positions is that they fail to rise to the level of transcendental reflection and thus, do not recognise pure consciousness as an autonomous domain of self-contained phenomena. Consciousness regarded in its purity, according to Husserl amounts to a self-contained context of being, a context of absolute being, into which nothing can penetrate and from which nothing can escape.²⁹

This Husserlian view is closely related to Leibniz's monadology where the monads are windowless. But the difference is that, for Husserl, where Leibniz views the monads as the only true existing substances in reality, pure consciousness is transcendent but not the only existing reality. Therefore, even though Husserl does not explicitly take a particular position on the mind-body problem or by implication, the metaphysical cum social relations, there are undeniable echoes of dualism animating his phenomenology. His theory of intentionality is predicated on what he regards as a strict categorical distinction between consciousness and reality. The phenomenological epoche or transcendental reduction, for example, consists in the bracketing of one's natural attitudes in order to attain the contents of transcendent or pure consciousness immanent within things.

²⁸ Edmund Husserl.1970. *The crisis of European science and transcendental phenomenology: an introduction to phenomenological philosophy*. D. Carr. Trans. Evanston, III: Northwestern University Press. 60.

²⁹Edmund Husserl.1976. *Ideen zu einer reinen phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Husserliana III*. K. Schuhmann, ed. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 93.

The theory of a monadic universe presents individualistic, windowless, monads and denies any form of causal interaction of the monads. We are prompted to ask at this point that, if the activities of the monads are individualistic, how can they enter into a community and become a part of it considering that humans are monads?

Leibniz conceives of humans as monads and this is not far from the fact that, as an idealist, he rejects the substantiality, priority and reality of bodies. This is why he also rejects the mind-body interactivism of Cartesians since indeed, they do not interact. The plausibility of Leibniz's Monadologism is sometimes less recognised partly due to the dominance of materialist orientations within the different strands or approaches to metaphysics. Aristotle and Plato for example have different approaches to metaphysics. In his theory of 'Hylomorphism', Aristotle like Descartes recognises the reality of soul and body or Form and Matter and proposed a mutual interaction between them. Plato, in his theory of the Forms conceives of matter or bodies as shadows of the archetypal Forms and ipso facto denies the reality of matter or bodies.

For the materialists, the real world is just this phenomenal world that we perceive and it is from this position that we have an appreciation for the notion of objectivity. The objective world is believed to be constructed from our human and shared knowledge. Yet ultimately, we cannot break out of our own individual perspective. We always perceive our world from our own privileged individual point of view. The phenomenal world is in contrast to what Kant calls the 'noumenal' world consisting of 'things-in-themselves', that is, things that exist for themselves independently of our perceiving them. The thing-in-itself is the thing beyond our experience, yet it is what our phenomenal knowledge is about. Kant argues that we can never know this noumenal world. It is forever out of our reach because we cannot step out of our perspective on the world. It follows that we do not know reality as it might be in itself apart from how our minds structure experience of mind-independent reality. We do not know noumena, we only know reality in terms of how our active minds structure, organise and form our experiences of mind-independent reality. This means that, for Kant, we only know phenomena.

From the above analysis, it is obvious that there are different perspectives to reality. Plato and Aristotle are diametrically opposed to each other in their metaphysical worldviews but, we do not dismiss any of their theories as not being genuine metaphysics. Leibniz's Monadologism is another strand of metaphysics which has an idealist orientation just like Plato's. For this reason, to accept Plato's theory necessarily implies an acceptance of Leibniz's. From the foregoing, it is clear that Leibniz proposes a world solely composed of metaphysical beings known as monads. The monads are windowless, self-actuating, indestructible, individuated and they do not interact with each other.

For Leibniz, the harmony which exists among monads is not as a result of their interaction but that it is pre-established by God. Leibniz is of the view that Descartes was influenced by the idea of simple archetypal substances which has been at the heart of the debate among ancient philosophers like the Atomists- Leucippus and Democritus. Democritus opined, "All matter is composed of tiny, indivisible particles differing only in simple physical properties such as size, shape, and weight"³⁰ Leibniz's rejection of the notion of atoms was based on the popular claim that atoms are material and extended bodies which implies divisibility. For this reason, Leibniz was not in support of Democritus' conception of atoms. The true elements of things, in Leibniz's view are simple substances which possess no parts, not extended, indivisible, do not interact and are windowless. Leibniz refers to them as Monads. With this conception of monads he was able to respond to the mind-body problem as well as the problem of metaphysical cum social interactivism. In his view, the perceived interaction or harmony among monads is pre-established by God.

It is clear at this point that dualists agree that there exist both the metaphysical and the physical (social) domains of souls and bodies respectively, and that there exist a harmony resulting from the connection between them, but have difficulty explaining the source of this connection. A monist like Leibniz rejects this duality and any claim that

³⁰ Carpenter, A. N. 2008. *Western philosophy*, Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, Microsoft Encarta.

these two domains interact. In fact, for him, there is no interaction because bodies are not real entities. They are phenomena predicated on real substances.

The dispute originating from this debate can be tied to the fact that there are different realities and traditions in philosophy, most of which happen to be diametrically opposed to each other in such a way that the truth of the one excludes the other. As Wittgenstein argued in his 'Philosophical Investigations', in a 'Language-Game', we cannot use the rules governing one language to judge another.³¹ Also, we cannot use the values of one culture to judge another as doing so will be conceptually infelicitous.

Idealism and materialism are different realities that are diametrically opposed to each other in such a way that we cannot use a materialist orientation to judge an idealist view without running into some conceptual problems or committing a category mistake. Leibniz is an idealist and not a materialist. He believes that ultimately, there are only simple, un-extended, indestructible substances. Therefore, material things and living creatures are nothing more than mere appearances in the mind.

Despite some of the objections to Leibniz's Monadologism, the instrumentality of the principle has been employed in responding to as well as in some cases addressing a number of philosophical problems. The problem of Cartesian duality is an example. Issues surrounding Leibniz's notion of the pre-established harmony of the monads have been addressed by scholars who claim that in order to escape the Cartesian problem of interactionism, he invoked God in aid as the orchestrator of the harmony. Thus far, the notion of inter-subjectivity, interactionism, solidarity and unity are the missing elements scholars have not been able to introduce in the nature of existence of the monads.

³¹ Wittgenstein L. 1953. *Philosophical investigations*. G. E. M. Anscombe. Trans. Oxford : Basil Blackwell. 13.

Statement of the Research Problem

As revealed from the review of literature, the basic concern of scholars with regards to the monadology is that Leibniz offers unsatisfactory explanation for the harmony in reality by making allusion to God. It is also believed that this was done as a way of escaping the problem of interactionism among monads and by implication, avoiding an interaction between the metaphysical and the physical in the structure of human society. This problem which is also implied in the relationship between the mind and the body has been interrogated by philosophers but without much success. Leibniz's response to this problem was that there is no interaction between them. This is because soul-like monadic substances alone are the real things while bodies are mere phenomena. This platonic argument of the Forms influenced Leibniz's opinion that the monads are individualistic, windowless and non-interactive with the external phenomenal world.

For the above reason, the problem of this study was to rethink this relationship as well as attempt to establish proper relations between these disparate fields and emphasise that the monads do interact with each other and with the external world. This is necessary because Leibniz proposes a world solely composed of metaphysical beings whose properties are the monads. It was noted as well that Leibniz's Monadologism which could be interpreted to underlie the culture of individualism is capable of straining inter-subjectivity and deepening the crisis of social order. While acknowledging the distinction between matters of social values and matters of metaphysics, the study investigated the idea that metaphysical beliefs often form the basis for social values which in turn shape the way we view and interact with the world.

Statement of Thesis

Humans are believed to be necessarily inter-subjective because no one under normal circumstances desires to live in isolation. Therefore, considering that the monads are windowless implies that inter-subjectivity and solidarity are missing elements in Leibniz's monadologism. Their introduction into our perception of the monads is capable of eliminating individualism from their mode of existence. It is for this reason that the

study argued that with Thomas Aquinas' 'Principle of Participation' where humans are viewed as social beings who necessarily go out of themselves to complete or be completed by others, the problem of social order promoted by the culture of individualism in Leibniz's Monadology will be on the right part towards being addressed. But, this research identified that communication or inter-subjectivity is necessarily implied in the principle of participation while solidarity or unity is not. Since inter-subjectivity does not guarantee solidarity or unity which is necessary for social order, the need arose for this research to reconstruct and go beyond Aquinas' principle.

In doing so, as noted above, in a world of social monads, inter-subjectivity which is implicit in the principle of participation is evident but it is the missing element in Leibniz's monadologism. Therefore, to reconstruct the monadology in a way that suits the social world requires an introduction of the principle of participation and inter-subjectivity. This principle enables a conception of humans as gregarious beings who necessarily go out of their ways seeking social existence. But, as earlier stated, the principle of participation alone cannot guarantee social order hence, the need to go beyond Aquinas by the introduction of solidarity which creates mutual trust and forms the basis for shared responsibilities towards the Other. In the notion of solidarity, A engages in a solidarity exchange with B, if A gives something to B out of a feeling of gratitude, not necessarily directed at B, and without believing or having the right to receive something equivalent in return.³² This suggests that, in the quest for unity and social order, it is important to emphasise solidarity exchange for its ability to promote social bonding.

This study also acknowledged that Leibniz's metaphysical monadologism may not necessarily be responsible for the culture of individualism anywhere in the world but, it stated that this philosophy promotes and encourages it. This means that Leibniz's metaphysical monadologism which emphasises closeness, self-sufficiency, determinism and indestructibility strengthens the grip of individualistic tendencies which may strain

³² John Danaher. 2016. Human enhancement, social solidarity and the distribution of responsibility. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 8.

inter-subjectivity and other social values requisite for social order and common development.

Aim and Objectives of Research

The specific aim of this research is to establishing a proper relationship between the metaphysical and the physical and express that, though this relationship is a necessary condition for interaction and participation, it is however not sufficient for solidarity which is *sine qua non* for social order. To achieve this aim, the research;

- i. Explored the deterministic orientation of the monads as well as the metaphysical foundations of beings and raised the concern that humans are monads with freewill. The study emphasized that, even though Leibniz did not expressly state that his monadic theory was meant to achieve human solidarity for the reason that perfection has been pre-inputted in the monads at creation, it still raises some concerns because humans are monads with windows.
- ii. Critically evaluated and clarified concepts like communalism and individualism and expressed that they have metaphysical basis.
- iii. Evaluated Aquinas' 'Principle of Participation' and noted that it argues in favour of inter-subjectivity as basic for co-existence and that its absence in a community of human beings would result in a maladjusted society.
- iv. Examined the extent to which Leibniz's monadologism poses a challenge for the challenge of social order and laid emphasis on the need to introduce the concept of solidarity and unity which are not guaranteed in the principle of participation as veritable means of aiming at social order.
- v. Attempted to go beyond Leibniz in responding to the problem of the relationship between the metaphysical and the physical domains. It stressed that we must look beyond the notion of connection which resulted in Leibniz's inability to marry the disparate fields and focus on the notion of relationship which exposes the fluidity of both fields.

Methodology

The study employed the qualitative method of research which involves content analysis of texts, library and archival materials, using the philosophical tools of conceptual elucidation, critical analysis and reconstruction. Conceptual elucidation was employed in clarifying concepts like metaphysics, communalism, individualism and determinism, while critical analysis was used to interrogate the notions of monadology, social monadology, solipsism, inter-subjectivism and democracy. Reconstruction was used to reform Leibniz's claim concerning monadological windowlessness as incompatible with social monads that possess freewill.

Justification of Study

This study is justified in that, despite the elaborate works already done on Leibniz's philosophy especially his 'Monadology', sufficient attention has not been paid to the issue of its application in human societies as a result of the inability to draw a proper relationship between the metaphysical and the physical. Monadologism, understood as a deterministic, self-sufficient and individualistic philosophy is an idea that scholars of Leibniz have not fully explained in terms of human society, with the underlying belief that matters of social values are metaphysical products. They have indeed dealt with the issue of how the soul of a corporeal substance is related to its body in a bid to resolving the problem of Cartesian mind-body duality, where this body is understood to belong to the phenomenal realm of extended things.

The study emphasised that the notion of inter-subjectivity is basic for co-existence, and harmony. This means that its absence in a community of human monads who possess freewill would result in a maladjusted society. This is because it is not possible to conceive of any moral idea when in isolation and removed from others. One question which reveals when an action could be said to be either right or wrong is, 'who does it hurt?' If no one is hurt, then, no wrong has been done and going by the egoistic nature of man, that is, the desire to always follow one's interest, no one would under normal circumstances want to hurt oneself. The implication of this is that, without the

‘Other’, judgements about rightness or wrongness of human actions would be unnecessary. A situation of harmony without ethics will in fact be possible in Leibniz’s metaphysics but unfortunately, this will not hold in human societies where there is constant interaction of people and each being aware of the existence of the other.

Chapter Analysis

This research is grouped into five chapters excluding the General Introduction and the General Conclusion.

Chapter One- Monadologism and its Deterministic Orientation: it argued from the angle of individualism of Leibniz’s monads and inter-subjective mode of social monads with the view that beings are metaphysically constituted. And that, even though Leibniz did not put forward his monadic theory to achieve human solidarity for the reason that perfection has been pre-inputted in the monads at creation, it still raises some concerns because humans are monads with (windows) freewill. It appraised the idea of inter-subjectivity alongside Leibniz’s metaphysics, especially his monadology which portrays strong elements of determinism and individualism. It set the foundation for other successive chapters by offering conceptual clarifications of the basic terms that were applied in this research such as; monadology, metaphysics, solipsism, social monadology, democracy and being.

Chapter Two- The Metaphysics of Communalism and Individualism: this chapter critically evaluated social concepts like communalism and individualism and expressed that communalism, like centripetal forces tends to pull individuals together while individualism like centrifugal forces tends to pull individuals apart. The chapter concluded with the claim that social values have affinity with metaphysical values.

Chapter Three- Aquinas’ Principle of Participation and the Idea of Inter- subjectivity: appraised the idea of inter-subjectivity alongside Leibniz’s metaphysics, especially his monadologism which portrays strong elements of determinism and individualism and stated that it poses some concern for social harmony.

The chapter was concluded by emphasising that the application of Aquinas' Principle of Participation greatly enhances social tolerance. It also argued that the notion of inter-subjectivity is basic for co-existence. This means that its absence in a community of human beings would result in a maladjusted society.

Chapter Four- Leibniz's Monadologism, Inter-subjectivity and the Challenge of Social Order: examined the argument for inter-subjectivity in Aquinas' Principle of Participation against the backdrop of Leibniz's metaphysics. It emphasized the need to go beyond Aquinas as communication and inter-subjectivity do not guarantee social order, hence the need to incorporate solidarity and unity. Solidarity and unity have the tendency to restore social order and minimise crises. Crises or conflicts are not new phenomena on the world stage. Since no individual lives in isolation from the society, it is believed that we all have shared and inter-subjective experiences as advocated in Aquinas' Argument for Community. Every people form a social web with each other and each individual person is a strand in that web. This means that whatever happens to the one no sooner than later affects the other. Crisis in one part of the country if not properly checked has the tendency of spreading to other parts. If a problem is to be resolved, the Principle of Participation requires all individuals to play its role or the problem will remain intractable. The chapter examined the extent to which Leibniz's metaphysics poses a challenge to inter-subjectivity and the quest for social order.

Chapter Five- Beyond Leibniz: Inter-subjectivity and the Challenge of Social Order: looked into the problem of inter-subjectivity in Leibniz's metaphysics especially his principle of monadology through the application of Aquinas' Principle of Participation. There was an attempt to go beyond Leibniz in responding to the problem of the relationship between the metaphysical and the physical domains. This chapter emphasised that the problem remains intractable because Leibniz and other scholars have been looking for a connection which presupposes an in-between which is necessarily different from the elements it brings together while the notion of relationship presupposes a fluidity of the similarities of different states or entities. In this case, the

relationship between the metaphysical and the physical is 'being'. The chapter ended with a statement that the basic prospect of the Principle of Participation is its ability to unite individuals for the resolution of a single problem like social crisis. It noted that the theory emphasises similarities (synthesis) of ideas and de-emphasises differences (anti-thesis). In social crises resolution, Aquinas' Principle of Participation holds that individuals could come together in a collective manner to resolve social issues by focusing on factors which bind a people together. This means that all individuals from all ethnic, religious or political groups must shelve their differences, co-operate, form a chain and act like a single complete system for the realization of social order.

Contribution to Knowledge

The study contributed to the volume of extant literature on social interactivism through the application of the 'Principle of Participation' in the following ways; by establishing that social values have affinity with metaphysical values. By emphasising that the application of Aquinas' Principle of Participation greatly enhances social tolerance as inter-subjectivity is necessary for peaceful coexistence. In addition, by emphasising the relationship between the metaphysical and the physical domains and deemphasising the notion of connection which is not possible to establish between entities from different realities. The end result of this research would come in handy to individuals and researchers in peace and conflict resolution, metaphysics as well as students in social philosophy.

CHAPTER ONE

MONADOLOGISM AND ITS DETERMINISTIC ORIENTATION

Introduction

In one of Leibniz's letters to Remond in the 'Philosophical Papers and Letters' translated and edited by Leroy Loemker, Leibniz there explains his approach to philosophy, and offers a very brief account of his philosophical development and his view of the 'monads' as the only true substances. He stated thus;

I have tried to uncover and unite the truth buried and scattered in the opinions of different philosophical sects, and I believe I have added something of my own to take a few steps forward. The circumstances of my studies, from my earliest youth, have given me some facility in this. I learned Aristotle as a lad, and even the Scholastics did not put me off; I am not at all regretful of this even now. But at that time Plato too, and Plotinus, gave me some satisfaction, not to mention other ancient thinkers whom I consulted later. After leaving the trivial schools, I fell upon the moderns, and I remember at the age of fifteen taking a walk by myself in a grove on the outskirts of Leipzig, called the Rosental, in order to deliberate about whether I should retain substantial forms. Mechanism finally prevailed and led me to apply myself to mathematics. It is true that I did not enter into its depths until after I had conversed with Mr Huygens in Paris. But when I looked for the ultimate reasons for mechanism, and for the laws of motion themselves, I was very surprised to see that it was impossible to find them in mathematics, and that I should have to return to metaphysics. This is what led me back to entelechies, and from the material to the formal, and ultimately brought me to understand, after a number of corrections and improvements to my notions, that monads, or simple substances, are the only true substances, and that material things are only phenomena, albeit well-founded and well-connected.¹

¹ Leibniz, G. W. 1969. *Philosophical papers and letters*. Trans. and ed. L. Loemker. 2nd edn. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 654-5

The whole universe, bodies as well as minds, are monads in Leibniz's conception. What this means is that they are simple substances, each of which is by the Creator endowed with certain active and perceptive powers. "The Monads have no windows through which anything could come in or go out. Accidents cannot separate themselves from substances nor go about outside of them, as the 'sensible species' of the Scholastics used to do. Thus, neither substance nor accident can come into a Monad from outside."² A monad is an active substance, simple, without parts or figure, which has within itself the power to produce all the changes it undergoes from the beginning of its existence to eternity. The changes which the monad undergoes, of what kind whatsoever, though they may seem to us the effect of causes operating from without, yet they are only the gradual and successive evolutions of its own internal powers, which would have produced all the same changes and motions, even though there had been no other beings in the universe.³ The existence of a monad is deterministic, solitary, solipsistic and raises some concerns for an understanding of beings like humans who are social monads and exhibit freewill. This is the reason why most philosophers according to Wildon Carr,

...who have given their attention to the theory of a monadic universe are scared by a certain non-possibility which seems to confront us in the initial presentation of the doctrine. On what conceivable principle, they ask, can 'windowless,' non-interacting monads be compounded? Have you not, they say, in characterising your simple-substance unit negated the interrelatedness of the monads? Is not the monad by its definition a solipsistic activity; how, then, can it enter into and become part of a community?⁴

² Leibniz, G. W. 1714. *The monadology*. Trans. Robert Latta. 2

³ Daniel, S. 1975. Blake's monadology: the universe of perspectives. *Mosaic: An Interdisciplinary Critical Journal* 8.2: 84. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24776978>

⁴ Wildon, H. C. 1926. The reform of the Leibnizian monadology. *The Journal of Philosophy* 23.3: 75. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2014378>.

The objection of an idealist like Leibniz to this criticism is that interrelatedness of monads is an ideal relation which does not depend on physical interaction.

The objective of this chapter is to appraise the idea of inter-subjectivity alongside Leibniz's metaphysics, especially his monadology which portrays strong elements of determinism and individualism. It will set the foundation for other successive chapters by offering conceptual clarifications of the basic terms that will be applied in this research such as; monadology, metaphysics, solipsism, social monadology, democracy and Being. It will attempt to draw a relationship between metaphysics and the social with the view that the metaphysical have social significance. The chapter will begin with a section that offers clarification for the notion of monadology which is at the core of Leibniz's metaphysics with the intention of expressing that Leibniz's description of the monads as windowless logically coheres with his conception of substance. The second section will focus on monadic solipsism which expresses the individuality of the monads with the implication that reality only exists in the self and that there can never be an existence external to the self. This opinion will be contrasted with the concept of social monadology in the next section after which other sections will consider the metaphysical basis of democracy, knowledge and being.

On Monadologism

Leibniz's monadology sets forth a logically consistent theory of the composition or constitution of a universe in which every constituent is an active subject of experience living its own life and in living its own life subserving the universal life, the life of the universe. The 'Monadology' identifies inconsistency and self-contradiction in the idea that dead, inert, material atoms or mass-units are or can be constituents of a universe. There is nothing dead, nothing purely inert in the universe. To be absolutely dead is not to be. The Democritean concept of the atoms and the void is rejected because mathematically the atom is not a unit, but divisible to infinity, and physically it is not simple. The reals are monads, simple substances, self-centered subjects of experience, whose activity consists in perception, and whose perceptions are the apprehension of the

whole universe, limited in the degree of clearness or obscurity, because the monads are created and therefore finite, and qualified by their individual standpoints.⁵

Leibniz proposes a world composed solely of metaphysical beings which he refers to as the monads. These monads, based on their behaviours as solipsistic beings can best be described as beings-in-the-world and not as beings-with-others. This is so because in Leibniz's own view, the monads are windowless and self-actuating, they possess independent existence and are not causally related to each other. Therefore, the coherent existence they enjoy is ascribable to a supreme agent who pre-established it. Leibniz's description of the monads can be better understood from his conception of substance. He views substance in a clearly different way from the materialists who propose that a substance is concrete, tangible, extended; it is an aggregate and therefore divisible. As far as Leibniz is concerned, he being an idealist is of the opinion that real substances are simple, invisible, not extended, not made up of aggregates, they are not divisible into parts and therefore cannot go out of existence. These indivisible and eternal substances are the monads which he describes as the true atoms of nature.

Leibniz believes that ontological issues about existence and the constituents of reality are vital for metaphysics and that everything is composed of or reducible to simple substances. A substance, he says, is essentially an active, genuine unity endowed with perception and appetite and it is the nature of an individual substance to have Complete Individual Concept (CIC). That is, a substance is a subject that contains within it all the properties of the predicate. Therefore, only beings endowed with true unity and capable of action can be called substances. In line with this, all living bodies have a dominant entelechy which in the animal, is the soul but the limbs of this living body are full of other living beings each of which also has its entelechy, dominant monad or

⁵ Wildon, H. C. 1926. The reform of the Leibnizian monadology. *The Journal of Philosophy* 23.3: 72. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2014378>.

monas monadum.⁶ As the entire solar system is a monad made up of other monads like the Planets with the Sun as the dominant monad, entelechy or monas monadum, so is the human person a monad made up of other monadic parts of the body but with the soul as the dominant monad or monas monadum.

Leibniz proposes four types of monads such as; humans, animals, plants and matter which all have perceptions in the sense that they have internal properties that express external relations. The first three have substantial forms, and thus, appetition, the first two have memory, but only the first has reason. Despite that these basic constituents have no causal relations to one another, they experience coherent lives due to a pre-established harmony instilled in them by God at their creation. This leads each of them to a programmed existence corresponding to the evolution of each monad.⁷ This evolution is expressed in the doctrine of pre-established harmony which Leibniz also attempted to use to address the Cartesian problem of mind-body interaction.

Leibniz holds that each monad which is windowless behaves in accordance with its own created purpose but their purposes are synchronised or orchestrated in a harmonious manner that was pre-established by God. Just as the Sun may appear to be in motion when indeed, it does not move, so do the monads appear to interact when indeed, they do not interact. In Leibniz's opinion, there could be no causal interaction between the mental and physical domains any more than between two corporeal objects. Thus, they do not interact.⁸ Monads, he opines are;

Living mirrors of the universe, each representing all other monads from a distinct and individual point of view. God perceives everything with equal clarity, and without any point of view; whereas created monads are limited by their perspectival point. The harmony of the total system

⁶ Garber, D. 2009. *Leibniz: body, substance, monad*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 27.

⁷ Gale, R. M. 2002. *The blackwell guide to metaphysics*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 3.

⁸ Sweet, W. 2004. *Approaches to metaphysics*. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 76.

consists in the fact that the perceptions of each individual monad interlock to form a single, consistent view of the universe as perceived by God.⁹

Therefore, bodies act as if there were no souls and souls act as if there were no bodies and yet, both body and soul act as if the one was influencing the other.

Leibniz is of the view that everything mirrors the entire world in which it exists, saying that, “the action of one finite substance on another consists only in the increase of the degree of expression together with the diminution of the expression of the other, insofar as God requires them to accommodate themselves to one another.”¹⁰

The mind and body interaction and the monads mirroring each other can be compared to the working of two different clocks that are in perfect harmony. Empirically, for this to happen, there ought to be a physical connectivity between the two clocks as Descartes thought should be the connection between the mind and the body which he never found. But Leibniz opined that the synergy that exists between the two clocks or the mind and the body is as a result of the harmony pre-established between all substances. Souls act according to the laws of final causes, through appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or of motion and are in harmony with each other.¹¹ One important question to ask here is, who is the orchestrator of this pre-established harmony? For Leibniz, the answer is God. It is clear then that monadologism as an individualistic, independent and deterministic philosophy presents a world of solipsism which denies the possibility of inter-subjective relationship.

⁹ Bunnin, N. & Tsui-James, E. P. 2003. *The blackwell companion to philosophy*. U.K: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 666.

¹⁰ Craig, E. Ed. 2005. *The shorter routledge encyclopedia of philosophy*. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. 558.

¹¹ Craig, E. Ed. 2005. *The shorter routledge encyclopedia of philosophy*. 559.

On Monadic Solipsism

Etymologically, the word solipsism originated from the Latin words ‘solus’ which means ‘alone’, and ‘ipse’, which means ‘self’. Collectively, they mean ‘the self alone or the self on its own’.¹² Gorgias’ extreme scepticism is identified as one of the earliest solipsism when he claimed that, nothing exists, even if something exists, nothing can be known about it and even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it cannot be communicated to others. Solipsism therefore, can be described as the claim that reality only exists in the self and that there can never be an existence external to the self. The individual mind is the primary source of knowledge and nothing exists in the world unless one is aware of it.

The three major variants of solipsism are; Metaphysical Solipsism which views the individual as the only source of reality whereby the external world, or people or objects have no existence of their own. Epistemological Solipsism which maintains that only the mental state of the observer is the true approximation of reality, and the external world need not to be contemplated upon because it does not exist in the first instance and Methodological Solipsism which puts forward that the individual self and mental processes are the only launching pads of reality, and that nothing can exist beyond the consciousness.¹³

Transcendental phenomenology is seen as being unable to grasp the real world and being instead caught in the mental life of an individual. In Minna-Kerttu Vienola’s reading of Dreyfus’s criticisms of Husserl’s Phenomenology, he posits that for Husserl, all reference is made possible only by mental activity. Thus, Husserl’s method of

¹² Wiktionary contributors. 2020.Solipsism. *Wiktionary, The Free Dictionary*. Retrieved: 11 March 2021. <https://en.wiktionary.org/w/index.php?title=solipsism&oldid=59866404>

¹³ Sylva Waribugo & Continue Anddison Eketu. 2016. Solipsism in social inquiry: revisiting a redundant paradigm *International Journal of Advanced Academic Research / Social & Management Sciences* 2. 4: 20. Retrieved May 8, 2018, from www.ijaar.org

reduction reveals merely abstract mental structures in which intentionality is a complex of representational content. Since reduction is a means for studying intentionality, it is therefore an investigation of the representational content in one's mind. This goes to show that meaning is in the world rather than in one's mind.

The first step of reduction which is the phenomenological epoche involves the bracketing of natural assumptions about the existence of objects. It is an act of totally excluding the entire objective existence of the world which leaves a subject merely with her own pure experience. This is why Husserl's reduction is criticised for leaning towards epistemological solipsism where one cannot be certain of anything else than one's own subjective experiences. After bracketing all natural assumptions, that is, after not positing or denying the existence of anything that is not found in pure experience, there remains nothing that would hinder transcendental-phenomenological investigation from taking illusion to be reality or vice versa.¹⁴

Solipsism, when conceived with greater generality covers the doctrine that the whole of reality has single owner and is relative to a single experient, and that beyond such an experient nothing further need be assumed, without implying that I am the only 'I' that owns the universe. Any 'I' will do. Any 'I' that thinks it is all that is, is a solipsist. And solipsism will be true if any one of the many 'I's' that are, or maybe, solipsists is right, and really is all that is. Provided of course he knows it.¹⁵

Wittgenstein believes that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. That the self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension. Here it is observed that Wittgenstein acknowledges the truth in solipsism as against certain forms of realism in holding that we cannot know the world independently

¹⁴ Minna-Kerttu Vienola. 2017. *Reduction and solipsism: edmund husserl's method of reduction and solipsism critique presented against it*. University of Jyväskylä: Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy. 10.

¹⁵ Schiller, F.C.S. 1906. Is absolute idealism solipsistic? *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 3. 4: 86. Retrieved May 9, 2018, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2012145>

of the human perspective, independent of how it appears in language or experience. Where the solipsist is confused is in supposing that he must therefore deny the reality of the world. The reality of the world shows itself in language and experience. Every time we speak we acknowledge the reality of the world. For no language is conceivable which does not represent this world.¹⁶

The humanist's refutation of Solipsism is such that he chooses to believe in the existence of others. He believes this not so much for the sentimental reason that he does not want to be alone in the universe, but because he does not want to regard himself as the author of his whole experience. He will not take the responsibility of being all there is in a world such as is now provided. He does not desire to be any or all of the other minds, nor the totality of reality. He sees that he cannot be the Absolute without being also the Devil, and so he prefers to be neither.¹⁷

Elements of solipsism is also found to be implied in the doctrine of foundationalism which requires that before a belief can count as knowledge it must be incorrigible, infallible, certain, or such as could not turn out to be false. The primary case of beliefs which might satisfy this criterion are beliefs about oneself, more specifically beliefs about one's inner or psychological states. These, accordingly, would be the foundations. If there are foundations, there is no reduction of the rest of our supposed knowledge to them hence, a form of solipsism. All that one can know about are one's own inner or psychological states if there are foundations must follow from the rest of our beliefs which satisfy the foundational criteria. Why cannot there be inductive support for all those beliefs? Foundationalism on this view would require that some beliefs be certain but not all. The rest of our beliefs do have inductive support, and this implies fallibility. But it seems that if those beliefs count as knowledge, there would be no need

¹⁶ Mounce, H.O. 1997. Philosophy, solipsism and thought. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 47. 186:12. Retrieved May 9, 2018, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2956468>

¹⁷ Schiller, F.C.S.1909. Solipsism. *Mind, New Series* 18. 70: 180. Retrieved May 9, 2018, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2248518>

for foundations in the first place; and if one is committed to infallibility for there to be knowledge, then those beliefs cannot count as knowledge.¹⁸

The notion of the monads being solipsistic is criticised based on the thoughts that one has no direct awareness of the mental states of others, and a more radical, argument is that one is unable even to form any concept of a state of consciousness that is not one's own. This approach is discussed by Wittgenstein who believes that we should abandon the natural and mistaken conception of a state of consciousness which leads us into solipsism. This is why it is believed that solipsists wrongly think they can ascribe such states to themselves and then consider the question whether other human bodies have associated mental states as well.¹⁹

The monad is the personal I which designates the full experience of the self in all its concreteness, that is, the self in its full concretion. A monad bears in itself the whole 'me', that is, everything that falls under the unified situation of 'I think' or 'I intuit'. This level of the ego comes to the fore just by uncovering an intentional object and then turning towards the intentional subjectivity itself. According to Moran, the monad refers to concrete ego or the person as an individual, a living concrete unity, established over time as a life with its own temporal field and capacity for self-development. Thus, monad does not refer only to the person merely in his or her present states, but involves the ways in which she or he has evolved intentionally, including various sedimented layers of intentionality. The term monad designates its being an experienced unity which can neither begin nor end in any other way than all at once; that is to say, a monad cannot begin except by creation, nor end except by annihilation; whereas that which is compounded, begins and ends by parts.²⁰

¹⁸ Mark Leon. 1987. Solipsism regained. *Analysis* 47. 2:116. Retrieved May 9, 2018, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328869>

¹⁹ Craig Edward. Solipsism. *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

²⁰ Leibniz, G. W. and Hedge, F. H. 1867. The monadology. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. 1.3: 6.

The Concept of Social Monadology

The idea of social monads which in other words refers to social beings is better understood within the concept of 'being' itself. The question of being had lingered from ancient philosophical epochs with Plato thinking of it as a transcendent reality within humans and Immanuel Kant later dismissing it as an impossible venture because being-in-itself in his own opinion is forever inaccessible to the human mind. This concept was reawakened by Heidegger who in his 'Being and Time', opined that man is not just a being-in-the-world but also a being-with-others. He was of the view that "only man can raise the question about his being or about being itself."²¹ Humans therefore are the only beings for whom the question of being is important. He emphasised that an understanding of 'being' is necessary for authentic existence which existentially addresses the challenges associated with being-with-others.²²

To affirm humans as beings-in-the-world and as beings-with-others at the same time presupposes inter-subjectivity and for there to be harmony and authentic existence in this form of relationship, there must be constant reconciliation of 'the self' with 'the other'.²³ Social monads or social beings experience a communal relationship and a community is understandably an aggregate made up of parts. It is a situation where all the parts work in harmony towards achieving a common objective. In a community of social beings, beings interact and this interaction sustains the universe. All beings in this category are bound together in the sense that whatever affects the one correspondingly affects the others within the community.

²¹ Stumpf, S. E. 1971. *Philosophy, history & problems*. 4ed. New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company. 497.

²² Unah, J. 1996. *Heidegger's existentialism: an essay on applied ontology*. Lagos: Panaf Publishing Inc. 60.

²³ Oyeshile, O. A. 2011. *Reconciling the self with the other*. Ibadan: Hope Publication. 7.

The basic elements in a communal society are co-operation, coexistence, togetherness and inter-subjectivity. This suggests that all beings within such a relationship are directly or indirectly connected to every other being else. That is, they are one despite the differences that may exist among them. This relationship shows that beings, humans in this case though egoistic, are capable of being altruistic or other-centered.²⁴ The belief that humans are necessarily beings-with-others is deeply rooted in some cultures. It is believed that humans need other humans to be truly human and an individual can only be a person with the aid of other persons in the community. This implies that the source of an individual's humanness is tied to others, in such a way that they realise this fact with internal assurance. That is, in the absence of others, no grounds exist for a claim regarding one's own standing as a person.²⁵ Therefore, to be is to be with others.

Social monads or beings are continually engaged in transactions with one another. This is because, in a community, a combination of individual interests makes up communal will and where the will of an individual conflicts with the general will, the general will, takes preeminence. The behaviour of an individual person affects their family and friends, and vice versa. Similarly, families affect communities and communities affect families, and so on. A mother, for example, experiences certain family pressures, has thoughts and feelings about these pressures, and responds to the original source of stress in what she says and does to her family and friends. This reaction is also capable of been extended from the family to the entire society. Since everything is connected with every other thing else, it is impossible for a major change to occur in one area without having some noticeable impact in other areas which impinge upon it. Consider a family in which the parents have recently separated and are moving toward divorce. One can expect the marital separation to have an impact on the children

²⁴ Midgley G. 2000. *System intervention: philosophy, methodology, and practice*. Kluwer Academic.128-129.

²⁵ Menkiti, I. A. 2004. On the normative conception of a person. In Kwasi Wiredu Ed. A *Companion to African philosophy*. USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 324.

while the children extend it to their peers in school and this could go on and on to affect the larger society.

This is why Leopold Senghor is of the view that “the whole universe is a network of life forces.”²⁶ For this reason, beings go out of themselves to interact with others. When this happens there is a sharing or a communication of vital energies one to another benevolently. Aquinas opined that when beings interact, they enhance or complete the being of others and they are as well enhanced or completed in the process. This communal interaction of social beings he believes sustains the universe and that it is the initiative of God to make it so since, it is the very nature of God to be self-communicative love. Interaction of beings could lead either to a strengthening or to a weakening of force. In other words, some beings act malevolently. Rather than simply communicating their vital energies (forces) as in the case of fire lighting other things and yet remains the same, is not affected, these malevolent forces extract the forces of their victims leading to a diminution.

Since a community is an aggregate of parts where all the parts are harmoniously connected with each other towards achieving a common objective, it bears a good relationship with Thomas Aquinas view of the life of beings, where exchange, co-operation, co-existence, togetherness and inter-subjectivity are the core values. These values stand opposed to the principles of Leibniz’s monadologism which encourages individualism, independence and self-sufficiency.

Guzel Saykina is of the opinion that metaphysics creates a purely human connection, a relationship in which each person is irreplaceable and invaluable. Through metaphysical event, which in the ultimate sense draws ‘me’ to an ‘Other’, I perceive the nature of the social; while through physical, institutional object-mediated relationships I can perceive only the objectified (distanced from me) form of social relationships, but not their human essence. For this reason, the metaphysical act of a person’s birth is not only an existential event; it highlights the truth about the meaning of togetherness.

²⁶ Senghor. L. S. 1966. Negritude. *Optima* 16.8: 4.

Therefore, metaphysics of the social asserts the primacy of person-to-person relationships before all other types of physical or institutional relationships. It constitutes the essence of other relationships as reciprocity. The connection of one person to another is not one of cause-and-effect, but one of being, because of which metaphysical human togetherness appears existential. Metaphysics creates a special kind of social relationships that produce, in Semen Frank's terminology, 'an inner stratum of society' characterised not by a random, mechanistic combination of people in society but in the super-temporal unity of the 'we,' achieved through spiritual and personal means of connection through transcendental values, the sphere of the Absolute. Society's inner layer is founded on an a priori sense of trust, which is metaphysical in nature.²⁷

Living in a society is one of the important behaviours of human beings and this is in keeping with Aristotle's idea that "to live alone one must be either a beast or a god,"²⁸ since human beings are neither beasts nor gods, they necessarily live in societies. But for them to enjoy any form of inter-subjective life certain norms or contract had to be in place or there would be chaos which according to Thomas Hobbes would make "the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."²⁹

Since social monads interact, it is therefore impossible to rule out social conflicts as one would when dealing with Leibniz's idea of monads. These conflicts are usually as a result of conflicting opinions originating from freedom of the will. The role of the ego in demonstrating social inequality, injustice, and intolerance towards others is also not negligible. These social vices are not unconnected to the attractions of the individualism and self-sufficiency of Leibniz's monadologism whose individualistic ethics places

²⁷ Guzel, K. Saykina. 2015. The social potential of human metaphysics: human metaphysics as anthroposociodicy. *Russian Studies in Philosophy* 53:3, 247

²⁸ Flynn, T. 2006. *Existentialism: a very short introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press. 25.

²⁹ Hobbes, T. 2002. *Leviathan*. Edward White & David Widger. ed. Canada: Green Dragon. 58. <http://www.gutenberg.org/3/2/0/3207/>. Retrieved; 4th April, 2012.

emphasis on self-interest and self-sufficiency to the detriment of the society. This poses great threat to inter-subjectivity and the survival of beings in a social world.

Ojomo's description of African communal life as an example of the relationship between individualism and communalism can by extension be associated with the relationship between Leibniz's monads and social monads. Ojomo lamented that, Africa has a complex history of valuable heritages as well as multifaceted challenges in her cultural-politico evolution. He noted that, since primordial times, African people have had a humane and peaceful society and environment informed by a sound ethics. But owing to some internal dynamics in the people's culture and some other external constraints and forces from the culture of individualism, African states are now experiencing acute developmental challenges which have impacted negatively on their environment and indeed their social relations.³⁰ The democratic system is not new to Africans as they already have it in their cultural practice. For instance, it is applied when settling disputes.

The Metaphysical Basis of Democracy

Democracy which is one of the social institutions which advocates for equal rights of people for the promotion of order in the society is discovered to have its foundation in metaphysics. Democracy is not solely a political organisation, but rather a social relationship which involves a conscious striving on the part of each member for the advancement of the common welfare. It is essentially a mode of associated living, for it exists in the lives and the living of its members and not apart or above them in some form of political organisation. Democracy is a cooperative society rather than a competitive one. It is a society in which individuals are cooperating with one another rather than competing against one another. It is a society in which individuals are striving to aid

³⁰ Ojomo, P. A. 2011. Environmental ethics: an African understanding. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*. 4.3:102.

rather than to exploit. It is a society where each individual is aware of the existence of the other in an inter-subjective manner.³¹

The word democracy originated from Greek and it is made up of two other words ‘demos’, meaning ‘People’ and ‘kratein’ meaning ‘to govern or to rule’. Democracy can then be literally translated to mean; Government of the People or Government of the Majority. Democracy, as a State form, is to be distinguished from monarchy, aristocracy and dictatorship. The most common definition of democracy was given by Abraham Lincoln as, ‘the government of the people, by the people and for the people’. To put it in another way we can say that a government comes from the people; it is exercised by the people, and for the purpose of the people’s own interests.³² Etymologically therefore, democracy is the rule of the people.

Democracy has come to be regarded as that form of government which “bestows an aura of legitimacy on modern political life: laws, rules and policies appear justified when they are democratic”.³³ Democracy was instituted as a reaction against the absolute monarchy of the Kings who by virtue of their position as divine authorities imposed their personal sentiment on the people they governed. According to Murray Rothbard “the concept of parliamentary democracy began as a popular check upon absolute monarchical rule.”³⁴ It is noticed that in a democratic system, high premium is place on the importance of civic virtue and there is desire for a balance of interest among citizens which is not the case in the authoritarian forms of government. So, democracy is generally conceived as the government of all people by all people who have equal representation in government.

³¹ Hollingshead, A. D. 1941. *Guidance in democratic living*. New York: D. Appleton-Century. 17-18.

³² Paula Becker and Jean-Aime A. Raveloson. *What is democracy* 2008. Germany: KMF-CNOE & NOVA STELLA. 4

³³ Held, D. 1995. *Democracy and the global order*. U.K: Polity Press. 3.

³⁴ Rothbard, M.N. 2009. *Anatomy of the state*. Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute. 30.

Democracy is a method of preventing those who govern from permanently appropriating power for their own ends. Those exercising power are subject to procedures which enable others to question or replace them. The distribution of power in democratic systems tends to reflect the outcomes of political contests framed by permanent decision-making. Conflict and compromise are therefore institutionalised and power becomes secular and disembodied. It is not permanently consubstantial with any particular individual or group such as a monarch for instance, but is exercised instead by flesh-and-blood mortals who are subject to removal and are accountable to others, in accordance with the rules of the democratic game.³⁵

Deliberation which is key to the democratic system is in fact, what makes the system inter-subjective. This shows that democracy is more than just electing representatives. It is concerned with questions relating to the organisation of institutions like schools, workplaces and families. One mistake of classical democratic theory is the idea that democracies are only genuinely democratic on Election Day itself. Surely, democracies are about more than the act of voting alone.

The issues that impact election results change from one election to the next and the relative importance of these issues is itself one product of deliberations about politics amongst citizens. Moreover, citizens deliberate about more than how they might vote on Election Day, they also deliberate about the best means of educating their children or lending support to their families. As citizens engage largely with one another, their representatives also engage with one another. These two levels of deliberation are not entirely separate and each informs the other. For example, debates held in either Congress or Parliament are not merely deliberations between political leaders, but deliberations which are often informed by public opinion and other factors.³⁶

³⁵ Norberto Bobbio.1989. *Democracy and dictatorship: the nature and limits of state power*. P. Kennealy. Trans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. x.

³⁶ Thom Brooks. 2009. A critique of pragmatism and deliberative democracy *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 45. 1: 51. Retrieved May 9, 2018, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/tra.2009.45.1.50>

From the above analysis, democracy can be seen as a social construct which in the final analysis has its basis in metaphysics. This is so because democracy is founded on the notion of inalienable rights. This means that without the recognition of human rights, there can be no democracy. These rights are described as inalienable because they are not being given or transferred to anyone; rather, we have them a priori. We have them essentially before coming into existence. A simpler approach to appreciating the metaphysics of the social is to consider the very foundation of knowledge itself.

The Metaphysical basis of Knowledge and Science

We approach the domain of metaphysics when we inquire about the real things and go beyond physics. Although the word ‘metaphysics’ comes from the title of Aristotle’s book known by that name, Aristotle did not call what he does in it ‘metaphysics’ but ‘first philosophy’. The first, physics, considers moving bodies. The second, geometry or mathematics, considers bodies but not as they move. The third considers the source of all motion, which is not itself a body and is unmoved. In Aristotle’s opinion, divine science is the most noble, because God is thought to be the cause of all things. If the only real things were material, physics would be first philosophy. Many scientists now recognise that not everything is explained by science. Science raises questions that it cannot itself answer. Thus, physics leads to metaphysics as we have to go beyond physics to answer some of its questions.³⁷

Science is understood as a way of investigating and knowing reality. It searches for truth about reality in an organised and systematic manner in an attempt to gain understanding of the universe and to explain occurrences in our surroundings. Its major interest is to accumulate knowledge about the world and not about reality beyond the physical. However, the irony is that, the knowledge which science seeks has its foundation in reality beyond the physical.

³⁷ Francis J. Selman. 2000. The recovery of metaphysics. *New Blackfriars* 81: 955. p.377 Retrieved April 25, 2018. From <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43250479>

If one takes the general idea of knowledge for instance, it is worthy of note that knowledge in the epistemic sense is necessary for social interactions because one needs to know in order to communicate. It is also admissible that all forms of knowledge are grounded in metaphysics. This is because the justifications for knowledge claims cannot be possible without making recourse to their metaphysical foundations.

The metaphysics of physicalism for instance is shown in the following induction with the assertion that, ‘not T1 and not T2 ... and not T ∞ ’, where T1, T2, ... T ∞ are infinitely many disunified rivals to accepted physical theories. Physicalism cannot be empirically verified, because this would require that all of T1, T2, ... T ∞ are falsified, but as there are infinitely many of these theories, each requiring a different falsifying experiment, this can-not be done. Equally, physicalism cannot be falsified, as this requires the verification of at least one of T1, or T2, ... or T ∞ , which cannot be done, as physical theories cannot be verified empirically. Hence physicalism, being neither empirically verifiable nor falsifiable, is metaphysical.³⁸

The internalist-externalist debate shows that justification of knowledge claims can either be internal (intuitive) or external (experiential). Internalism and externalism may not be theories of justification per se but they are ways of further buttressing the various theories of justification. This is why the theories of justification are each traceable to either internalism or externalism.

Foundationalism employs the internalist’s mode of justification as it relies on basic beliefs which are internally justified by the knower. For example, the Cartesian foundationalism began with doubting and ended with the discovery that to doubt is to think. He arrived at the certainty of knowledge with the basic foundation that man is a thinking being and thought is internal to the cognizer.

³⁸ Nicholas Maxwell. 2017. *Karl Popper, science and enlightenment*. Los Angeles : UCL Press. 147. Retrieved April 25, 2018. from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1vxm8p6.10>

Coherentism on the other hand falls within the internalists and the externalist modes of justification. The coherentist could be an internalist when he seeks justification from within his cognitive self. A coherentist argument in favour of internalism focuses on how well internalism can handle cases of justified and unjustified beliefs.

Imagine that Jim and George each hear a bit of testimony from Tracy. Tracy is a very reliable person, Jim knows about Tracy's good track record, but George does not. As such, Jim is more justified in believing what Tracy says. The mental difference of memories regarding Tracy's honesty, that Jim has and George lacks, account for the justificatory difference here. Imagine that Jim and George both see on the news that it is raining today. In addition to watching the weather, Jim looks outside and sees the rain falling. Internalism can explain why Jim is more justified in his belief than George is because of a mental difference – Jim has perceived the rain falling.³⁹

The internalists and externalist debate in epistemology regarding justification centers on the question of what states, properties, and events can contribute the kind of justification necessary for knowledge. It is a contest for which position produces a more reliable source of justification of knowledge claims. The debate makes a contrast on what can confer justification or what can convert mere true belief into knowledge.⁴⁰

For the internalists, the content of our consciousness or mental states are very important. They are that to which one has access by introspection or reflection, where introspection can be simply focusing on what is in consciousness and reflection can be as brief as considering a proposition. To have internal access to something is either to have it in consciousness or to be able, through self-consciousness or at least by reflection, whether introspective or directed outward toward an abstract subject matter, to become

³⁹ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Internalism and externalism in epistemology. www.think/internalismexternalism-debate.html

⁴⁰ Alston W. P. 1998. Internalism and externalism in epistemology. L. M Alcoff. ed. *Epistemology the Big Question*. U.S.A: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 45.

aware of it, in the phenomenal sense that it is in one's consciousness.⁴¹ So, internalism relies on the content of the subject's introspection.

Internalism has been described in different ways, but it is basically the claim that all the factors that justify beliefs are internal to the subject and can be understood as mentalism, which is the claim that the justificatory status of a person's beliefs strongly supervenes on that person's mental states, events, and conditions. It is understood therefore, to include the claim that justifiers must be accessible to the subject. In other words, it is a claim that only mental factors determine justification. So, Foundationalism and Coherentism are examples of internalist theories of justification.

Foundationalism as a theory of justification holds that a belief is justified if it is derived from some basic beliefs called foundations. It points out that some beliefs are self-evidently justified, absolutely incorrigible and therefore need no further justifications.⁴² Coherentism on the other hand is the view that a statement is true if there is coherence or agreement between the statement and a systematic body of statements already known to be true.⁴³ Laurence Bonjour stated that "beliefs are justified by virtue of their coherence with each other"⁴⁴ and Ernest Sosa is of the view that a belief is justified if and only if it has a place within a system of beliefs that is coherent and comprehensive.⁴⁵ This shows that coherentism has affinity with foundationalism,

⁴¹ Audi, R. 2003. *Epistemology A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge*. New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. 238.

⁴² Owolabi, K. A. *Foundationalism, coherentism: two misconceptions of knowledge and its justification*. 22.

⁴³ Omoregbe, J. I. 1998. *Epistemology: asystematic and historical study*. Lagos: Joja Publishing Ltd. 43.

⁴⁴ Huemer, M. ed. 2002. *Epistemology: contemporary readings*. London and New York: Routledge. 370.

⁴⁵ Sosa, E. 1998. The raft and the pyramid: coherence versus foundations, in the theory of knowledge. L.M Alcoff. ed. *Epistemology the Big Question*. USA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 200.

which asserts that all beliefs have a justificatory structure. This is understandable because just like foundationalism which is metaphysically self-evident, for ideas to cohere and therefore serve as justificatory factors, each idea must have its own foundation which is also metaphysically self-evident. Thus in persistently rejecting metaphysical claims, science make a persistent metaphysical assumption about the world.⁴⁶ This presupposes that our knowledge about the world is metaphysically based and ultimately, beings in the world must derive their beingness from beyond the physical domains.

The Metaphysical Basis of the Notion of Being

A conceptualisation of being is very important at this point because the agents of Leibniz's monadologism are beings in the same way that social monads are beings. The purpose of this sub-section is to draw a relationship between Leibniz's monads and social monads with an affirmation that the concept of being has its foundation in metaphysics.

Metaphysics is concerned with an understanding of the notion of being, an ultimate reality that exists in and for itself. The concept being can be described both as an animating principle and as an existential category. This dichotomy explains itself in the notion of being as 'life force' and being as 'an entity'. In this dichotomy, the life force animates the entity in such a way that recognition is given to the entity because it is animated. In other words, the entity holds no relevance outside its animation. It is for this reason that idealists like Plato and Leibniz for instance deny the substantiality of bodies and only affirm the monadic being or metaphysical principle in things.

A being constitutes principles which are very necessary for its actual existence but these constitutive principles are not present in the same way in all beings. This is

⁴⁶ Nicholas Maxwell. 2017. *Karl Popper, science and enlightenment*. Los Angeles : UCL Press. 147. Retrieved April 25, 2018. from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1vxm8p6.10>

because the rank or position of a being is determined by the amount of perfection and potentiality that being has in relation to the ultimate and most perfect Being. It is also the case that the closer any being is to the ultimate Being, the more perfect it is and the more force it wields.

Beings are grouped into categories of two where the second category is further grouped into two. The first group is referred to as the self-creating while the second is the created being. God occupies the first class and He is the creator, He is infinite, eternal, He is uncaused and essentially or necessarily existing being. The second category is recognised as belonging to the finite and contingent beings that rely on God for their existence.

It is evident that God is the first efficient cause of all finite beings. This group of finite beings are further categorised into metaphysical and corporeal where angels, divinities or deities (ancestors inclusive) are said to occupy the metaphysical world while human beings (with an exception to the soul), animals, plants, minerals occupy the corporeal world. The soul does not belong to the corporeal world that is why at the death of the body, the soul is believed to return to the metaphysical world. Aquinas believes that “the human soul, unlike the souls of plants and beasts, is subsistent: that it continues to exist after separating from the body in death.”⁴⁷

This being is convertible to a thing which is divided into categories. Placide Tempels holds that “all being is force... God, men, living and the departed, animals, plants, minerals”⁴⁸ are all forces and in Leibnize’s conception, they are all monads. To be endued with force means to be endued with life, the Bantu according to Tempels say that, “We never speak of the ‘force of life’ because with us life and force are one and the same thing.”⁴⁹ In other words, they never speak of the being of life because life and

⁴⁷ Eleonore, S. 2003. *Aquinas*. London: Routledge, Tailor & Francis Group. 16.

⁴⁸ Tempels, P. 1959. *Bantu philosophy*. Trans. Rev. Colin King. Paris: Presence Africaine. 36.

⁴⁹ Tempels, P. 1959. *Bantu philosophy*. 33.

being are one and the same thing. Force or being is used both in the universal and particular sense, for example, humans are beings in the same manner as this particular human say- Akin is a being. Birds are beings in the same manner as different species of bird are beings. The trees in the same way as a particular mango tree, animal- a goat as examples are beings. For the Bantu just like Aquinas therefore, being or force is a simple, metaphysical, and analogous notion. It is applied to whatever possesses existence (vital force) regardless of its nature. Being refers also to the metaphysical content of a concrete, existing stuff in reality.

Parmenides is of the opinion that being does not change, that being is one, eternal and unchanging which means that whatever changes is not being. This is the reason Leibniz describes the monad as windowless and self-actuating. Aquinas could be interpreted as saying that no being in the universe exists by chance and without purpose. He believes that beings exist in order for them to perfect the universe. So, a departure from the purpose of any being leads to chaos in the universe. This is why matter or bodies will continue to occupy their places at the metaphysical space.

Al-Razi, adopts Plato's conception of the soul and affirms the survival and self-subsistence of the soul. He believes that all human beings have three souls; the first is the vegetative, incremental, and sensually desiring soul, located in the liver, the second is the irascible or animal soul, located in the heart, the third is the rational (al-natiqa) or divine soul (al-'ila-Kiya), located in the brain. survives death and that this soul, which is self-subsisting, may go through a series of transmigrations before reaching its complete liberation from the body and its return to its own world, the world of the cosmic soul.⁵⁰

When matter decomposes or disintegrates, it does not go out of existence. whatever comes into existence does not go out of existence otherwise, it was never in existence. This is the reason for the eternity of the soul as held by Plato and the eternity of monads as held by Leibniz. With this, the rejection of the substantiality and eternity of

⁵⁰ Thrbse-Anne Druart. Al-Razi's conception of the soul: psychological background to his ethics. *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5. 247

matter by Plato and Leibniz is therefore questionable. Matter, once in existence, it will be absurd to consider it to go out of existence at any point in time. The only time if at all matter can go out of existence is the time Leibniz's monads or souls can go out of existence. And according to Leibniz, this can only happen by annihilation or total dissolution of the universe by God. Thus, "no dissolution is to be feared for them, and a simple substance cannot perish naturally in any conceivable manner. For the same reason, no simple substance can come into being naturally, since it cannot be formed by composition. Thus, it may be maintained that monads cannot begin or end otherwise than instantaneously, that is, they can begin only by creation and end only by annihilation; while what is complete begins and ends through and in parts."⁵¹

According to Wildon Carr, "there is nothing dead, nothing absolutely inert in the universe. To be absolutely dead is not to be."⁵² Air bubbles when trapped in a bottle of water may be thought to be non-existent because it is invisible, but that is not the case. It can only cease to exist when the bottle is broken, a process which would lead to the destruction of the bubbles, the water and the bottle altogether. This is the total annihilation Leibniz talked about. This argument is supported by Aristotle's description of Form and Matter as well as Act and Potency. The vaporisation of liquid in the presence of heat does not mean it has ceased to exist rather, it has simply changed form. This is the reason every act is in potency of becoming.

Therefore, Leibniz's claim that bodies are well-founded phenomena, which he describes as the representational contents of certain perceptions raises some doubts because, in one of his letters to Burchard De Volder, he emphasised that matter and motion are not substances or things so much as they are the phenomena of perceivers

⁵¹ Leibniz, G. W. 1965. *Monadology and other philosophical essays*. P. Schrecker and A. M. Schrecker. Eds. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company. 148.

⁵² Wildon, H. C. 1926. The reform of the Leibnizian monadology. *The Journal of Philosophy* 23.3: 72. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2014378>

(monadic souls). He believes that their reality is situated in the harmony of individual perceivers with themselves and in a pre-established manner with other perceivers.⁵³

Conclusion

The chapter begins with a section where an attempt on clarification for the notion of monadology which is at the core of Leibniz's metaphysics was made and expressed that Leibniz's description of the monads as windowless is logically coherent with his conception of substance. His view of substance is seen to be clearly different from the way materialists conceive of it. They propose that a substance is an aggregate and therefore divisible. And for Leibniz, he being an idealist is of the opinion that real substances which are the monads are simple, deterministic, indivisible, not extended, not made up of aggregates and are the true atoms of nature. Following from the meaning of the suffixes '-logy' and '-ism' which both mean 'the study of' and 'the behaviour of' respectively,⁵⁴ monadology can aptly be defined as the study of the beingness of monads while the description of the behaviour of monads can be referred to as monadologism. Since monadology is concerned with the beingness or metaphysics of the behaviour of monads, it will not be cyclical or out of place to simply define monadology as the science or the study of monadologism.

The second section focused on monadic solipsism which expresses the individuality of the monads with the implication that reality only exists in the self and that there can never be an existence external to the self. It brought to the fore, the essence of individuality and determinism of solipsistic beings like the monads and contrasted with the notion of social monads in the next section.

⁵³ G.W Leibniz. 30 June 1704. *Leibniz-De Volder Correspondence*. P. Lodge. Trans. 2013. London: New Haven. 306.

⁵⁴ Cambridge English Dictionary. 2018. *ism meaning, definition*. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved April 4, 2018 from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/englishism>

The concept of ‘social monads’ which are inter-subjective and possess freewill brought to bare the idea that there is a form of monad which is diametrically opposed to Leibniz’s individualistic and deterministic monads. This is because, Leibniz’s monads on the one hand have distinctive behaviours which are that they neither affect nor are affected by other monads, they are self-sufficient and are programmed to behave or perceive the world in their own peculiar ways. Social monads on the other hand as distinct from Leibniz’s monads possess freewill, are not determined and thus, experience inter-subjective existence. This shows that the quest for solidarity and inter-subjectivity in the life of deterministic and self-sufficient monads like Leibniz’s is as much as a misnomer as the quest for individualism and self-sufficiency in the life of social monads. To do so can be likened to seeking interaction in a solipsistic world or seeking self-sufficiency in a world where nothing is self-sufficient respectively.

The goal of Leibniz in the ‘Monadology’ is not to achieve human solidarity. It is rather to show that the world is not only metaphysical in nature but that it is occupied by windowless, solipsistic and metaphysical beings which he calls ‘monads’. Leibniz holds that the idea of social or physical interaction is incompatible with the life of the monads because collision in bodies is fundamental to all physical change and motion. For this reason, Leibniz “rejected completely hard bodies, because any collisions would involve completely abrupt changes of speed and thus, a breach of continuity.”⁵⁵ Since the monads are unaffected by external forces, there was no way interaction could be possible. According to Leibniz, God has determined this at creation. He pre-established the activities of the monads and do not need to intervene by inputting motion or interaction. This chapter has been able to argue from the angle of the solipsistic mode of Leibniz’s monads and the inter-subjective mode of social monads that being and beings are metaphysically constituted. And, even though Leibniz did not put forward his monadic theory to achieve human solidarity for the reason that perfection has been pre-inputted in the monads at creation, it still raises some concerns because humans are

⁵⁵ Russell. L. J. 1977. Leibniz on the metaphysical foundations of science. *Studia Leibnitiana*. B.d. 9. H. 1: 102. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40693820>.

monads with freewill. In a logically distributive manner, he wholly included the class of humans in the class of monads therefore, his concept of monads cannot escape social criticisms.

Other sections of this chapter attempted a consideration of the metaphysical basis of democracy, knowledge and being. Democracy is seen as a social construct which in the final analysis has its basis in metaphysics. This was found to be so because democracy is founded on the notion of inalienable rights. This means that without the recognition of human inalienable rights, there can be no democracy. These rights are described as inalienable because we have them essentially before coming into existence they are not given or transferred to anyone; rather we have them a priori.

This chapter was able to argue that knowledge has its foundation in reality beyond the physical because the justifications for knowledge claims cannot be possible without making recourse to their metaphysical foundations. Other theories of knowledge discussed above just as foundationalism are metaphysically self-evident in their final analyses. For ideas to cohere and therefore serve as justificatory factors, each idea must have its own foundation which is also metaphysically self-evident. This presupposes that our knowledge about the world is metaphysically based and that beings which constitute our knowledge of the world must derive their beingness from beyond the physical domains. For Leibniz, when assuming only a succession of states and no sufficient reason for the world can be found in any one of them or in any set of them however large, obviously the reason for the world must be found elsewhere. That means out of the world, out of the totality of finite things and so in something infinite and eternal.

Despite Popper's denial of metaphysical certainty on the basis that it cannot be empirically falsified, it remains undeniable that metaphysics is the first point of call of all scientific investigations as it forms the basis of scientific critical inquiry. It is for this reason that, Marx Wartofsky argued that, "If a scientist does a fundamental criticism of the sets of concepts, of working theoretical assumptions, or of the models of science,

question like characterisation of causality is raised.”⁵⁶ From this, we see the inability of falsification to show the inference of metaphysics. Metaphysical claims therefore, help to bring about order into man’s view of the world, and in most cases have led to successful predictions in the sciences.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Marx, W. Wartofsky. 1967. Metaphysics as heuristic for science. In R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky. eds. *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science 1961/ 1966*, Vol. III. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 153.

⁵⁷ Karl Popper. 1959. *The logic of scientific discovery*. London: Hutchinson & Co. 32.

CHAPTER TWO

THE METAPHYSICS OF COMMUNALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM

Introduction

Metaphysics is a comprehensive inquiry into the ultimate nature of reality. It involves a systematic study of the more general categories of being. Aristotle defines it as the study of 'being qua being'. There are different approaches to metaphysics, but the two major ones are obviously essentialism and existentialism.

The essentialists believe that essence precedes existence. This is a belief that all that any being needs for its existence and for what it will eventually become is already contained in that being. In other words, the creator has pre-established all things in existence. Leibniz's monadology can be traced to this essentialist approach and the implication of this rests in the problem of freewill and determinism. It raises the question whether or not one really is capable of making any choice about life. This is not a problem for Leibniz's individualistic monads, but it is for social monads.

The existentialists on the other hand believe that existence precedes essence. It is the belief that man first exist before defining himself or determining what he will become. The concept of social monads is to a reasonable extent tied to the existentialist approach. This is because the concept of social monads also acknowledges nurturability and the active role of the creator in the course of events. So, there are theistic existentialists and atheistic existentialists. Sartre, an atheist believes in man's active role in determining his own destiny and argues that there is no given human nature precisely because there is no God to have a prior conception of it. According to him, at first man is nothing. Only afterword will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be. Thus, there is no human nature since there is no God to conceive of it. Not only

is man what he conceives himself to be, but he is also what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward existence.¹

This chapter shall critically evaluate social concepts like communalism and individualism with the view to showing that they have metaphysical basis. But before embarking on that, considering the above opposing views, a brief study of metaphysics as history of philosophy will be necessary to provide an insight for explanations for the existence of society, the individual person, and the world.

Metaphysics as History of Philosophy

There are some cultural impressions in the way philosophy is sometimes being perceived. These impressions are visible through a study of the history of philosophy. From one definition of philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’ one would notice a presupposition that philosophy originated with the Greeks whereas, prior to Thales of Miletus, a prominent pre-Socratic philosopher, there had been individuals across various cultures around the world who did not only love wisdom but drank from its wells. Other definitions of philosophy are that ‘it is a set of principles and rules guiding human lives and activities’ and that, “it is the criticism of the ideas we live by.”²

The most significant influence on the history of philosophical thought is religion which also dominated science until modern times. The development of science marked a new era and the course of development that profoundly influenced the manner of life and thought. Pierre Hadot in his analysis of what he conceives as the history of philosophy gave a description of what he believes it is not. According to him it is not the deposit of philosophical concepts, theories and systems to be found in the surviving texts of

¹ Sartre, J. P. 1992. *An existentialist approach to metaphysics. in the challenge of philosophy: introductory readings*. P. F. Fink ed. California: Chandler Publishing Company. 335.

² Staniland, H.S. 2000. What is Philosophy? In Kolawole A. Owolabi. Ed. *Issues and Problems in Philosophy*. Ibadan: Grovacs Network. 3.

Graeco-Roman antiquity, the subject matter of course is not of its study in the curricula of modern universities. This subject matter indeed does constitute the philosophical discourse of the ancient philosophers. But that discourse is itself merely the expression of the essence of ancient philosophy which, in his view, is a way of life. He opined that,

Philosophical discourse originates in the choice of life and an existential option- not vice-versa. This existential option, in turn, implies a certain vision of the world, and the task of philosophical discourse will therefore be to reveal and to rationally justify this existential option, as well as this representation of the world.³

The relevance of the history of philosophy cannot be overemphasised. A careful study shows how philosophical ideas have developed over time beginning from wondering about the nature of the universe to dogmatism about the nature of religious beliefs and other metaphysical views. The development continued with skepticism about traditional beliefs to the desire of certainty in the modern era. For instance, ideas that were once held as dogmas became accessible to seekers of knowledge. An example was Geo-centrism which was a popular belief in the Ptolemaic tradition and which was very important in religious circles, as it emphasised an earth-centered universe which was the center of creation and salvation of man. But, this dogma was challenged by the Copernican theory of Helio-centrism which emphasised a sun-centered universe.⁴

The history of philosophy gives an individual, hindsight into the events which occurred in the past and how they have contributed in shaping the world. This is because the solutions to some of the world's problems are rooted in the past. Hegel's dialectics of thesis, antithesis and synthesis as well as our knowledge of causes and effects has made this very clear. The effect of a particular cause has the potentiality of being the cause of yet another effect and that new effect is also in potency of being the cause of something else. As this process could go on ad infinitum, so is it traceable backwards in an infinite

³ Hadot, P. 2002. *What is ancient philosophy?* Trans. Michael Chase, U.S.A: Harvard University Press. 3.

⁴ William, F. L. 2002. *The voyage of discovery*. U.S.A: Wordsworth Group. 206.

regression. This is where the history of philosophy comes in to shed light on the role metaphysics has to play.

In the Ancient period, explanation of phenomena was mythological and the Pre-Socratic philosophers rejected this traditional practice in favour of more rational explanations. They, especially the Milesians asked very important questions based on the first causes of things and wanted to know where all things came from and why there are such varieties and multiplicities of things in nature that can be described mathematically. Asking questions about first causes was a way of seeking for universal principles to explain the whole of Nature. Although they could not proffer adequate solutions to the questions they asked, but such questions set the pace for rigorous rational discuss about issues that were hitherto given mythological explanations.⁵

An important development in the Medieval period was the establishment of the first universities.⁶ It is also noted that there was a strong resurgence in Islamic and Jewish philosophy at this time. The most influential cultural movements of the period were Scholasticism and the Islamic schools of Averroism, and Avicennism. The Renaissance began in Italy and lasted from about 1300 to about 1600. It was a time of intellectual reawakening stemming from the rediscovery of ancient Greek and Roman culture. During the Renaissance, major advances occurred in such sciences as astronomy, physics, and mathematics. Scholars called humanists stressed the importance of human beings and the study of classical literature as a guide to understanding life.⁷ Emphasis on science and on humanism led to changes in the aims and techniques of philosophic inquiry.

⁵ Ancient Era of Philosophy. Retrieved on 7th of August 2016 from www.philosophicalbasics.com/historical_ancientera.html

⁶ Medieval Era of Philosophy. Retrieved on 7th of August 2016 from www.philosophicalbasics.com/historical_meddievalera.html

⁷ Robert, G. 1998. Greece and the Hellenistic World. www.historyofgreece/greekcreativity. Retrieved on the 20th of January 2017.

Epistemology based on revealed knowledge from authoritative sources is one of the primary cultures of the medieval period. It was believed that ultimate truth could be known and the way to this knowledge is through direct revelation. This direct revelation was generally assumed to come from God or gods. The church being the holder and interpreter of revealed knowledge was the primary authority during this period.⁸

In the modern era, there was a shift in power away from the church. Politics and universities took over as the primary sources of authority. Oftentimes, a religious perspective was integrated into these new sources, but the church no longer enjoyed the privileged power and position. The modern period began with what is known as the Age of Reason. It is characterised by the rebirth or revival of classical civilisation and learning. Leibniz's main contribution to this period was the 'Monadology', the study of monads, or metaphysical units that make up substance. Monads, he said are elements of all things, mental as well as physical; they are windowless and indivisible. No two are alike, and change in the universe occurs because of the workings of each monad. Things are only connected by pre-established intervention of God.

It is currently being perceived that the modern era is fast giving way for the postmodern which is bringing with it a reaction against previous approaches to knowing. Instead of relying on one approach to knowing, there is now advocacy for epistemological pluralism which utilizes multiple ways of knowing. This can include metaphysics, empirical method of the sciences, rationalism of the idealists along with many other ways of knowing such as intuition and even dreams. The postmodern approaches seek to deconstruct previous sources and authority.⁹ It encourages cultural relativism and social inclusiveness.

⁸ Louis, H. 2008. Premodernism, modernism and postmodernism: an overview. Retrieved on 7th of August 2016 from. www.postmodernpsychology.com/philosophical_systems.

⁹ Louis, H. 2008. Premodernism, modernism and postmodernism: an overview. Retrieved on 7th of August 2016 from. www.postmodernpsychology.com/philosophical_systems.

From the above analysis, it is easy to identify that the primary subject matter of philosophy is human thinking itself as the history of philosophy is replete with the gradual fulfilment of the Socratic dictum which is ‘know thyself’. Therefore, the history of philosophy is the history of knowledge. Allegra de Laurentiis noted that, thought’s simultaneous double role as subject and subject matter in philosophy lends the latter the character of a peculiarly speculative enterprise, much in the sense adumbrated in Aristotle’s investigation of the soul. The mind itself is included among the objects which can be thought.¹⁰ Hence, the notion of ‘thinking about thinking’.

In attempting to identify the link between the mind and the world or the metaphysical and the physical domains, Wildon Carr stated that, there is assumed or postulated an existential distinction between mind and world and for him, knowledge is the relation between them. In this relation the only thing distinctively mental is the act of knowing, the relation being between act of knowing and thing known.¹¹

According to Allegra de Laurentiis, the history of philosophy does not tell a tale of strange and alien thoughts but rather the story of our own thinking in one peculiar mode. The development of this thinking mode is articulated in a multiplicity of forms, that is the philosophic systems. Accordingly, he says, a history of philosophy is not a history of opinions.¹² By this, he means that so-called opinions in the history of philosophy are hinged on coherent foundations.

¹⁰ Allegra de Laurentiis. 2005. Metaphysical foundations of the history of philosophy: Hegel’s 1820 introduction to the ‘lectures on the history of philosophy’. *The Review of Metaphysics* 59.1: 6. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130575>.

¹¹ Wildon, H. C. 1926. The reform of the Leibnizian monadology. *The Journal of Philosophy* 23.3: 70. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2014378>.

¹² Allegra de Laurentiis. 2005. Metaphysical foundations of the history of philosophy: Hegel’s 1820 introduction to the ‘lectures on the history of philosophy’. *The Review of Metaphysics* 59.1: 8. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130575>.

When studying the history of philosophy we are being confronted with concepts that are not just convictions of groups or individuals, but rather of principles of theories. What makes a concept a mere opinion is the fact of its intrinsic particularity or perhaps even singularity. As long as my ideas or my community's ideas about divinity or right are merely my opinions or our opinions respectively, their referents are merely my gods or my sense of justice and our gods or our sense of justice respectively.¹³ But we can agree with Allegra de Laurentiis that,

God is not divine if he presides over Athens alone; 'Justice' is not just if it admits of exceptions; and by virtue of its intention alone, the concept of 'personhood' cannot extend to some but not to other persons. These concepts are implicitly universal from the moment of their inception, but it is only in the course of history that they do become explicitly so.¹⁴

The history of philosophy has been able to show concepts and principles of theories are parts of the realities they explain. For this reason, Fadahunsi opined that, both the spiritual and the empirical nature of a metaphysical assertion are parts of a reality. It is not necessarily paradoxical because any object of empirical study is a combination of elements that are intuitive (mental) and those that are concrete (experiential). It takes intuition to knit together what we perceive empirically for conceptualisation¹⁵

¹³ Allegra de Laurentiis. 2005. Metaphysical foundations of the history of philosophy: Hegel's 1820 introduction to the 'lectures on the history of philosophy'. *The Review of Metaphysics* 59.1: 8. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130575>.

¹⁴ Allegra de Laurentiis. 2005. Metaphysical foundations of the history of philosophy: Hegel's 1820 introduction to the 'lectures on the history of philosophy'. *The Review of Metaphysics* 59.1: 9. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130575>.

¹⁵ Fadahunsi. A. 1980. On the reality of logic, mathematics and metaphysics. *The Nigerian Journal of Philosophy, University of Lagos* 10.1 & 2: 37.

The Metaphysical Basis of Religion and Belief in Ancestors

Metaphysical claims have most often been criticised by some scholars for being inaccessible to humans considering the fact of human finitude. One of Hume's display of such critical scepticism is found in the 'Treatis' where he said, though we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis that pretends to discover the ultimate or original qualities ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.¹⁶

Metaphysics as a science does not displace the particular sciences such as physics, the study of the soul, or mathematics. Rather, it alone offers an inquiry into areas beyond the purview of any of the particular sciences. But, how do we convince a Humean sceptic that there is such a science beyond the empirical? One foundational sign that there is such a science is that, in the midst of some other inquiries such as physics or the study of the principles of animate life, Aristotle proves the existence of activities, faculties, and beings whose natures are not reducible to matter or physical experience. But the scope of the other sciences never exceeds material composites of matter and form. As Aristotle bluntly puts it in the 'Metaphysics', if there were no immaterial entities, physics would be first philosophy. Since there are such entities, there is the possibility of another science of being, more universal than physics, which studies the attributes accruing to all things, material and nonmaterial, and their ultimate principles and causes. In this way, metaphysics is a comprehensive science.¹⁷

For something to be meaningful, it has to have a purpose and an idea of how that purpose can be achieved. For example, a sports game is meaningless without an idea of

¹⁶ David Hume. 2007. *Dialogues concerning natural religion and other writings*. D. Coleman ed. U.K : Cambridge University Press. xxvii

¹⁷ Thomas Hibbs. 2007. *Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion; Metaphysics and Practice*. U.S.A : Indiana University Press. 9.

how to win, and what the rules are along the way. This view means that for something to be meaningful it must have purpose and rules which override human wants and desires. Applying this to 'life' we can say that without laws and purpose our life is meaningless, and as rules have to be authoritarian or determined by an external agent, we are left requiring God to make life meaningful. Without such rules, we have an antinomian society with no laws, and no morality. Of course, this is based firstly on the idea that we can actually apply this metaphor to 'life', and secondly it requires life to be meaningful. Some would say that if life is meaningless then anything is permitted, as there is no reason to behave.¹⁸ Religion which derives mostly from metaphysical orientations speaks of how life should be lived in accordance with certain regulations as well as the recognition of the dignity and meaningfulness of life.

The recognition and respect of human needs, desires and expectations of one individual by another is a projection of human dignity. This recognition is indispensable because no human being survives alone. Human dignity creates the foundation of society and civilisation. Our knowledge of history suggests that religious ideas have provided this basic foundation of civilisation. Describing the first recognised civilisation in history one historian says, 'Religion permeated Sumerian civic life.' According to another historian, 'Religion dominated, suffused and inspired all features of Near Eastern society such as law, kingship, art and science.' Based on these observations while defining civilisation Samuel Huntington asserts, 'Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilisations.'¹⁹

Etymologically, religion as a word stems from the Latin word 'religio', which means both earnest observance of ritual obligations and an inward spirit of reverence. Religion is a way of life through which various societies, cultures, and people interact with entities they believe to be transcendently sacred. These entities may be in the form

¹⁸ Paul Nicholls. 2007. Religion and Morality A12 *Religious Studies* .3.

¹⁹ Abdullah al-Ahsan. 2009. Law, religion and human dignity in the muslim world today: an examination of Oic's Cairo declaration of human rights. *Journal of Law & Religion* Vol. XXIV. 569.

of gods, spirits, ancestors, or any kind of sacred reality with which they believe themselves to be connected. As traditions and practices of religious groups evolve over time, so has religion undergone several forms of modifications over time. Without the idea of God today, religion can be conceived as atheism. Religion therefore can be described as any phenomena which seeks to help the individual satisfy his or her spiritual thirst. It is therefore a part of everyday life and not merely an esoteric discipline which only involves esoteric methodology.

David Hume believes that if our reasoning does not involve thoughts which come from impressions then our reasoning does not have a legitimate ground. This led to his rejection of metaphysical ideas like God, Angels, spirits, religion and the likes. For Hume, such concepts do not have impressions and should be considered nonsensical. He claims that;

If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.²⁰

Human actions and inactions are regulated by certain norms and code of conducts in the society. This is necessary because man finds himself in the midst of others so, in order to foster harmonious coexistence ethics becomes important. Ethics is concerned with how people ought to behave, it determines what act should be considered praiseworthy or blameworthy, virtuous or vicious. Religion is interested in ethical code of conducts that would guide people's behaviours aright. Ethical norms and modes of conduct are very crucial in the understanding of religious activities for the reason that devotees or adherents of any form of religion do interact among themselves and with other people in the society. This is because the meaningfulness of ethical norms is

²⁰ David Hume. 2007. *An enquiry concerning human understanding*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 144.

appreciated mostly when viewed from within a social context. Since man is a social being, religious devotees need norms and code of conduct to guide their activities which encompass mode of worship, mode of praying, dancing, eating, dressing, and sexual behaviours.

Granted that there is some kind of general feature of the universe which makes it possible to acquire knowledge of our local environment, it is reasonable to suppose that we do not know all that there is to be known about what the nature of this general feature is. It is reasonable to suppose, in other words, that we can improve our knowledge about the nature of this general feature, thus improving methods for the improvement of knowledge. Not to suppose this is to assume arrogantly, that we already know all that there is to be known about how to acquire new knowledge. Granted that learning is possible, it is reasonable to suppose that, as we learn more about the world, we will learn more about how to learn.²¹ For this reason, ‘meta-knowability’ is a reasonable conjecture which can be applied to other areas of human existence like after-life and belief in ancestors.

The notion of the ancestors is a metaphysical one but it does not include ghosts or spirits, rather, living dead. They are portrayed as departed family members. It is also true that only specific members of the living dead, and not all deceased, occupy the position of ancestors. In an urbanised society, the concept of the ancestors is rapidly evolving into a more generalised concept, and that the specific tribal association is lost due to a dislocation from the patrilineal or matrilineal bonds. Ancestor belief is also integrated in what would generally be termed cultural practices, such as birth-:the belief that ancestors could be reborn and reintegrated physically into families, name giving-:this is evident in the kind of names that are given to children who are believed to be the embodiment of or medium for the reintegration of the particular ancestor and so on.

²¹ Nicholas Maxwell. 2017. Karl Popper, science and enlightenment. Los Angeles: UCL Press. 167. Retrieved April 25, 2018, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1vxm8p6.10>

A system of belief does not exist distinctively from the cultural practices. It is a more holistic understanding of the dimensions of life. The spiritual is part and parcel of this holistic understanding of reality. Religion is culture and vice versa. Although this thought-structure may vary between groups and societies, but with recognisable universal traits. One may call these universal patterns of thought an African indigenous cosmology. The most common feature of this cosmology is the integration of three distinguishable aspects, namely environment, society, and the spiritual. All activities are informed by this holistic understanding so that they singularly or collectively maintain or transform the socio-cultural and spiritual landscape. An act is never separated from its environmental, societal, or spiritual impact. The cosmology becomes visible in that indigenous knowledge informs acts of technology, agriculture, animal keeping, music, song, dance, ritual, family care and parenting, tribal administration, the handling of conflict, and so on. It is a system of thought embedded in action.²²

Western cultural tradition which includes ghosts accepts that the dead can be endowed with cultural tradition, accepts that the dead can be endowed with extraordinary powers. The dead belong to what we call the supernatural world. A Western anthropologist, working in an African society, finds it easy to accept without much further questioning that the dead, including the ancestors, should be believed capable of extraordinary doings, that they should mystically confer benefits or punishment upon the living, that they should have supernatural powers. Such beliefs about the dead are culturally acceptable to Africans, and it is appropriate that such dead should have a cult. But living people in African cultural conceptions do not have such mystical powers merely because they happen to be older. If they are said by Africans to have such powers, these must be derived from elsewhere; and the ancestors, being dead, are seen as an appropriate source.²³

²² Nel, P. J. 2008. Morality and religion in African thought. *Acta Theologica* 2:37

²³ Kopytoff Igor. Ancestors as elders in Africa. In *The Centre for Social and Anthropology Computing*, University of Kent. par.26. Retrieved July 26, 2013, from <http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/era/ancestors/intro.html>

The Metaphysics of Individualism

The term ‘individualism’ originates from a Latin word ‘individuus’ which means ‘indivisible’.²⁴ The early ideas of individualism in social and political theory included the ideas of the maximum welfare and freedom of the individual, with society existing only for the sake of its members. More specifically, individualism is a political and social philosophy that places high value on the freedom of the individual and generally stresses the self-directed, self-contained and comparatively unrestrained individual or ego. The individualistic theory of human nature holds that the interests of the normal adult person are best served by allowing him or her maximum freedom and responsibility for choosing his or her objectives and the means for obtaining them, and acting accordingly’.²⁵

The first use of the term, in its French form ‘in-dividualisme,’ grew out of the general European reaction to the French Revolution and to its alleged source, which is the thought of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment further gave rise to the commonwealth where individuals are considered to pass like shadows while the commonwealth is fixed and stable. The Revolution was proof that ideas exalting the individual imperilled the stability of the commonwealth, dissolving it into an unsocial, uncivil, unconnected chaos of elementary principles.²⁶ This is expressed in Stirner’s claim that, “I, the egoist, have not at heart the welfare of this human society. I sacrifice nothing to it. I only utilise it: but to be able to utilise it completely I must transform it

²⁴ Anu, R. & Kati, K. 2002. Three components of individualism. *European Journal of Personality* 16: 167.

²⁵ Encyclopaedia Britannica, www.britannica.com.

²⁶ Steven Lukes.1971. The Meanings of Individualism. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32. 1: 45. Retrieved July. 1, 2012. From <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708324>.

rather into my property and my creature-i.e., I must annihilate it and form in its place the Union of Egoists.”²⁷

But, Steven Lukes noted that it was in the United States that individualism primarily came to celebrate capitalism and liberal democracy where it became a symbolic catchword of immense ideological significance, expressing all that has at various times been implied in the philosophy of natural rights, the belief in free enterprise and the American Dream. It expressed in fact, the operative ideals of nineteenth and early twentieth-century America. It continues to play a major ideological role advancing a set of universal claims seen as incompatible with the parallel claims of the socialism and communism of the Old World. Individualism referred, not to the sources of social dissolution or the painful transition to a future harmonious social order, nor to the cultivation of uniqueness or the organic community, but rather to the actual or imminent realisation of the final stage of human progress in a spontaneously cohesive society of equal individual rights, limited government, laissez-faire, natural justice and equal opportunity, and individual freedom, moral development, and dignity. Naturally it carried widely varying connotations in differing contexts and at different times.²⁸

Individualism when contrasted with collectivism is a characteristic of cultures in which the ties between individuals are loose. Everyone is expected to look after him or herself and his or her immediate family. In such societies, group membership is not essential in one’s life, one may become a member of many groups but none of the groups exerts strong influence on his or her behaviours. An individualistic person is more likely to hold moral principles that are universal and behave in accordance with what he or she perceives is right. Members of individualistic cultures are described as valuing personal time, freedom, challenge, direct communication style, and material rewards.

²⁷ Stirner, M. 1907. *The ego and its own: the case of the individual against authority*. S. T. Byington. Trans. London : Bluminton. 18.

²⁸ Steven Lukes.1971. The Meanings of Individualism. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32. 1: 59. Retrieved July. 1, 2012. From <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708324>.

Independence and self-reliance are greatly stressed and valued. Collectivism, on the other hand, is a social pattern which draws on the ethos of communal living consisting of closely linked individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collective families, tribes, or nation. Individuals are primarily motivated by the norms and duties imposed by those collectives. They are willing to give priority to the goals of these collectives over their own personal goals and emphasise their connectedness to members of these collectives. One's identity is, in large part, a function of one's membership and role in a group. The survival and success of the group ensures the well-being of the individual, so that by considering the needs and feelings of others, one protects oneself. Harmony and interdependence of group members are stressed and valued.²⁹

Individualism with respect to Leibniz's metaphysics is best understood as solipsism. This is why Edwin Lewis stated that, in philosophy, the word individualism means solipsism, or what is called Leibnizean monadism.³⁰ Solipsism as seen from the previous chapter is simply put, the theory that the self knows only itself.

The mode of existence of Leibniz's monads presents a good example of solipsistic individualism. For this reason, a look into the self-sustaining ability, immortality and pre-established harmony of the monads would be necessary for establishing the metaphysical basis of individualism.

According to Leibniz, "The individual substance or monad is a genuine unity that cannot be split."³¹ He also believes that souls or Monads are not the same since they differ in quality and cannot be externally influenced because they have no window through which anything can enter or leave. For Ridling, "each of the monads is gifted with some degree of perception; each mirrors the universe in its own way and differs

²⁹ Ahmad Al-Issa . 2005. When the west teaches the east: analysing intercultural conflict in the classroom. *Intercultural Communication Studies* 14. 4: 152.

³⁰ Edwin, H. L. 1911. Some definitions of individualism. *American Journal of Sociology* 17.2: 228

³¹ Craig, Ed. 2005. *The shorter routledge encyclopedia of philosophy*. 557

from each other in the degree of perception of which they are capable.”³² So, each monadic soul or being has its own internal principle of existence, it is individuated and self-sufficient.

Since monads have no parts, that is, they are not aggregates, it poses a problem trying to understand how they come into existence, for each monad is said to have a plurality of properties and relations, which constitute its perception. Each monad has its own perceptions which differ from the perceptions of other monads. This worry closely relates to Leibniz’s assertion that the monads are not subject to destruction. They are indestructible because their existence is unconnected to nothing at all. They individually contain within themselves their own principles of existence. In his own words;

There is thus, no danger of dissolution, and there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can perish naturally. For the same reason, there is no way in which a simple substance can begin naturally, since it could not be formed by composition. Therefore we may say that the Monads can neither begin nor end in any other way than all at once; that is to say, they cannot begin except by creation, nor end except by annihilation; whereas that which is compounded, begins and ends by parts.³³

The ultimate constituents of things which are the monads or souls must therefore be immortal for they are points, not mathematical but metaphysical points. That is, points of real existence. They are indeed a kind of soul.³⁴ Minds, or rational souls, are basically the same thing in all living things, so that both the soul and the being begin only when the world begins, and never come to an end, any more than the world does.³⁵ Leibniz

³² Ridling, Z. 2001. *Philosophy then and now: a look back at 26 centuries of thought*. Access Foundation. 156

³³ Leibniz, G. W. and Hedge, F. H. 1867. The monadology. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. 1.3: 6.

³⁴ Ridling, Z. 2001. *Philosophy then and now: a look back at 26 centuries of thought*. 152

³⁵ Bennett, J. 2007. *The principles of philosophy known as monadology*. 11.

concludes, “The universe has existed from eternity with the same number of monads. No new monads are created and no existing monads are destroyed. All change throughout the history of the universe consists in the transformation of already existing substances in accordance with the laws of mechanics.”³⁶

The above idea is in keeping with most views regarding the immortality of the soul. Among the ancient Greeks, transmigration was a doctrine closely associated with the followers of Pythagoras. According to Pythagorean teaching, “Reincarnation, also called transmigration or metempsychosis, in religion and philosophy, rebirth of the aspect of an individual that persists after bodily death-whether it be consciousness, mind, the soul, or some other entity-in one or more successive existences.”³⁷ This means that the soul survives bodily death, being immortal and merely confined to the body.

Therefore, the only way a simple individual substance like the soul could cease to exist would be through a supernatural or miraculous decision by God. However, since God has already determined that everything will happen in accordance with the laws of mechanics, there is no question of any simple substance simply disappearing into thin air. Berens noted that the soul “after death, frees itself from corruption, to live again under a better and purer form.”³⁸ The indestructibility of a monad or soul is predicated on its independence and individuality vested in it by God.³⁹ Therefore, the perfect harmony that exists among monads or substances despite that they do not communicate with each other, for Leibniz, is a pointer to the fact that a supremely intelligent being must have orchestrated it.

³⁶ Ross, G. M. 1999. Leibniz: the monadology. *Internet encyclopaedia of philosophy* Par.2

³⁷ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia (2020, May 22). Reincarnation. Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/reincarnation>

³⁸ Berens, E. M. 2007. *Myths and legends of ancient Greece and Rome*. New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co. 58.

³⁹ Leibniz, G. W. 1902. *Discourse on metaphysics*. The Open Court Publishing Company. 24.

One initial impetus to individualism derives from Cartesian epistemology which asserts that the source of knowledge rests in the rational individual cognizing the world. The first and crucial certainty is the cogito ergo sum. The individual is conceived as a disengaged rationality (res cogitans), perceiving the external world (res extensa). It is incumbent upon each individual to think self-responsibly for herself.⁴⁰

The important points here are: the centrality of individual to knowledge of the world; it is only individuals who can be moral, accountable, and responsible; and as such individuals form the key units out of which society is constructed. Aggregates cannot act nor have any being in the world, unless they are disaggregated into their atomic parts. This is expressed in the doctrine of methodological individualism which is largely about explanation, not a sociological observation. At its simplest, it asserts that all attempts to explain social phenomena must be couched wholly in terms of facts about individuals.⁴¹

Daniel Stempel's illustration of the notion of individualism in Leibniz's monadology goes thus; There was one man in England, who insisted on his right to say, like Leibniz's monad, 'I am myself alone' and indeed, not only a right but a necessity. Explaining to a friend why he could not move from his lodgings, he gave as the cause 'intellectual peculiarity, that I must be myself alone shut up in myself, or reduced to nothing.' Like Leibniz, he equated individuality and being, and from this fundamental conviction he developed a complex cosmology of interrelated individual perspectives which bears a strong likeness to Leibniz's universe of monads.⁴² Therefore, to be is to be

⁴⁰ Andrew, V. 1995. The ontology of individualism. *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory* 85: 127. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017. from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41802022>.

⁴¹ Andrew, V. 1995. The ontology of individualism. *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory* 85: 128. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017. from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41802022>.

⁴² Daniel, S. 1975. Blake's monadology: the universe of perspectives. *Mosaic: An Interdisciplinary Critical Journal* 8.2: 80 & 81. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24776978>

individuated, because aggregates as earlier stated can neither act nor have any being in the world, unless they are disaggregated into their atomic parts.

The Metaphysics of Communalism

The term communism if not properly clarified is one that can be used in different senses which could lead to conceptual misinterpretation. The term on the one hand refers to the Marxist-Leninist version of a classless society in which capitalism is overthrown by a working-class revolution that gives ownership and control of wealth and property to the state. It is a one-party state in which the system of government involves a single, usually totalitarian state where the party controls power and the economy. On the other hand, the term communism is used in reference to a political theory or system in which all property and all the members of that society own wealth in a classless society. It is in this later sense that this research is concerned with when reference is made to communism but for the avoidance of misinterpretation, a less contentious term which conveys the same meaning as the later would be used. The term communalism in the sense of communitarianism aptly represents the later sense as it denotes a society where wealth is owned in a classless society of individuals in a collectivist or cooperative community.

Communalism generally refers to a strong commitment to one's own cultural group which anchors on cooperation, shared lived experiences, common ownership of available resources and cultural heritage. So, the human being can be conceived as a being that is necessarily communal, since it is only later as he develops among others in the community in terms of skills, acquisition of means of production, power and authority does he begin to see himself as autonomous, self-sustaining and subsequently he becomes individualistic and alienates himself from others.

Communalism is also considered as an idea which perceives of the individual person as an intrinsic part of the society who is never in isolation but is constantly involved in an inter-subjective relationship with other members of the society. Some important features of communal life according to Kwame Gyekye are shared life, shared purposes, interests, and understandings of the good. He noted that, what distinguishes a

community from a mere association of individuals is the sharing of an overall way of life. In the social context of the community, each member acknowledges the existence of common values, obligations, and understandings and feels a commitment to the community that is expressed through the desire and willingness to advance its interests.⁴³

Just as each individual in the community derives his meaningfulness or identity from the community, so is the notion of the interaction of forces. Every force is sustained not in isolation but in its continual situatedness in what J. M Nyasani calls, the cycle of unbroken chain of horizontal and vertical relationships. In this communal relationship, he said, my own individual life-force is not mine by right or by nature but a gratuitous conferment from the ex post facto reality of those who already enjoyed it and who jealously safeguard it for purposes of continuity, social cohesion, social harmony, social and physical integrity and for the sake of realising the teleological good of human existence, in perpetual communion and perpetual vitality.⁴⁴ This shows that there is a mutual, continuous interconnection or interaction of beings.

Close knittedness is also an important feature of communal life and it derives from the common interest in, shared goals and in some cases, it derives from a cherished common history, ancestry and ancestral heritage. Communal values are inherent in the cultural practices of a people as expressed in strong emphasis on inter-relatedness among not just human beings but with the rest of other beings. Communal relationships exhibits values which are drawn from sayings like, “one tree does not make a forest,”⁴⁵ ‘a bird does not fly with one wing’ and that ‘a cooking pot does not sit on a single stone’. It is practically evident that, alone, a broom stick is useless and in using this to express the

⁴³ Gyekye, K. 1997. *Tradition and modernity: philosophical reflections on the African experience*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 41.

⁴⁴ Nyasani, J. M. 2013. *The ontological significance of ‘I’ and ‘We’ in African philosophy*. 19. Retrieved May. 7, 2013, from www.galerieinter.de/kimmerle/galerie.htm.

⁴⁵ Brannigan, M. C. 2005. *Ethics across cultures: an introductory text with readings*. New York: Mc Graw-Hill Companies, Inc. 326.

need for selfless service and contribution to the welfare of every member of the society without debate on who takes the credit, it is said that the particular broom stick that kills the fly is never known while in the midst of the bunch. Therefore, joy and sadness, victories and defeats, gains and pains are shared.

In communal relationship, people see the human person as an inherently communal being, embedded in a context of social relationships and interdependence, never as an isolated, atomic individual. Consequently, they see the community not as a mere association of individual persons whose interests and ends are contingently congruent, but as a group of persons linked by interpersonal bonds, biological and, or non-biological, who consider themselves primarily as members of the group and who have common interests, goals, and values. It is the notion of common interests, goals, and values that differentiates a community from a mere association of individual persons.⁴⁶

Metaphysics of community has as its task to show how community is the way by which human beings participate in being. Therefore, the metaphysics of human being is communal. An elementary condition for community is that different people must be able to be conceived together, and themselves actually to understand something of that togetherness. This is the condition addressed by Plato's logical-metaphysical discussion of being and non-being, sameness and difference. Another condition for community is dual in a sense, that human beings be understood as social by nature and that this sociality be embodied in such ideal conditions as those for friendship. Descriptive social interdependence is not metaphysically interesting except as it is shown to be made possible and fulfilled by some actualisation of friendship. A third condition for community is that it be understandable cosmologically as requiring a normative self-reference to the whole, its ultimate context, or being. Else, community fosters self-destruction. Augustine expressed this as living before God as in the city of God, in

⁴⁶ Coetzee, P. H. 2003. Morality in African thought. In Coetzee, P. H. & Roux, A. P. J. Eds. *The African philosophy reader*. 351.

contrast to the customary living for oneself, which ruins community and feeds otherwise harmless faults.⁴⁷

Conflicts are necessary conditions for social living since humans, being in the world are necessarily in the midst of others. They are constantly under pressure to act and behave like others and also to live as they are expected to and not as they ought to. When an individual becomes unable to be that which defines his being, he plunges himself into anxiety. When his anxiety deepens, he is alienated from himself. He stops being himself, he loses his identity and becomes an object rather than a subject in the world. This plunges him into a situation where everything including his own existence becomes absurd and meaningless.

One basic existentialists theme is that, ideas are not discovered by individuals, rather, individuals create ideas. This against Leibniz's view implies that individuals do not have predetermined ideas because, it is only when they confront realities here in this world that they begin to formulate or create ideas. This is why another major claim of existentialists is that 'existence precedes essence', meaning that man first begins to exist before defining his purpose of living. This is because man did not choose to be born into this world. He simply finds himself here, 'thrown into the world', into a world full of burden, fear, dread, anxiety, and even death. These predicaments are the absurdities of life which continually shape human existence as noted in the previous paragraph. As man confronts these absurdities, his choices, behaviours and attitudes to life are being influenced.

Two classes of existentialists are noticeable; they are, the theistic existentialist (those who believe in the existence of God) and the atheistic existentialist (those who deny the existence of God). Soren Kierkegaard was a theistic existentialist and one of his major works is 'Fear and Trembling'. He believed like other existentialist that truth is

⁴⁷ Robert, C. N. 1997. Comments on 'is there a metaphysics of community? A continental perspective on American philosophy'. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* New Series, 11.2: 98 Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25670211>.

subjective. For this reason, whatever I believe to be true is true for me and I should be ready to live for it or die for it. Christianity for instance, he believes is true as long as it is true for the individual who believes in it. For the existentialist it is man's feelings and passion that made him what he is.

Jean-Paul Sartre was an atheistic existentialist and one of his major works is 'Being and Nothingness'. He believes that man creates his own destiny out of the absurdities of life. This is very necessary for him because, there is no God to conceive man's destiny or to create human nature. For him, man makes himself and is responsible for his choices. Man exists in a state of abandonment and outside his existence is nothingness.⁴⁸ Since there is no God, there is nothing to prevent man from becoming what he wants to be. Man has absolute freedom in the world; he is in fact condemned to be free. Sartre's concern is that man tries to make himself into a God, and the fact that there is no God plunges man into further absurdity. We conceive of the idea of God so that we can have excuse for our errors. So, when people offend they refuse to take responsibility for their actions.

The existentialists believe that man must rely on himself and remain true to himself; that he alone must decide for himself what course of action to take at any given time. This is because man does not discover ideas, he creates them. Existentialism says that we start with a completely blank page and have to decide on our own criteria for moral action. The key points about existentialism are freedom and responsibility. The way we act defines who we are. Sartre, finds man's lot in the world absurd. Since there is no God, life can have no ultimate meaning and there can be no objective knowledge of good and evil. We cannot decide a priori, or find out by investigation, what we are to do. Man in his freedom imposes values. The choices man makes, the projects he forms for himself, and the sum of his acts constitute his values. There is no good and evil to be intuited or in any way discovered by humans.

⁴⁸ Uduigwomen, A. F. 2001. *Introducing ethics: trends, problems and perspectives*. Calabar: Jochrisham Publishers. 68.

Man (Dasein) becomes aware of what Heidegger calls ‘my thrown-ness’ when he is in relation with others. This ‘thrown-ness’, is the fact that I am simply ‘there’, “thrown-into-the-world without asking to be there”⁴⁹. In this situation, he desires to be like others, to fit-in to the world or “to behave as one is expected to instead of as I ought to”⁵⁰. This leads to inauthentic existence because by so doing, he loses his own identity and becomes alienated or what Heidegger prefers to refer to as ‘the fall’. As Dasein falls into inauthenticity, he is confronted with the absolute enigma of his own being, and flees from himself and loses himself in anxiety⁵¹. It is in order to escape anxiety that man ceases to be himself and become one of ‘them’, an object, and a part of the world. This inauthenticity is what brings with it the ‘sense of the absurd’, the sense that objects are without meaning.

Heidegger is of the view that we are aroused out of our inauthentic existence when we face ultimate situations and particularly when we realize that we must die. The thoughts of our own death make us feel that our own human existence has to come to an end and since nobody can die for me, the only thing is to try to forget the thought of death⁵². But, trying to forget the thought of death, not facing it, is to live an inauthentic life. One question that easily comes to mind when confronted with life’s absurdities and the question of authenticity is that, is living an absolutely authentic life possible? Man can express some form of autonomy when it comes to dealing with issues that are very private to him. He could choose to live his life as he wills. He could express his freedom to any extent but that extent is limited to where the freedom of his neighbour begins. This is because man as a being with others necessarily lives among other people. He does not live in isolation otherwise he would be regarded as either a god or a beast. The inter-subjectivity of man in the society predisposes him to influence and be influenced.

⁴⁹ Stumpf, S. E. 1971. *Philosophy, history & problems*. 4Ed. New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company. 500.

⁵⁰ Stumpf, S. E. 1971. *Philosophy, History & Problems*. 497.

⁵¹ Scruton, R. 1995. *A short history of modern philosophy*; from Descartes to Wittgenstein 2ed. London; Routledge. 257.

⁵² Oyeshile, O. A. Critique of Husserlian approach to knowledge. In R. A. Akanmidu. ed. *Footprints in Philosophy*. Ibadan; Hope Publications. 2005. 56.

Man is contractually bound with the society in which he finds himself and therefore, cannot live a life that is totally free from the pressures of the society. So, man will necessarily continue to find himself in some form of inauthentic activities, activities he would rather not engage in if he has an absolute freedom to choose.

Man is therefore confronted with the notion of choice which is an indication of freedom. This is because one cannot choose without being free and freedom to choose carries with it the burden of responsibility. When we choose, we are morally responsible for our actions and must be ready for the consequences whether they be praise worthy or blame worthy. But, no matter how well we express our freedom and autonomy, we still remain bound by societal norms which go to show that absolutely authentic life is impossible. Existence is therefore, a constant engagement with the absurd and to be able to address life's absurdities, recourse must be made to the very foundation of community or social living. This is where the notion of a priori rights as discussed in the concept of democracy in the previous chapter becomes relevant. There is no community when there is no sharing of any kind, otherwise, a community would be no different from solipsistic individualism, a situation where rights are meaningless. This is so because, we speak of rights when there are engagements with others. Ultimately, the implication of this is that there can be no community where there are no rights. Rights which are themselves metaphysically a priori are the founding blocks of a community. Therefore, a community is metaphysical writ-large.

Conclusion

In Leibniz's 'The Ultimate Origin of Things' as edited by Jonathan Bennett, he opined that, we cannot find in any individual thing or even in the entire collection and series of things, a sufficient reason why they exist. So, for Leibniz, when assuming only a succession of states and no sufficient reason for the world can be found in any one of them or in any set of them however large, obviously the reason for the world must be found elsewhere. That means out of the world, out of the totality of finite things and so in something infinite and eternal.

This is because causality implies motion and motion is implied in succession or in a series of existing things. For even if eternal things don't yield causes as finite things do, they give reasons. For a thing that lasts through time without changing, the reason is the nature or essence of the thing itself. In a series of changing things if we imagine that it goes back forever, the reason is the superior strength of certain inclinations. This is why causality itself is said to be rooted in metaphysics.⁵³

To corroborate the above claim, Merton Yewdale while expressing his views on the metaphysical foundation of ideas like music, he expressed that, "It is evident that if the idea cannot arise in the composer without some source, however indefinite or obscure, and if that source cannot be found in Nature proper, it must be sought for elsewhere. The truth is, that it is to be found in Nature, though not in Nature proper- that is, not as phenomenon, but as noumenon; and therein lies the explanation of the metaphysical foundation of pure music."⁵⁴ This gives the impression that we have physical necessity derived from metaphysical necessity and that the world is metaphysically necessary.

That the physical world is metaphysically necessary is evident in the disintegration or disaggregation of bodies. Bodies in the Platonic and Leibnizean sense are not monadic souls themselves; rather, they embody souls. This is why when bodies disintegrate, they are by extension the diffusion of some quality or nature. By hypothesis, the quality or nature is no longer there to be continued or extended, and so per impossibile, for Leibniz we will be left with an utter and complete metaphysical vacuum.⁵⁵ This is why; "whether the world, including the physical body exists or not,

⁵³ Leibniz G. W. 2004. The ultimate origin of things. Bennett. J. ed. 1,2

⁵⁴ Merton, S. Y. 1928. The metaphysical foundation of pure music. *The Musical Quarterly* 14.3: 400. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/738437>.

⁵⁵ Glenn, A. H. 1992. Leibniz's phenomenalisms. *The Philosophical Review* 101.3: 532.

pure consciousness remains as a phenomenological residue.”⁵⁶ This metaphysical or phenomenological vacuum or residue explains the foundation of all being both physical and metaphysical. Therefore, as said earlier, the reason for the existence of any reality must be found out of the totality of finite things and so in something infinite and eternal.

Leibniz believes that science becomes real and demonstrative by means of principles such as principles of sufficient reason and the identity of indiscernibles whereas before it generally consisted of empty words. What we have then in regards to the metaphysical foundations of science, is an account of the basic principles of science derived from concepts and principles of the widest possible generality.⁵⁷ A posteriori demonstration proceeds from experience of an effect to its cause and produces knowledge of the nature of the effect while a priori demonstration proceeds from cause to effect and produces knowledge of why the effect obtains. The notion of causality or cause and effect is basic for scientific advancements and causality itself is rooted in metaphysics. Therefore, science just like other means of knowing, is rooted in metaphysics.

The metaphysical foundation of community is seen in the relationship between the individual and the community. This relationship is metaphysical because human actions or activities with, for or against another have consequences far beyond the physical realm. This relationship is meaningless with the consideration of a priori rights. From an African perspective, all beings including humans either increase or experience a diminution of force in the process of interaction or communication and the concept of this force cannot be explained without the notion of being itself.

⁵⁶ Hiroshi, K. 2000. *Monad and thou: phenomenological ontology of the human being*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 40.

⁵⁷ Russell. L. J. 1977. Leibniz on the metaphysical foundations of science. *Studia Leibnitiana*. B.d.9.H.1. 102. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40693820>.

CHAPTER THREE

AQUINAS' PRINCIPLE OF PARTICIPATION AND THE IDEA OF INTER-SUBJECTIVITY

Introduction

The 'Principle of Participation' which necessarily implies the notion of inter-subjectivity is better appreciated when viewed with reference to Aquinas' description of the hierarchy of beings. The hierarchy of beings is nothing but a sacred principality which forms a link between the metaphysical and the physical domains and runs from the Supreme Being at the apex down to rational creatures and to inanimate things. That there is but one hierarchy, is a notion Aquinas defends with the description that principality includes two things; "the Prince himself and the multitude ordered under the Prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of sacred things."¹

James Weisheip, an Aquinean scholar noted that, unless the teaching of Thomas Aquinas is seen in its true historical perspective, there is not only the danger of misunderstanding his teaching, but also of rendering him irrelevant to our age. His teaching he said, is not esoteric, but public and intelligible to all who would take the time to study it.² Thomas Aquinas was an Italian Monk of a noble birth, who lived in the 13th century during the era of great intellectuality. He opines that man is naturally a political being and as such seeks to live in the community or society. He also believes that man is basically a political being endowed with speech and intellect, therefore man is a social

¹ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa theologiae*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part I-II. Q.106. A. 8

² James A. Weisheip. 1974. *Friar Thomas D'Aquino: his life, thought, and his works*. New York: Doubleday Co. 1-2.

being. He believes that man must live in the community or society and bring people to live together under one ruler for the purpose of a common good.³

For Aquinas, the necessity to live in a community is inherent in man's nature. He believes that for all other animals, nature has "provided with a covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes, and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as being deprived of the above means of protection."⁴ It is as a result of this that Aquinas believes that man was essentially endowed with reason, by the use of which he could procure all these things for himself, by the work of his hands. No single individual alone is able to procure all these things for himself, for one man could not sufficiently provide for life unassisted. It is therefore natural that man should live in the society of many people.⁵

In saying that man is 'naturally social,' there are two different senses in which the term 'natural' can be used according to Aquinas. First, he opined that what is natural is whatever comes-to-be by its own natural impulses. In this sense, nature is a cause, distinct from other causes such as chance, spontaneity and artifice. Things which come-to-be by these causes are not a result of the innate impulse of the thing. In the second sense, the natural are those conditions necessary for the fulfilment of our end as human beings. These two senses interact, as our natural impulses lead us to create those

³ Ada M0-J, Ada JA, Egomo JE. 2012. Saint Thomas Aquinas theories on man, society, government, law and applicability of these ideas in the administration of Nigerian Secondary Schools. *World J Young Researchers* 2.5:7

⁴ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa Theologica*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. I-II, Q.76, A.5, O.4.

⁵ Bourke J. 1960. *The pocket Aquinas*. New York: Washington Square Press Inc. 5.

conditions which will help us live a fully human life which requires interaction and inter-subjectivity.⁶

Aquinas identified the necessity of interaction or communication for the continuous existence of beings. He noted that beings participate and receive reality from the ultimate being in relation to their proximity to Him. He believes that beings are in an inter-subjective relationship with each other and in this process, they enhance or complete the being of others or they are as well enhanced or completed. This communal interaction of beings, he believes, sustains the universe and that it is the initiative of God to make it so since it is the very nature of God to be self-communicative love and since all other beings are in some way participating in the divine love, it is in their nature to extend this to other beings.

Aquinas opines that the real beings in our universe go out of themselves in search for interaction for two reasons. Firstly, it is because they are poor and as limited and imperfect, they seek completion of themselves from other beings. Secondly, it is because they are rich and thus, possess some degree of actual perfection and they also have an intrinsic tendency to share this in some way with others. Thomas Higgs corroborated this self-communicative, inter-subjective attribute of God which he extends to all other beings when he noted that, behind the account of virtues of dependent animal rationality is metaphysics of participation and a theological teaching on the internal life of God as self-communicative love. The same teaching, though much neglected, provides the foundation for Aquinas' account of the natural law, which he defines as the participation of the rational creature in the eternal law.⁷

⁶ Holly Hamilton Bleakley. 1999. The art of ruling in Aquinas' 'de regimine principum'. *History of Political Thought* 20. 4 :589. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26219662>. Accessed: July 11, 2018.

⁷ Higgs, T. 2007. *Aquinas, ethics, and philosophy of religion: metaphysics and practice*. 34.

This chapter examines the argument for society in Aquinas' Principle of Participation against the backdrop of Leibniz's individualistic metaphysics as discoursed in the previous chapter. Here, Aquinas' Principle of Participation is being established as a springboard that will lead to a proper conception of social order in the next chapter. This is because participation and inter-subjectivity alone as implied in this principle do not guarantee peace and social order hence, the need to go beyond Aquinas. The notion of interaction or participation is necessarily implied in the concept of society or community. However, the feeling of unity is not necessarily present. This places the burden of uniting the people for the realisation of social order on leadership. It is the role of the leaders to build the feeling of belongingness amongst the members of the society. The leaders need to have the wish to create a union amongst the members because all the differences present in the society, all the interests, all the values and beliefs of the majority as well as those of the minorities should be unified into one collective whole.

In order to properly situate this discourse, this chapter will focus on sections such as 'The Principle of Participation and the Hierarchy of Being'-which will give an understanding that the notion of participation is ontologically hierarchical, 'Teleologism in Aquinas Principle of Participation and Inter-subjectivity'-which will give an understanding that the notion of participation is socially and ontologically teleological, 'Aquinas on Leadership as a Medium of Inter-subjectivity'-which will discourse that one of the telos of leadership is to create an atmosphere of inter-subjectivity while the last section will focus on happiness as the second and very important telos of leadership on 'Aquinas on Happiness as the Telos of Human Life'.

The Principle of Participation and the Hierarchy of Being

Aquinas' use of the term 'participation' in the 'Summa Theologica' has its background in the metaphysical doctrine of participation which is founded on ethics. It explains that the moral law governing human conduct which stems from the natural law is one of the ways in which the rational creature shares in the divine order, that is, God's eternal law. Although law seems to us to be primarily related to social thought, Aquinas is taking it metaphysically as the rule and measure constitutive of all natures. That is, it is the eternal

law which impresses upon all things their tendencies toward their own proper acts and ends.⁸ In the basic sense of participation, all beings participate in existence, that is, they share in being and its transcendental properties, more perfectly or less so, since they are caused by the first being, which is being perfectly. Hurdson, in his description of the principle of participation says it means, “To receive partially what belongs to another in a universal way, that is, to receive only part of what belongs to another fully and so merely to share in it without exhausting it.”⁹

The dominant worldview that engaged the Medieval and Renaissance era at about the dawn of Scientific Revolution was the idea that all of Creation existed in a hierarchical relationship, and that absolutely everything could be stratified as either above or below any other thing in the universe. All entities existed in hierarchy of increasing greatness, culminating with God. This succession which was known as ‘the Great Chain of Being’ is what was later described as the Hierarchy of Being. That things were ordered in the world according to their perfection or participation in the absolute as a reflection of God’s plan.

According to Aquinas, the universe is full of actual beings of which none exists by chance and without purpose. Aquinas holds that each finite being was purposefully brought into existence to perfect the universe. Therefore, any distortion of the purpose of any being consequently affects the entire universe. He opined that, “to take away from the perfection of created things is to detract from the perfection of divine power.”¹⁰ He maintains that the criterion for the rank of beings is the amount of perfection and potentiality a being has in relation to God who is the Most Perfect and the Purest Act. The closer a being is to God, who is the Purest Act, the more perfect it is and the less

⁸ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa Theologica*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: IntelLex. Part I-II Q.91. A.2

⁹ *De Hebdonuulibus*, (author unknown). lect. 2; *In I Metaph.* 1, 10, 154.

¹⁰ Thomas, H. 2007. *Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion: Metaphysics and Practice*. 127.

potentiality and materiality it has in its composition. The closer a being is to prime matter, the more imperfect it is. God, Aquinas believes is a “self-communicative love, and since all other real beings are in some way images, participating in the divine goodness, they all bear the mark within them, according to the nature of each, of this divine attribute.”¹¹ The closer a being is to God who is the purest act, the more perfect it is while the closer a being is to prime matter the more imperfect it is.

All existing entities find their place in the universe in order of hierarchy. This is in form of an imaginary vertical chain extending from the most supreme down to the least. An object’s position is said to depend on the relative proportion of spirit and matter it contains, which implies that, the less spirit and the more matter an existing thing possesses, the lower down its position in the hierarchy. At the bottom is found the various types of inanimate objects such as metals, stones, air, water, fire. Higher up are various members of the vegetative class like, trees and flowers. Next are animals, then humans and divinities or angels. At the apex is God. This shows that beings are differentiated by their positions in a hierarchical order which is a product of their proximity to the absolute according to the amount of spirit they possess. Plato’s list of the hierarchy of being runs in a descending order from the Divine Mind down to inorganic material. He divided this list into two realms; the anti-material and the material realms. The entities which occupy the upper or anti-material realm in their separate hierarchy he considered to be superior to the entities in the lower or material realm. Humans ultimately belong in the lower realm but given the bifurcation of the human being into soul and body, the soul is exalted to the higher realm while the body is trapped below the dividing line.¹²

Beings in African ontology are distinguished by the level of forces they wield and this gives them their positions in the hierarchy of forces. In descending order, one can

¹¹ Norris, C. 2001. *The One and the many*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 33.

¹² Fashola, J. O. 2015. *Being and force towards a unified view*. Germany: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing. 36.

identify how Tempels captures these forces in Bantu thought system. It has God who is the ultimate at the apex of this hierarchy and then the first fathers of men who also are the founders of the different clans.¹³ The dead of the tribe in order of their ancestry, the living humans in order of their vital forces, animal, vegetable and mineral also in order of their individual vital forces. God is Himself seen as a self-galvanising force, the inexhaustible ocean of force. Just as rivers and streams go dry when disconnected from their sources, so do forces in nature cease to exist when they lose connection with God.

God vitalises and sustains other forces in measure of the order of their hierarchy and proximity to Him as the ultimate force. After God, the next in hierarchy are the first fathers of men or the founders of different clans who are directly under the influence of God and are capable of communicating it to all other forces since they are the most important vertical link, the link between God and humans. They are the dead that can best be described as living dead or spiritualised beings that now exist in a higher hierarchy, participating to a certain degree in divine force. Directly below the forces at the spiritual realm are humans who live on the earth and are in fact the most important forces at this level beginning from the eldest to the least in the clan. After human beings, the next in hierarchy are inferior forces which by reason of their nature have been put at the disposal of men. They include; animals, plants, minerals which exist only and by the will of God to increase the vital forces of humans while they are on earth.¹⁴

This notion of the hierarchy of being is also present in the ontology of the Bantu people as advocated by Placide Tempels in his 'Bantu Philosophy'. All beings from the ultimate to the least in hierarchy, Tempels noted are entities which make up the community of forces. Just as individuals in a community interact and influence one another, so do forces. The community of forces is a harmonious one and not a world of conflict between or among forces of say, light, and darkness, good and evil, God and

¹³ Tempels, P. 1959. *Bantu philosophy*. Trans. Rev. Colin King. Paris: Presence Africaine. 41.

¹⁴ Fashola, J. O. 2015. *Being and force towards a unified view*. Germany: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing. 21

Satan. This is because all these forces, even when they clash, they do so for the attainment of harmony of the entire cosmos. According to Tempels; the Bantu universe is not a chaotic tangle of unordered forces blindly struggling with one another. Nor must we believe that this theory of forces is the incoherent product of a savage imagination, or that the action of the same force can be now propitious and now pernicious, without a determining power to justify the fact. Doubtless there are force influences acting in this unforeseeable manner, but this assertion does not allow the conclusion that action occurs in a manner scientifically unpredictable, in a totally irrational mode.¹⁵ Therefore, there are laws governing African ontological system such that the interaction of forces is not an arbitrary engagement of forces without any principle of justice.

The universe in African cosmology is not,

Understood as something discrete and individuated but rather, it is conceived of as a series of interactions and interconnections. This general cosmic vision is particularly applicable in coming to an understanding of the relationship between self and community.¹⁶

This is why Tempels in his description of Bantu psychology stated that; Bantu psychology cannot conceive of man as an individual, as a force existing by itself and apart from its ontological relationships with other living beings and from its connection with animals or inanimate forces around it. The Bantu cannot be a lone being, he feels and knows himself to be a vital force, at this very time to be in intimate and personal relationship with other forces acting above him and below him in the hierarchy of forces. He knows himself to be a vital force, even now influencing some forces, and being

¹⁵ Tempels, P. 1959. *Bantu philosophy*. Trans. Rev. Colin King. Paris: Presence Africaine. 45.

¹⁶ Kochalumchuvattil, T. 2010. The Crisis of Identity in Africa: A Call for Subjectivity. *Kritike*4.1:112.
http://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_7/kochalumchuvattil_june2010.pdf. ISSN 1908-7330. Retrieved; 15th May 2013.

influenced by others. The human being, apart from the ontological hierarchy and the interaction of forces, has no existence in the conceptions of the Bantu.¹⁷ It is for this reason that death is simply a transition from here to there and not in the death of the body. To die an actual death is to lose complete link or interaction with other beings, it is for vital force to suffer complete diminution.

Teleologism in Aquinas Principle of Participation and Inter-subjectivity

In Plato's metaphysics where he expounded on the problem of universals as conceived by Socrates, he explained that when we describe a particular individual thing as beautiful, it is not because that thing is Beauty per se but that it shares in the absolute universal concept of beauty. The same goes for the description we make about goodness, love, perfection and the likes. This is because these qualities exist in the universal sense. They are expressed in individuals at various levels of approximation. For Socrates, it seems that if anything is beautiful besides Beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than because it shares or participates in that beauty and that all things are like this. Socrates goes on to insist that, though the precise details remain mysterious, we can find no better explanation for the sensible experience of something such as beauty other than either the presence or the communion of that Beauty in things.¹⁸

This points out that, the presence of identifiable features in material things presupposes the reality of those features in their own right. For this reason, material things only participate in universal idealistic qualities. Aquinas shares with Neoplatonism the notion that all beings are essentially unities, and at the same time that no beings in the world are simply identical with their being. Because they are not necessary beings. Whatever does not exist by eternal necessity can exist only by sharing in or participating in being. To participate implies a certain degree of difference from the

¹⁷Tempels, P. 1959. *Bantu philosophy*. Trans. Rev. Colin King. Paris: Presence Africaine. 68-69.

¹⁸ David C. Schindler. 2005. What's the difference? on the metaphysics of participation in a Christian context. *The Saint Anselm Journal* 3.1: 5.

one with whom a being participates, for one cannot simply be what one has only through participation. Aquinas says that there is a difference between existence and that which is.¹⁹ The nearer a being is to its cause, the more it does participate in its influence. Hence, if some perfection is more perfectly participated by a group of things the more they approach a certain object, then this is an indication that this object is the cause of the perfection which is participated in various degrees.

The ethical theory that is concerned with the justification of an action based on the end result is called 'Teleologism'. Teleologism took its source from utilitarianism, an ethical theory which is based on the principle of utility and holds that the goal of every action should be to promote the greatest welfare of the greatest number of people.²⁰

In the promotion of this greatest welfare of the greatest number of people, some believe that emphasis should be placed on the action in question and nothing more. This is the view that is referred to as 'act utilitarianism.' It is concerned with the consequences involved in any act. For instance, for a lie to be judged morally wrong, one should first weigh its consequences with reference to its ability to promote the greatest welfare. If an assassin comes after one's father who is hiding somewhere inside the ceiling which one is aware of and the assassin asks about his where about, what should one's response be? Remember that denying knowledge of the where about of one' father in this case amounts to telling a lie in the view of the absolutist. For the act utilitarians, there is nothing morally wrong in this act since it is intended to protect the life of the father at the same time promoting the welfare of the members of his family. It is the performance of the act that advances the welfare of the greater or greatest number of persons without giving considerations to societal, religious or legal constraints that is most important. Rule utilitarianism on the other hand considers the general consequences

¹⁹ David C. Schindler. 2005. What's the difference? on the metaphysics of participation in a Christian context. *The Saint Anselm Journal* 3.1: 5.

²⁰ Uduigwomen, A. F. 2006. *Introducing ethics: trends, problems and perspectives.* Calabar: JOCHRISHAM Publishers. 42.

of actions. For instance, the rule that lying is generally bad for the society. In this case, rules are considered valid if and only if their consequences promote the general good.

Teleologism in the view of John Stout Mill holds that there can be only one ultimate standard of conduct which is teleological and driven towards the promotion of happiness. Mill's support for this position is clearly seen in his assertion that,

The general principle to which all rules of practice ought to conform, and the test by which they should be tried, is that of conduciveness to the happiness of mankind, or rather, of all sentient beings: in other words, that the promotion of happiness is the ultimate principle of Teleology.²¹

By teleology, he means an ethical approach or evaluation of actions that is concerned with utility or a desired end result. Teleologism which is also known as the consequentialist theory is “based on the notion of choosing one’s action so as to maximize the values to be expected as consequence of those actions.”²²

Aquinas states that a community is made up of different people who comprise statesmen, artisans, soldiers, farmers and others. He believes that a society can function well if only nature produces people who are physically strong, some intellectually keen and others fearless. He believes that nature for the purpose of realising human ends will continue to supply the society with all such as is needed to make the people comfortable and viable.²³ He believes that humans as beings which possess reason are those who are

²¹ Mill. J. S. 1997. In Roger Crisp. ed. *Mill on utilitarianism*. New York: Routledge. 160.

²² Hull, R.T. The variety of ethical theories, speech given at Buffalo Psychiatric Centre, March 27, 1979. 1.

²³ Ada M0-J, Ada J.A, Egomo J.E. 2012. Saint Thomas Aquinas theories on man, society, government, law and applicability of these ideas in the administration of Nigerian secondary schools. *World J Young Researchers* 2.5: 8

able to plan and order their actions for the sake of an end and are able to set themselves in inter-subjective motion toward an end whereas those beings without reason have to be set in motion by someone or something else, because they do not grasp the concept of an end. Hence, it is the comprehension of which is the mark of self-acting individuals, and the self-acting individual, one who can bring oneself to an end, is the rational being.²⁴

Aquinas' notion of reason is therefore essential to understanding his view of human ends. This is because reason is that quality which measures and gives direction to human acts but, since direction can only be given with a view to an end hence, the function of reason is to plan for an end. In the 'Summa Theologica', Aquinas describes the necessity for togetherness and social living for man and also explains the exclusive nature of reason and will and their teleological relationship with human actions in the following words;

Of actions done by man those alone are properly called 'human', which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as 'the faculty and will of reason.' Therefore, those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions 'of a man', but not properly 'human' actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power in accordance with the

²⁴ Thomas Aquinas. 1966. *Summa theologiae*, trans. T. Gilby. vol. 28. London. Part I-II. Q. 90. A.1.

nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore all human actions must be for an end.²⁵

Aristotle defines the end that is proper to human beings, or the human good, as a kind of activity of the soul, a function which man must perform based upon his particular nature qua man. Man is distinguished by nature from all other animals and creatures in that he has the ability to reason. Thus, the end of man is to act according to reason, and such an action is specific to humans, what Aristotle called praxis. But because desire, not the process of reasoning, is what causes action, praxis does not follow simply from the human capability of thinking in ways that other animals cannot. It follows, instead, from a specific kind of desire which Aristotle describes as thought related to desire or desire related to thought. This thoughtful desire is indeed what is unique to humans; as Salkever argues, it is what is at the heart of what Aristotle means by defining human beings as rational beings: beings whose thoughts and desires can interact to produce a characteristic way of life.²⁶

The notion of rationality is at the heart of the argument for freedom of the will to choose which action produces the best consequence. Humans are rational animals who reason from experience, act freely and choose from several possible courses. Aquinas argues that human beings have free decision from the very fact that they are rational. Rationality or reason he believes exerts a causal influence on the will but it is through various operations of the will and intellect that one enjoys freedom of decision.²⁷ Not blind decisions, but those that are directed towards ends.

²⁵ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa theologica*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part I-II. Q.1. A.1, O. 2.

²⁶ Salkever, S. 1990. *Finding the mean*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 67.

²⁷ Denise Ryan. 2014. *Thomas Aquinas on human nature*. Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of MA of the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. Presented to the Faculty of Philosophy National University of Ireland, Maynooth. 42.

In explaining the exclusive nature of reason and will to man and their teleological relationship with human actions, Norris Clarke in corroborating Aquinas' position gives a picture of what self-communicative and inter-subjective motion really means. He explains that a conception of being in this manner,

Plunges us immediately into real being as a community of distinct but inter-communicating centres giving and receiving from each other across the bridge of self-expressive action. In a word, it reveals to us that, to be is to be together, actively present to each other.²⁸

This act of willingly coming together to form solidarity is in Locke's conception in the nature of humans as free agents. All free, equal, and independent, such that no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it.²⁹ This mode of existence is quite different from the mode of existence of Leibniz's monads which are closed and are self-sufficient.

To be is to be together and humans need others in order to have everything they need for life and happiness, they have natural impulse to associate with others. This implies that the attainment of the life of happiness is one of the telos of inter-subjectivity. When individuals therefore consider each other to be one and united with others, they would care for each other and when they view others as moral agents and co-inhabitants of the earth, they would not enslave or use them for selfish benefits.

²⁸ Norris, C. 2001. *The one and the many*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 38

²⁹ Locke, J. 1690. *Second treatise of government*. 31. Retrieved 3rd August, 2018, from www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm.

Based on the rules or norms that govern the giving and receiving of benefits, in exchange relationships, benefits are given with the expectation of receiving a comparable benefit in return or a repayment for a benefit received previously. In contrast, the norm in communal relationships is to give benefits in response to needs or to demonstrate a general concern for the other person.³⁰

This attitude of care which is necessary for the sustenance of healthy individual and community relations is manifest in deep regard and concern for the interest of others as seen in tolerance, good neighbourliness, solidarity, humaneness, courtesy, and sportsmanship.³¹

Inter-subjective relationship with others is believed to be a continuum which means it does not end at death. Life for some groups is very important, they celebrate when a child is born, and celebrate when an individual dies especially in a ripe old age. Rites are even performed during the stages of development of an individual beginning from birth, adolescence to adulthood so, when death occurs, funeral rites grace the ceremony. All these go to show how the people appreciate each other and believe that their relationship or interactions do not end at death. Death is simply a transition from 'here' to 'there' so, individual and community relationship is a continuum, and this is why ancestors are believed to intervene in the affairs of the community when the need arises.

It is important to note here that the notion of community which is a group of people with a common background, shared values, interests and who live together has

³⁰ Clark, M. S, and Mills, J. 1993. The difference between communal and exchange relationships: What it is and is not. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*. 19:684.

³¹ Uduigwomen, A. F. 2006. *Introducing ethics: trends, problems & perspectives*. Calabar: Joechrisham Publisher. 180.

now acquired a new interpretation, as it is no longer limited to people living together. With the aid of technology, people from different geographical zones who do not have physical contacts with each other but have common values and interests now form virtual or cyber-communities. We now live in a globalising world where society is becoming more and more inclusive but not without its attendant problems, especially with respect to strained individual, and community relationship that is crippling societal and interpersonal bonds. Riesman noted the dominance of media in our lives as moving us from being inner-directed people in the society to becoming other-directed. What he means here is that people are no more getting guided by social norms rather they are being guided by social media.³²

Society, by uniting men's efforts, achieves benefits for the individual and for families through cooperation that are greater than what each man could obtain by himself. Not only material advantages but also moral, cultural and intellectual benefits depend on and derive from social life.³³ Because every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labour and leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his own. Hence, it is to be observed that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed.³⁴ Disharmony is a threat to

³² Delaney, T. 2005. *Contemporary social theory investigation and application*. Pearson Prentice Hall. 265.

³³ Address by Antonio Fazio Governor of the Bank of Italy Roccasecca, 11 March 2000. The contemporary relevance of Thomas Aquinas at Comune Di Roccasecca, Province of Frosinone on the *Thomist Celebration of St. Thomas Aquinas*

³⁴ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa theologiae*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part. II-II. Q.66. A.2.

peace and happiness therefore, the notion of sharing being intrinsic to participation is necessary for the attainment of happiness as the telos of human life.

Aquinas on Leadership as a Medium of Inter-subjectivity

Grint makes a distinction of four kinds of leadership theories which are; trait, contingency, situational and constitutive theories. He categorises these according to whether they emphasise the individual or the context as essential. He describes the trait theory as essentialist in terms of the leader but non-essentialist in terms of context. This meaning that a leader is a leader under any circumstances. The difficulty of applying this to a political setting is that the context is constantly changing and can be different depending on the nature of particular challenges, or the different actors with whom they interact. Political leaders' networks are not static, as is implied by the idea of a prevailing mode of working, instead they are highly fluid. Changes in these, or the wider context, influence the contingencies of leadership. He describes the contingency theory as essentialist both in terms of the leader and the context. Both the essence of the individual and the context are knowable and critical. The situational theory is essentialist in terms of the context, but not in terms of the leader: this is because certain contexts demand certain kinds of leadership and we do need to be very clear about where we are. Situational theory like contingency theory acknowledges the importance of context and thus, offers advantages over trait accounts. However, they overlook the ways in which leader and context may be interdependent. This is a limitation because political leaders are concerned with developing far-reaching policies that govern the authorising environment within which organisations and institutions operate. The constitutive theory is non-essentialist in terms of the leader and the context. The meaning of context and leader are both contested, but leadership must still be perceived as appropriate.³⁵

Leadership is a social influence process in which the leader seeks the voluntary participation of the subjects in an effort to reach societal goals. Therefore, the contingency theory which is essentialist in terms of both the leader and the context as

³⁵ Grint Keith. 2000. *The arts of leadership*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2-3.

both the essence of the individual and the context are knowable and critical is considered most preferred by this research. In the ‘*Summa contra Gentiles*’, Aquinas proposes that the best form of government for a multitude is to be governed by one. This for him is obvious from the telos of governance which is peace, for peace and unity of the subjects is the end of governance and one is a more apt source of unity than many.³⁶

The best form of government therefore, is in a state or kingdom where one person has the power to preside over all. At the same time, this individual has under him others who also have governing powers in such a way that all share in a government of this kind, both because all are eligible to govern, and because everyone is involved in determining the rules. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy or government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose their rulers. In Aquinas’ strong view, such was the form of government established by the Divine Law. For Moses and his successors governed the people in such a way that each of them was ruler over all. Nevertheless, it was a democratic government in so far as the rulers were chosen from all the people.³⁷

There is therefore need to have someone take the position of leadership if the society must advance in peace and safety. This is why Aquinas recognises that men, as individuals, are interested in a variety ends. This means that, every man pursues his own particular goals. However, this behaviour is ultimately destructive of social life as the particular interest and the common good are not identical. It is the common good that must be sought after and attained for that is what keeps a community together. This is why he argues that there could be no social life for many persons living together unless their number was set in authority to care for the common good. Hence, man needs to be

³⁶ Thomas Aquinas. 2005. *Summa contra Gentiles*. Trans. Joseph Rickaby. U.S.A: The Catholic Primer. 4. 76: 4.

³⁷ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa theologica*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part. I-II. Q.105. A.2.

directed by a reason other than his own which directs him in his actions towards others. Just as his own reason rules himself, there has to be an intelligence which rules the community of men. This is Aquinas' justification for political subjection. There must be a controlling influence which orders unity out of diversity, by directing each individual to act in accordance with the common good.³⁸

This is necessary because, haven moved from the state of nature, each member of the society has given up his freedom into the hands of the society, and therein to the governors, whom the society hath set over itself, with this express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good, and the preservation of their property. Now, this power which every man has in the state of nature, and which he parts with to the society in all such cases where the society can secure him, is to use such means, for the preserving of his own property, as he thinks good, and nature allows him; and to punish the breach of the law of nature in others, so as according to the best of his reason may most conduce to the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind.³⁹

Anyone that should be chosen from among the people to represent them must possess certain traits which qualify such a person to act as true representative of the people. The kind of ruler must be someone who will rule the city in justice and equity which form the bonds of human society. A ruler therefore, must be chosen because of his virtues, and not because of birth or nobility, those who choose their ruler using the latter as their criteria, hoping that he will make the city friendlier or more peaceable, make a terrible mistake because destruction and sedition arise in cities when one part is favoured

³⁸ Holly Hamilton Bleakley.1999. The art of ruling in Aquinas' 'De Regimine Principum.' *History of Political Thought* 20. 4: 591. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26219662>. Accessed: 11-07-2018.

³⁹ Locke, J. 1690. *Second treatise of government*.54. Retrieved 3rd August, 2018, from www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm.

over another. Thus, it is of utmost importance to have a virtuous ruler, for if the ruler has idle virtues, then the good effect of the ruler ceases.⁴⁰

In discussing the virtues which are necessary for being able to lead a specifically good human life, Aristotle acknowledges that nature has not provided us with these excellences. However, she has given us the capacity to receive them. This capacity he emphasised is brought to maturity by habit. So, developing virtues is compared to an art. As arts are learned and improved upon by the repeated performance of them, so do we become virtuous by practising virtue and we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.⁴¹ This goes to show that social life is not preserved simply by the natural inclination to be in a society just as man's natural impulse to be virtuous is not enough to make him virtuous, so is man's natural impulse to be in society insufficient to create and maintain the common bonds which characterise social existence. Just as art is to complete nature by guiding men in their actions to make them virtuous, so also is art to complete nature by building on the natural impulses of individual men to create a community. For this reason, it is the duty of the ruler to create both the community and virtuous men.⁴² He takes responsibility for the kind of end that results from the mutual existence of the members of the society.

This is why Hamilton compares,

The ruler's role as the formal cause of the city both to God
as the creator and formal cause of the world, and to the soul

⁴⁰ Holly Hamilton Bleakley.1999. The art of ruling in Aquinas' 'De Regimine Principum.' *History of Political Thought* 20. 4: 579. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26219662>. Accessed: 11-07-2018.

⁴¹ Aristotle, 2000. *Nicomachean Ethics*. trans. & ed. C. UK: Cambridge University Press. Book II-I. 1103b.

⁴² Holly Hamilton Bleakley.1999. The art of ruling in Aquinas' 'De Regimine Principum' *History of Political Thought* Vol. 20, No. 4. p. 590. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26219662>. Accessed: 11-07-2018.

as the formal cause of the body. God's function as creator was not only to create things themselves, but also included the orderly distribution of all things throughout the universe. The creation of the world was, in large part, ordering of its various parts: separating night from day, the heights from the depths the waters from the dry land etc. By the same token, the soul as the actuality of a living thing is what makes a whole out of the thing's various parts by ordering those various parts in a function that is above their individual functions. Hence, as the formal cause of the city, the ruler is what makes the city what it is. He creates an integral whole— a unity out of an array of individual men by ordering them towards the common good.⁴³

According to Samuel Beer, Aquinas' conception of society was dominated by the idea of hierarchy where he affirms an ontology of inequality in which every individual kind was organised into a hierarchy of being, ranging from the most inclusive and perfect at the apex, down to the least inclusive and most imperfect at the base of the pyramid. The implication of this according to Beer is that since all parts of the whole ought to be directed to the perfection of the whole, in the same manner, within human society it is necessary that a governing power direct the various parts of the society to their proper ends towards the common good.⁴⁴ This underscores the importance of governance in a society. It is for this reason John Locke concludes that there cannot be a government when the society is dissolved and that no society experiences dissolution without an institution of another except by external influence.

⁴³ Holly Hamilton Bleakley.1999. The art of ruling in Aquinas' 'De Regimine Principum.' *History of Political Thought* 20. 4: 592. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26219662>. Accessed: 11-07-2018.

⁴⁴ Nicholas Aroney. 2007. Subsidiarity, federalism and the best constitution: Thomas Aquinas on city, province and empire. *Law and Philosophy* 26. 2: 165. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27652614>. Accessed: 11-07-2018

He that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of government ought in the first place to distinguish between the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government. That which makes the community, and brings men out of the loose state of nature, into one politic society, is the agreement which everyone has with the rest to incorporate, and act as one body, and so be one distinct commonwealth. The usual, and almost only way whereby this union is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest upon them: for in that case, (not being able to maintain and support themselves, as one entire and independent body) the union belonging to that body which consisted therein, must necessarily cease, and so everyone return to the state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself, and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some other society. Whenever the society is dissolved, it is certain the government of that society cannot remain. (John Locke)

Gregory Reichberg summary of Aristotle's notion of the state which has strong influence on Aquinas is that peoples' ends are only achievable in the state. Aristotle considered the city-state to be a composition of households and villages. The latter, he said, are formed to secure the bare necessities of life, whereas the city-state, being self-sufficient, is concerned with securing the good life. The polis is therefore prior to families and villages in nature or essence, just as the whole is prior to the part. This is because Aristotle insisted that humans are by nature political animals, animals whose ends are fulfilled only in the polis.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Nicholas Aroney. 2007. Subsidiarity, federalism and the best constitution: Thomas Aquinas on city, province and empire. *Law and Philosophy* 26. 2: 176. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27652614>. Accessed: 11-07-2018

Nicholas Aroney noted that not only does Aquinas allow for a very wide variety of private and public associations within the context of the city, but he also writes regularly of political societies on a much wider scale, such as kingdoms, nations and provinces, themselves composed of a multiplicity of households, villages, towns and cities. He observed that a nation for Aquinas is clearly a community on a scale much larger than a city, and that the good of the nation is more divine than that of the city, family, or person.⁴⁶

This progression, starting with the individual and moving progressively through the categories of household, neighbourhood, city, kingdom and province; and culminating in the Empire is suggestive of what Otto von Gierke considered to be typical of medieval political thought. That is, the conception of a universal order consisting of a manifold and graduated system of intermediating units lying between the individual on the one hand, and a universal empire and church on the other.⁴⁷ In all of this, therefore, Aquinas was adapting the Aristotelian account of the city-state to a medieval institutional context in which there was a wide range of jurisdictions, ecclesiastical and secular, ranging in scale and complexity from the smallest rural village to the empire and church as a whole.⁴⁸

Aquinas is of the opinion that different societies are confronted with different social, political, economic and cultural challenges and will for this reason construct different social norms and laws that will regulate the life of the people. Each society he believes should devise its own laws but at the same time, since the natural law is applicable to all, universal compliance is required. Aquinas therefore makes a distinction

⁴⁶ Nicholas Aroney. 2007. Subsidiarity, federalism and the best constitution: Thomas Aquinas on city, province and empire. *Law and Philosophy* 26. 2: 187. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27652614>. Accessed: 11-07-2018

⁴⁷ Otto von Gierke. 1968. *Political theories of the middle age*. Frederick Maitland. trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 20.

⁴⁸ James Blythe. 1992. *Ideal government and the mixed constitution in the middle ages*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 46.

between the laws that apply to a particular people that is, laws that are basic for social coordination and collaboration especially in relation to economic transactions from the universal natural laws which are norms that are meant to regulate moral life.⁴⁹

Aquinas on Happiness as the Telos of Human Life

The word ‘happiness’ is open to many interpretations which are often misconstrued. When used in a broad sense, the word happiness is synonymous with quality of life or well-being. In this meaning happiness denotes that life is good, but does not specify what is good about that life. It is a general assumption that people live happier in well-ordered societies, where people can count on the rule of law and where government organisations function properly.

In the ‘Summa Theologica,’ Aquinas defines happiness as “the attainment of the perfect good.”⁵⁰ It follows that anyone who is capable of achieving the perfect good can attain happiness. In Aquinas’ view, human beings cannot find perfect happiness in this life. In fact, perfect happiness in this life is in principle an impossible idea because it would contradict our very nature as finite and imperfect beings. Human life itself is fragmented and we have only a precarious hold on ourselves. We are temporal creatures whose nature is to look beyond the present to the future, to the good we do not yet possess, to the person we have not yet become.⁵¹ Therefore, even if human beings naturally desire the good which they have to be permanent, it is certain that the goods of the present life pass away since life itself passes away. However, we naturally desire and would wish that life and the goods endure forever.

⁴⁹ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa Theologica*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part I-II. Q.95. A. 4.

⁵⁰ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa theologica*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part I-II. Q.5. A. 1.

⁵¹ Stephen Wang. 2007. Aquinas on human happiness and the natural desire for God. *New Blackfriars* 88. 1015: 328. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43251137>. Accessed: 11-07-2018

In man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own existence, according to its nature. According to this inclination whatever is a means of preserving human life, and prevents its termination, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of reason, which is proper to him: as man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.⁵²

The above is evidence to the fact that humans are continually naturally inclined towards the pursuit of happiness and will continue to do so even when it appears illusive. This is why even in extreme cases like suicide, the individual involved expects to escape misery with the hope of attaining better condition of happiness. Therefore, it can be said that man strives for happiness through many activities. He is in potentiality throughout his life, actively involved in various occupations that would lead to happiness. Just as nature does not fail human beings in things that are necessary, although it has not provided them with weapons and clothing, as it provided other animals, because it gave them reason and hands, with which they are able to get these things for themselves; so neither did it fail human beings in things that are necessary towards the attainment of happiness, although it did not give them the means by which they could attain them since this is impossible. But it did give them freedom, with which they can turn to God, so that He may make them happy.⁵³

⁵² Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa theologiae*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part.I-II. Q.94. A.2.

⁵³ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa Theologica*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part I-II. Q.5:Art. 5.

Here, one can see that Aquinas was greatly influenced by the basic premises of Aristotle's teleological metaphysics on which he builds most of his theological foundation for the intrinsic ends of entities. Which is that entities or creatures naturally advance towards the creator in such a way that it reveals its creator through a graduated hierarchy of beings where human life receives an elevated status because human intellect can be cognizant of the order that governs life by recognising the natural laws of both human and sub-human life? Human reason can understand how natural laws orient all beings towards their good, which, when realised, perfects them. Unlike animals, however, human beings cannot rely solely on natural instincts to achieve their good. As beings acting upon rational conceptions about the world, humans need to represent to themselves the goals they are to pursue. They need to make the implicit law that governs their lives explicit.

Man strives for happiness through many activities. He is in potentiality throughout his life, actively involved in various occupations that would lead to happiness. For Locke, the end of government is the happiness and good of mankind for which there is no alternative. He therefore asks, which is best for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed, when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction, and not the preservation of the properties of their people?⁵⁴ Mill sums this up when he said that, "the creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure."⁵⁵ However, a distinction that is found in Thomas's ethics is that man is ordered to an end other than himself while the doctrine

⁵⁴ Locke, J. 1690. *Second treatise of government*. 70 Retrieved 3rd August, 2018, from www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm.

⁵⁵ Mill, J. S. *In Defense of Utilitarianism*. Reprinted from Mill's *Utilitarianism* (1863) in Timmons, M. (ed.) *Conduct and Character: Readings in Moral Theory*, Third Edition. Canada: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999. 115.

of utilitarianism refers to something created and is dependent on the judgement of man and therefore limited and subject to error.

Aquinas is of the view that human desires necessarily point to God and that we can be brought to an initial, imprecise conception of God by reflecting on the nature of human desire. He opined that,

To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is the happiness of human beings. For we naturally desire happiness, and what is naturally desired by us must be naturally known to us. This, however, is not simply speaking to know that God exists, just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that our perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.⁵⁶

There is no doubt that there is an inherent desire for happiness in man. That is why it is often believed that happiness is the greatest goal in all of human endeavours. Nevertheless, the irony is that, the more humans pursue after happiness, the more it seems to elude them and this seems to be the reason for suffering in the world. That is, the quest for perfect happiness in a world where it is not possible.

Aquinas' study of human action leads him to draw two conclusions about the goal of human life. First, he said, human beings by their very nature as creatures of intellect and will, desire a perfect happiness which cannot be found in this life and can only be found in union with God. Second, union with God surpasses the very nature of

⁵⁶ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa theologiae*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part I-II. Q.1:Art. 2. O.1.

every creature including human beings. These two conclusions Stephen Wang says create a paradox. The perfect and crowning good, to which we naturally tend, cannot be reached naturally. Therefore, we have a natural desire for God which cannot be naturally fulfilled. Aquinas goes on to argue that there must be another way, provided by God, which can lead to our perfect happiness.⁵⁷ He believes that, whether human, animal or inanimate act is done for the sake of an end. Animals tend toward it by their natural appetite while human beings can knowingly and willingly set themselves in motion towards an end.

Happiness for Aquinas is the perfect and sufficient good which excludes every ill and fulfils every desire. In this life, every ill cannot be excluded and the desire for good in this life cannot be satisfied. Aquinas believes that human desires in this life never end. As long as we are living, we are unsatisfied with what we have. The desire for a good always reflects a desire to become what we are not, because in every good we seek we are always seeking our own good, that is, the being that we do not yet have.⁵⁸

The notion of happiness in Aquinas is considered as the end towards which humans pursue. This is because, the reality of the natural law is evident in the actions of humans as rational creatures and they derive their inclinations to act towards an end from the eternal law which is imprinted in them by virtue of their participation in it. For Aquinas, the law as a rule or measure can be in a person in two different ways;

In one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine

⁵⁷ Stephen Wang. 2007. Aquinas on human happiness and the natural desire for God. *New Blackfriars* 88. 1015: 322. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43251137>. Accessed: 11-07-2018

⁵⁸ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa theologiae*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part I-II, Q.5, A.3.

providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law... it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends.⁵⁹

An understanding of proper acts towards proper ends cannot be divorced from the notion of morality. The central tenets of Aquinas' moral philosophy can be stated in three principles. The first is the principle on the basis of which good and bad things of any kind are differentiated. This implies that, for something to be good, it must be good in every respect but for something to be bad, just one defect suffices. This principle is grounded in Aquinas' definition of goodness as fullness of being. The principle receives justification from a logical perspective when it is claimed that for an argument to be valid, it must be free from all errors or fallacies but for an argument to be invalid, just one error or fallacy is sufficient. The application of this principle to human actions Kenneth Kemp noted, requires identification of the four various relevant aspects of a human action which Aquinas identifies as Fourfold Goodness Principle which are, the genus, the species also known as object, the end, and the circumstances. However, Kenneth Kemp noted again that only three of these are aspects with respect to which a human action could be bad which are, the object, the end, and the circumstances.⁶⁰

The above is closely related to Aquinas' discussion of prudence which offers an illuminating account of the art of ruling as creating virtuous subjects. His general account of prudence very much follows from Aristotle. For Aquinas, prudence is that ability to deliberate well in specific situations. It is practical reason, the quality that deals with human actions and in ordering those actions towards an end, that means, human good that is achievable here and now. Prudence is not what sets the end for man this is

⁵⁹ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa theologiae*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part I-II. Q.91:A. 2.

⁶⁰ Kenneth W. Kemp. *The moral philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* lecture presented at the Thomistic Conference in Vilnius, Lithuania on July 2000.

the function of reason. Rather, prudence is the quality which determines the means to arrive at this end. Aquinas argues that prudence is essential for achieving the good-for-man, as acting virtuously is a matter of selecting the proper ends, as well as the right choice of means. As with Aristotle, Aquinas stresses that right action consists of keeping to a mean decided by reason. Hence, prudence is specifically concerned with how and through what we strike the virtuous mean. For though keeping the mean is the aim of moral virtue, nevertheless, it is in the correct marshalling of the means to end that the mean is found. Prudence therefore, is what completes our natural instincts to be virtuous.⁶¹

Conclusion

This chapter examined the argument for society in Aquinas' Principle of Participation against the backdrop of Leibniz's individualistic metaphysics as discoursed in the previous chapter. The Principle of Participation serves as a springboard that leads to a proper conception of social order in the next chapter. In order to properly situate this discourse, this chapter analysed issues on the Principle of Participation and the hierarchy of Being' which laid the foundation for an understanding that the notion of participation which is ontologically hierarchical, means to receive partially what belongs to another in a universal way, that is, to receive only part of what belongs to another fully, and so merely to share in it without exhausting it. As such, the closer a being is to prime matter, the more imperfect it is. While the closer a being is to God the Supreme Being, the more perfect it is. This is because God is self-communicative and since all other beings are in some way participating in the His divine goodness, they all bear the mark within them, according to their proximity to Him.

The notion of teleologism as found and discoursed in Aquinas Principle of Participation in relation to the notion of inter-subjectivity provided an understanding that

⁶¹ Holly Hamilton Bleakley. 1999. The art of ruling in Aquinas' 'De Regimine Principum' *History of Political Thought* 20. 4: 595. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26219662>. Accessed: 11-07-2018.

the notion of participation is socially and ontologically teleological. That is, nature for the purpose of realising human ends continues to supply the society with all such as is needed to make the people comfortable and viable.⁶² This gives the assurance that humans as beings which possess reason are those who are able to plan and order their actions for the sake of an end and are able to set themselves in inter-subjective relationship for the sake of an end whereas those beings without reason have to be set in motion by someone or something else, because they do not grasp the concept of an end.

The notion of leadership as a medium of inter-subjectivity provided the information that one of the telos of leadership is to create an atmosphere of inter-subjectivity by uniting men's efforts in such a way that will be beneficial for the individual and the group through cooperation that are greater than what each man could obtain by himself. The chapter summarises the notion of leadership as a social influence process in which the leader seeks the voluntary participation of the subjects in an effort to reach societal goals from an understanding of the contingency theory which is essentialist in terms of both the leader and the context as both the essence of the individual and the context are knowable and critical towards peace and harmony. Therefore, the best form of government in Aquinas is in a state or kingdom where one person has the power to preside over all. At the same time, this individual has under him others who also have governing powers in such a way that all share in a government of this kind, both because all are eligible to govern, and because everyone is involved in determining the rules. Aquinas therefore makes a distinction between the laws that apply to a particular people that is, laws that are basic for social coordination and collaboration especially in relation to economic transactions from the universal natural laws which are norms that are meant to regulate moral life.

⁶² Ada M0-J, Ada J. A, Egomo J. E. 2012. Saint Thomas Aquinas theories on man, society, government, law and applicability of these ideas in the administration of Nigerian secondary schools. *World J Young Researchers* 2.5: 8.

The last section focused on another very important telos of leadership which is happiness. Aquinas defines happiness as “the attainment of the perfect good.”⁶³ It follows that anyone who is capable of achieving the perfect good can attain happiness. It was noted that humans who are in potentiality throughout their lives are actively involved in various occupations that would lead to happiness and therefore strive for happiness through many activities. Happiness for Aquinas is the perfect and sufficient good which excludes every ill and fulfils every desire. The notion of happiness is considered as the end towards which humans pursue. This is because, the reality of the natural law is evident in the actions of humans as rational creatures and they derive their inclinations to act towards an end from the eternal law which is imprinted in them by virtue of their participation in it. As for Locke, the end of government is the happiness and good of humankind for which there is no alternative.

⁶³ Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa theologiae*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part I-II. Q.5. A. 1.

CHAPTER FOUR

LEIBNIZ'S MONADOLOGISM, INTER-SUBJECTIVITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL ORDER

Introduction

This chapter examines the extent to which Leibniz's monadologism as discoursed in the previous chapters pose a challenge for the quest of social order. Its objective is to explain how the culture of individualism which is central to Leibniz's monadology strains inter-subjectivity, thereby in particular, posing threat of peace and security which play out in form of challenge of corruption and terrorism. Leibniz's monadologism is individualistic and as such, against inter-subjectivity or social relations. This deterministic, windowless and closed metaphysics contradicts the reality in our social world. As seen in chapter two, metaphysical orientations have implications for the society. The individualism of Leibniz's metaphysics in a social world would lead to a disordered and dysfunctional society. An example is expressed in the exhibition of egoistic and solipsistic tendencies which show no concern for the other. This form of behaviour threatens the lives and existence of others who would be seen as mere means to ends. This tendency which strains inter-subjectivity could strain peaceful coexistence thereby leading to insecurity and crimes such as corruption and terrorism which are the examples in this research.

The world has over the years experienced various dimensions of crises and security situations which have their roots in individualistic tendencies and from which it is still trying to recover. An example is the event of the Second World War whose unpleasant aftermaths continue to linger for generations. Various countries, states, communities, groups and individuals have been involved in some form of crises and security situations or the other. So, crises or conflicts which breed social disorder are not new phenomena on the world stage as Thomas Hobbes has said.

For Thomas Hobbes, crises define the state of nature where the life of man was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Since no individual lives in isolation from the

society, it is believed that we all have shared and inter-subjective experiences as advocated in Aquinas' Principle of Participation which argues for community and social order. Every people form a social web with each other and each individual person is a strand in that web. This means that whatever happens to the one no sooner than later affects the other. Crisis in one part of a society if not properly checked has the tendency of spreading to other parts. If a problem is to be resolved and social order restored, the Principle of Participation requires all individuals to be collectively involved.

In a world of perceived uncertainty and danger, the desire for security becomes a central concern of both individuals and political authorities for action. In terms of security in Nigeria for example, the overarching strategic vision is to make Nigeria a violence-free, safe, peaceful, self-reliant, prosperous and strong nation. Her mission is to apply all elements of national power to ensure physical security, build individual and collective prosperity, cause national development and promote her influence in regional, continental and global affairs.¹

Conceptualising the Notion of Social Order

There is a close relationship between the concepts of morality, culture and social order. This is because one cannot talk about morality in a vacuum, as it has to be in relation to the 'other', which implies the society. When we talk about the society, we necessarily make reference to the culture and values that bind a people together for an ordered relationship. In Francis Offor's analysis of the notion of morality in the Hobbesian sense, he noted that morality "is a creation of the self for the sake of social order and peace."² He is of the view that, the laws of nature merely enjoin us to do things, but there is no moral obligation implied until men have moved up to a political society. He believes that it is at the level of society that men covenant, not only to give up some of their liberty

¹ National Security Strategy Federal Republic of Nigeria November, 2014. 4.

² Offor, F. 2005. From chaos to order: the role of the self in Hobbes' moralism. In Elvis Imafidon. ed. *The ethics of subjectivity: perspectives since the dawn of modernity*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 12.

but to also keep the terms of the covenant. It is for this reason he concluded that we are not moral creatures until we have moved through a social contract into a society in which we are obliged to follow that society's contract. So, without the social contract in the state of nature, there is no right or wrong when we act against other people or do any type of act. This underscores the place of social contract in the realisation of social order.³

Francis Offor's conception of the notion of 'world order' is also necessary for an understanding of the notion of social order. He conceives of 'world order' at three different levels thus; the first is that it can be used to describe any arrangement of the reality or relation between the different parts that make up the world. The second is that, it can be used to denote the conditions for the good life and the third which is of interest in this research is what he refers to as those conditions that should prevail for humans who are different in many ways to live together relatively well in one planet in such a way that conflicts and injustices would be minimised.⁴

Wilson and Jarikre noted that,

Social order is a concept applicable only with a society. It cannot be discussed in a vacuum but within a group of people living within a particular society with some shared ways of life as observed among the Swahili, Igbo, Lugbara and so on. A society is composed of people interacting on the basis of shared beliefs, customs, values and activities with common patterns which govern their interaction and make up the culture of the society. This implies that a

³ Offor, F. 2005. From chaos to order: the role of the self in Hobbes' moralism. In Elvis Imafidon. ed. *The ethics of subjectivity: perspectives since the dawn of modernity*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 17.

⁴ Offor, F. 2009. The modern Leviathan and the challenge of world order: Thomas Hobbes revisited. *Journal of Philosophy and Nature* 5.1: 27.

society must have shared beliefs as well as customs and values alongside culture to ensure order. Worthy of note is the fact that a society could be small, large and sometimes very large and there could be smaller societies under the canopy of a larger one. Arguably, societies which experience incessant cases of crises are mainly those that do not share common ways of life.⁵

The social theorist, Emile Durkheim conceives of social order as a set of shared social norms while Karl Marx is of the opinion that social order is the relations of production or economic structure. Mathias Jarikre who believes that social order can be contrasted to social chaos or disorder and refers to social order as a stable state of society in which the existing social order is accepted and maintained by members of that society also describes social order as “a particular set or system of linked social structures, institutions, relations, customs, values and practices which conserve, maintain and enforce certain patterns of relating and behaving.”⁶ Social order therefore, is a product of the decisions of individuals in a society to relinquish their wills, rights and freedom to a single authority for the purpose of gaining peace and security of lives and property. This description owes its credit to Thomas Hobbes who conceives of the social contract as process through which individuals surrender their freedoms to the Leviathan who in turn guarantees their peace and security. This is an indication that social order is achievable when individuals willingly submit to an authority they have unanimously chosen for themselves.

⁵ Nsikanabasi U. Wilson and Mathias Jarikre. 2016. African culture and the problem of social order. In Oyeshile and Offor. eds. *Ethics , governance and social order in Africa*. Ibadan: Zenith BookHouse Ltd. 290.

⁶ Mathias Jarikre. 2016. Ethnicity, Governance and social order in Africa. In Oyeshile and Offor. eds. *Ethics, governance and social order in Africa*. Ibadan: Zenith BookHouse Ltd. 223.

Broadly speaking, the concept of social order is viewed under utilitarian, compulsion and cultural approaches. Wilson and Jarikre aptly summarised these approaches thus; that the utilitarian approach views order in the society as being for the interest of the individual elements of the society as such, facilitates socio-economic development. The compulsion approach emphasises the use of force by those in position to dominate and enforce order in the society. Here, the military, judiciary, spiritual and economic power could be employed to ensure order in the society. The cultural approach stresses the role of shared norms and values. It states that the unity of society or its order arises naturally from the relations among men. These relations of people are governed by sets of shared rules and values which stabilise people's relationships and contribute to the unity and solidarity of the group or society.⁷

Rao submits that, within the common social boundaries of society, many and different kinds of social groups are pursuing a wide variety of activities. These groups may be mutually conflicting and their activities may be contradictory also. In the midst of these differences, divisions, conflicts and contradictions, society strives and struggles to maintain stability and order. Rao further observes that sociologists have developed two theoretical models in their attempts to analyse the unity of society, that is, the integration of whole social life which are; the value consensus and the conflict models. The former he says, stresses the importance of shared values and rules in bringing about unity and that a network of rules and values stabilises people's relationships which in turn contributes to the unity and solidarity of the society.⁸

From social perspective, a human monad or being is at the same time both an individual and a social entity. Against Leibniz's monadology, this position shows that no one lives completely in isolation, a situation which would require no rule or concern for

⁷ Nsikanabasi U. Wilson and Mathias Jarikre. 2016. African culture and the problem of social order. In Oyeshile and Offor. eds. *Ethics, governance and social order in Africa*. Ibadan: Zenith BookHouse Ltd. 287.

⁸ Rao Shankar. 2013. *Sociology: principles of sociology with an introduction to social thought*. New Delhi: S. Chand and Company Ltd. 18.

the other. This is because there would not be any knowledge of the other. In addition, if each individual were attached to one group mind, there would have been no individual impulses, desires and urges. Every individual inhabits a separate physical body and thus each has his or her own experiences, information, feelings and ambitions. Yet we are not totally independent. Stories of people living in isolation like prisoners in solitary confinement tell us that we need social relations to be alive and healthy physically and emotionally.

In Lawrence Frank's attempt to conceptualise the meaning of social order, he traces its origin to the process of being culturised and taught to be a participating member of the group life where each individual learns his peculiar idiomatic version of what his culture and society mean. He noted that, in terms of the lessons and of the persistent feelings the individual has developed from such teachings, each individual builds his own idiosyncratic way of organising and interpreting experiences and reacting affectively with feelings toward other people. This dynamic process of organising experiences according to what it means for the individual is what he calls 'the personality.' Social order, he says, appears as the way different personalities have accepted and translated the teaching of their culture and have learned to use the group-sanctioned practices of institutional life as their personal design for living. Social order he believes, arises therefore, not from some mysterious cosmic mechanism but from the patterning of human behaviour into the conduct approved by the group traditions.⁹

Pauline and Harry are of the view that the principles governing the relations of socialised persons and their actions to one another constitute what is described as social order. An example of such are cultural principles, consisting of the rules of the various games people play, principles guiding behaviours in relation to morals, conflicts, and in a more general sense, religion, politics, and socio-economic activities. This means that it can be said that there is social order if people's actions are in fact governed by the principles and the rules of their cultural code. By extension, it can be said that there is

⁹ Lawrence, K. Frank. 1944. What is social order? *A Review of General Semantics* 2. 1: 33. Retrieved April 25, 2018 from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42575950>

social order at the game of football when all the players and spectators adhere to laid down rules.¹⁰

Lawrence Frank noted that there is an ideal about social order concerning a belief in the existence of an over-all super-organic social system or organisation which operates through large-scale social forces that govern our whole social life. This belief is expressed either explicitly or implicitly in the assumption that whatever happens in a society is to be viewed as the outcome of the operation of large-scale social forces which, acting at a distance, produce all our social events. This is why whenever anything goes wrong in our society and the customary institutional practices of religious, economics and politics, social life fails to operate as expected. This is why the statement is sometimes made that someone or some group has been violating or interfering with the operation of social forces or economic laws. Therefore, the only remedy for our difficulties is to conform to the requirements of this assumed social system and to accept the operation of these social forces with full recognition that they alone can bring resolution of our difficulties.¹¹

The principles that bring about social order in a society sometimes take the form of a system theory which is understandably an aggregate made up of parts. It creates a situation where all the parts work in harmony towards achieving a common objective. Berim Ramosaj and Gentry Berisha describe this system as the product of the efforts of many researchers who wanted to create an intermediate field which encourages the coexistence of all sciences. In this manner, the system theory does not only provide a glossary of terms with which researchers from different fields can be understood, but

¹⁰ Pauline V. Rosenau and Harry C. Bredemeier. 1993. Modern and postmodern conceptions of social order. *Social Research* 60. 2: 342. Retrieved April 25, 2018, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40970741>

¹¹ Lawrence, K. Frank. 1944. What is social order? *A Review of General Semantics* 2. 1: 29. Retrieved April 25, 2018 from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42575950>

provides a framework for the presentation and interpretation of phenomena and realities.¹²

In essence therefore, the system's perspective is based on an image of a simple living cell developing and surviving within its natural environment. As a biological metaphor, it views conflicts as living entities made up of a variety of interdependent and interactive elements, nested within other, increasingly complex entities. Thus, a marital conflict is nested within a family, a community, a region, a culture, and so on. The elements of systems are usually not related to one another directly or in a linear manner, but sometimes they interact indirectly in a non-linear, recursive process so that each element influences the others. In other words, a change in any one element in a system may not necessarily constitute a proportional change in others but, such changes cannot be separated from the values of the various other elements which constitute the system. Thus, intractable conflicts are viewed as destructive patterns of a social order, which are the result of a multitude of different hostile elements interacting at different levels over time and culminating in an ongoing state of intractability.¹³

Societies therefore, naturally require certain level of order and stability to maintain cohesion and this is usually achievable through the establishment of social institutions because according to Kathleen Korgen, institutions order and shape our lives. She say,

What do social institutions have to do with your life? A lot!
The makeup of your family, the laws you must follow, your
professional career, your schooling and even whether or not
you believe in a higher power (and if so, what kind of

¹² Berim Ramosaj, and Gentrit Berisha. 2014. *Systems theory and systems approach to leadership*. 59. Retrieved from <http://www.researchgate.net/publication/276294845>. Accessed: 15 May 2016.

¹³ Valacher, R. R. et al., 2013. *Attracted to conflict: dynamic foundations of destructive social relations*. Peace Psychology Book Series. 31. DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-35280-5_2, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

higher power?) are all based on the social institutions in your society. You begin your life among family and learn about the world through educational institutions (including rituals surrounding birth, marriage and death) and cultural institutions. Much of your education is about preparing for life within structured economic institutions. All the while, your public life and even your private one is moved and shaped by the workings of political institutions. If institutions change, so do you.¹⁴

It is for the above reason that a problem in any of the social institutions whether economic, educational, health, religious and so on, would result to disorder in the society.

Social Order in Thomas Hobbes Notion of Social Contract

The theory of social contract amongst other social evolutionary theories is a description of how the society originated, and the kind of association that existed amongst people at that time. Social contract theory emerged during the Enlightenment in response to the changes imposed upon human beings as society evolved from an arrangement characterised by independence, each on one's own, living in the state of nature to which the economies afforded human beings as they came to live together in small families and clans and, then, as they formed small communities. Complicating these arrangements further was the later transition from rural, agrarian society to that of industrialised, urban society.¹⁵

Early proponents of the social contract theory, like Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jack Rousseau and John Locke differed in their views. They were all social contract theorists and were natural law theorists but proposed divergent views on both issues, though,

¹⁴ Kathleen, O. Korgen. ed. The Cambridge handbook of sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12

¹⁵ www.stanford.edu/philosophy/social_contract_theory.mht

Rousseau and Locke holding onto similar opinion on the state of nature. For Rousseau, the necessity of a social contract comes from the fact that the obstacles present in a state of nature are harmful to human survival. Since individuals are unable to rise to the level of adapting or developing their strengths enough to curtail such a situation, they have to come together with the objective of forming a community to unite their strengths without which, individual survival could not be guaranteed. Rousseau developed the idea of a social contract as the only way for individuals to move away from the chaos of the state of nature. He believes that the creation of a community implies the creation of a social contract through which individuals have to accept to relinquish their natural liberty while embracing the conventional liberty. Thus, the social contract strips individuals of their natural freedom and while at the same time affording them a civil liberty which guarantees the safety of their life and property.¹⁶

For John Locke, men in a State of Nature have full right to their life, liberty or possessions in such a way that no one can have an arbitrary power and no one can have a superior power over someone else. Therefore, each person has the same power to preserve his or her right to life, freedom or possessions. This means that in a state of nature, no one can give a greater power to another person, and no one can have a superior power in the aim of destroying his own life or taking away the life or possessions of another. This is why he says in ‘The Second Treatise of Government’ that the power of leadership or legislative power;

...is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society, and gave up to the community: for nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in

¹⁶ Rousseau, J. J. 1762. The social contract. G.D.H. Cole. ed. New York: New American Library. 21.

himself; and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects.¹⁷

All other natural law theorists assumed that man was by nature a social animal but Thomas Hobbes proposed the contrary and this is why his conclusions are different from those of other natural law theorists. But, before that, to have a proper understanding of Thomas Hobbes' idea of the social contract, one needs to appreciate his poetic phrase; 'the life of man was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.' It sums up the whole situation of man in the state of nature where every man was enemy to every man and there was always war of everyone against everyone. Man's notion of time was dictated by conflicts and wars. They lived in insecurity; there were no businesses because the products of such businesses would not be secured and will therefore be useless, no proper means of transportation and no technology. So, the state of nature is one where there was, "no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society;

¹⁷ Locke, J. 1690. *Second treatise of government*. 43. Retrieved 3rd August, 2018, from www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm.

and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”¹⁸

The ideas of thinkers are traceable to their social milieu that is, the prevailing events and circumstances of their time. During the English Civil War of the seventeenth century, insecurity was a fact of everydayness as Thomas Hobbes noted. This experience contributed in shaping his idea of human nature which he viewed as flawed. In the case of John Locke who also is a social contract theorist, there was relative peace at the time he started his writing and therefore proposed a view of human nature that was contrary to Thomas Hobbes’, which he conceived as social and peaceful. Locke is of the view that,

Where one man commanding a multitude has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases without the least question or control of those who execute his pleasure? And in whatsoever he does, whether led by reason, mistake, or passion, must be submitted to? Which men in the state of nature are not bound to do one to another? And if he that judges, judges amiss in his own or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.¹⁹

In other words, there were rules and order in the state of nature. Such that, if a ruler seeks absolute power, if he acts both as judge and participant in disputes, he puts himself in a state of war with his subjects and the subjects have the right and the duty to remove such rulers and their servants.

According to Hobbes, the basic constituents of human nature are “objects of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, and hoped.”²⁰ So, these are the things that

¹⁸ Hobbes, T. 2002. *Leviathan*. ed. W. Edward. Canada: Green Dragon. 59.

¹⁹ Locke, J. 1823. *Two treatises of government*. London: W. Sharp and son. 111

²⁰ Adams, I. & Dyson, W. R. 2003. *Fifty major political thinkers*. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. 8

drive man as he relates with other men in his environment and with the environment. He desires freedom and fears any form of restrictions to it. Other men also possess these hopes, fears and desires and this necessarily leads to clash of interests. In this kind of pristine and rustic state, there was nothing like law, justice or injustice, right or wrong. Rather, there was chaos and war of all against all. Every man struggled to get what he could and tried to keep it for as long as he could before another stronger than him gets it from him. And Hobbes says, it is this kind of passion that incline men to peace, and fear of death. The desires of such things as are necessary to commodious living and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggests convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called the laws of nature.²¹

So, the laws of nature which for Hobbes are products of reason are meant to check human desires and excesses, to control his fears and direct his hopes. A law of nature is a “precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or takes away the means of preserving the same and to omit that by which he thinks it may be best preserved”²²

Against Hobbes position, one would have thought that life in a state of nature would be a peaceful one, that is, a condition without government where each decides for himself how to act, and is the judge, the jury and the executioner in his own case whenever dispute arises. Hobbes calls this situation the condition of mere nature, a state of perfectly private judgment, in which there is no government with recognised authority to settle disputes and enforce its decisions.

Hobbes made a distinction between right and law saying that a right consists of the liberty to act while law is binding. He ascribes to each person in the state of nature a

²¹ Adams, I. & Dyson, W. R. 2003. *Fifty major political thinkers*. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. 59

²² Adams, I. & Dyson, W. R. 2003. *Fifty major political thinkers*. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. 60

liberty or right to preserve himself, which he calls the right of nature. This is the right to do whatever one sincerely judges as needful for one's preservation, yet because it is possible that virtually anything might be judged necessary for one's preservation, this limited right of nature becomes in practice an unlimited right to potentially anything or as Hobbes puts it, a right 'to all things'. Hobbes further assumes as a principle of practical rationality, that people should adopt what they see to be the necessary means to achieving their most important ends. So, the condition of man in the state of nature is such that every man had right to everything even the right to another person's body as long as his own life can be preserved through that. But this approach is bestial and encourages only the survival of the fittest. This is the reason for the war of every one against every one, in which case there is no guarantee of the security of any man since each one is governed by his own reason. If this condition of man must be ameliorated, then there must be a certain pact in place to harmonise the hopes, desires and fears of all men so as to eliminate the fear of war and death. So, the fundamental law of nature then is "that every man, ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it."²³

Hobbes believes that the state of nature is a miserable state of war in which none of our important human ends are reliably realisable. So, he proposes,

That each of us, as a rational being, can see that a war of all against all is inimical to the satisfaction of her interests, and so can agree that peace is good, and therefore also the way or means of peace are good. Humans will recognise as imperatives the injunction to seek peace, and to do those things necessary to secure it, when they can do so safely. Hobbes calls these practical imperatives 'Laws of Nature',

²³Adams, I. & Dyson, W. R. 2003. *Fifty major political thinkers*. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. 60

the sum of which is not to treat others in ways we would not have them treat us.²⁴

These laws teaches that people should seek peace with others by laying down part of their right to all things and mutually agreeing to submit to the authority of a sovereign. It is for the purpose of the actualisation of social order or a state of peace that the formation of the commonwealth or the social contract was made possible.

Thomas Hobbes made a distinction between the social contract and other means of transferring rights. For instance, he said that the transferring of the right to own a thing if it is being sold or bought in exchange of goods, lands or money which may also be delivered sometime after, is a form of contract but not the social contract. He identified an instance of covenant where one of the contractors, may deliver the thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some other time, and in the meantime be trusted; and then the contract on his part, is called a pact or a covenant and both parts may contract now, in other to perform it later, in which case, he that is to perform in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called keeping of promise, or faith; and the voluntary refusal to perform that which has been agreed is termed a violation of faith.

The mutual transferring of right could either be expressed or inferred in understanding of what they signify. They are expressed in words which could either be of the time present, or past; as, I give, I grant, I have given, I have granted, I will that this be yours: or of the future; as, I will give, I will grant; which words of the future, are called promise. Signing of contract by inference are sometimes the consequence of words; sometimes the consequence of silence; sometimes the consequence of actions; sometimes the consequence of forbearing an action: and generally a signing by inference, of any contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the contractor.²⁵

²⁴ Lloyd, S. A. & Sreedhar, S. 2008. *Moral political philosophy*. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

²⁵ Hobbes, T. 2002. *Leviathan*. ed. W. Edward. Canada: Green Dragon. 61

For there to be a covenant, there must necessarily be transference of right and the violation of such rights constitute acts of injustice. This is because, the definition of injustice is no other than the non performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust is just. Justice and propriety begin with the constitution of common-wealth, therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant.²⁶ So, we talk about injustice because there is a covenant and people have the right to own property. Ownership will be impossible where there is no common-wealth and consequently no security.

In a state of war, no man can sufficiently protect himself against his enemy so he will need the help of others who expects the same defense. He who thinks it is reasonable to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety, than what he can get from his own single power. Therefore, he who breaks his covenant cannot be received into any society that is united for peace and defense. Covenant keeping is therefore a rule of reason, by which we are not permitted to do anything destructive to our life, for to do so also will be a breach of the covenant. This position is supported by Locke in his 'Second Treatise of Government' where he stated that,

The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering into society, which was the end for which they entered into it...Men therefore in society having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the

²⁶ Hobbes, T. 2002. *Leviathan*. ed. W. Edward. Canada: Green Dragon. 66

community are theirs, that nobody hath a right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent: without this they have no property at all; for I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent. Hence, it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure.²⁷

For Hobbes, for the covenant and the content of it to be meaningful or significant, it must be secured in the custody of a powerful individual who is capable of punishing offenders or those who breach the covenant. He must be able to coerce anyone to respond to justice or be brought under subjection. According to Hobbes, “the Greatest of human Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Natural, or civil, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as is the Power of a Common-wealth.”²⁸

The great Leviathan, or the mortal god to which they owe their peace and defense. This Leviathan or state is second only to the immortal God. So, all people will confer all their powers upon this individual or assembly of men, they unite their wills to one will and accept the actions and judgments of this individual to be theirs as if every man should say to every man, I authorise and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that you give up your right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a common-wealth.²⁹ This is what Thomas Hobbes refers to as the

²⁷ Locke, J. 1690. *Second treatise of government*. 44. Retrieved 3rd August, 2018, from www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm.

²⁸ Hobbes, T. 2002. *Leviathan*. ed. W. Edward. Canada: Green Dragon. 42

²⁹ Hobbes, T. 2002. *Leviathan*. ed. W. Edward. Canada: Green Dragon. 77

social contract. The contract that collectively involves all people in an inter-subjective manner in order to bring about order in the society.

Social Order in Plato's Tripartite Psychology

In 'The Republic', Plato presents and supports Socrates' views on some salient issues like justice, the soul, the state and others. His notion of tripartite psychology is a description of the soul as being composed of three parts namely; the rational, the spirited and the appetitive parts. These three elements in the soul are distinguished primarily by their specific functions, which according to Plato is, "that which it alone can do or which it can do better than anything else."³⁰ Plato affirms Socrates' description of each part of the soul as being gifted and having an attitude of love and desires which are each aimed at a certain object.

The rational part is gifted with the ability to organise and bring harmony to the individual and is described as loving learning and wisdom, the spirited part as loving victory and honour, and the appetitive part as loving money, since this is the best means for satisfying its desires for whatever it finds appealing. Moreover, Plato argues that when an individual is steadily ruled by a certain part of the soul, he values the object associated with that part of the soul and organises his life around its pursuit. This suggests that we should think of the parts of the soul as representing deeply embedded drives or values, which colour our perception of the world, as well as direct our actions. He believes that it is because these values can conflict that we experience motivational conflict.³¹

For instance, it takes the dominance of the rational element in a poor individual to refrain from stealing a huge sum of money even when no one is watching. This decision

³⁰ Richard W. Sterling and William C. Scott. Trans. 1985. *Plato the republic*. New York: W.W Norton & Company. 51.

³¹ Rachel Singpurwalla. 2010. The Tripartite theory of motivation in Plato's republic *Philosophy Compass* 5:11. 888

not to steal would not have come without a dilemma or conflict of interests. The act of continuing to enjoy the taste of a good wine without considering the consequence of being drunk and becoming unruly shows the dominance of the appetites. Therefore, when an individual holds conflicting attitudes toward a particular idea, that conflict could not have arisen from just one aspect of the soul but from a combination of different aspects in relation to the rational and non-rational desires.

In consonance with the above interpretation, Rachel Singpurwalla makes a clarification of the difference between rational and non-rational desires. According to her, rational desires are beliefs about value based on reasoning, while non-rational desires are beliefs about value based on the relevant feelings and experiences which are appearances of value. This conception of non-rational desires can explain Socrates' view that feelings or experiences can engender beliefs about value. This is because feelings of attraction or aversion are mere appearances of value, and it is often a small step from something appearing good to believing it is good. This view can also explain how reasoning and argument can quell non-rational desires. If desires are mere beliefs about value, then they can be affected by reasoning, even if their origin lies elsewhere.³²

In a quest for order and justice in the society, Plato prescribes an ideal society led by an elite class of rational guardians who are trained from birth for the task of leadership. The rest of society is divided into spirited soldiers and the appetitive artisans or common people. In the republic, the ideal citizen is one who understands how best they can use their talents to the benefit of the whole of society, and bends unerringly to that task. There is little thought of personal freedom or individual rights in Plato's republic, for everything is tightly controlled by the guardians for the good of the state as a whole.³³

³² Rachel Singpurwalla. 2010. The tripartite theory of motivation in Plato's republic *Philosophy Compass* 5:11. 887

³³ Philip Stokes. 2006. *Philosophy 100 essential thinkers*. New York: Enchanted Lion Books. 2

In Plato's view, "the city was believed to be just when the three natural classes within it each did its own function and it was temperate and courageous and wise because of other conditions and states of these classes."³⁴ This is in the same way there is harmony in the soul when the three elements are engaged in their individual functions. It is for this reason that Plato would evaluate an individual in the same way he would evaluate a state because for him, the state is man 'writ large'.

Plato thinks there must be one ideal way to organise society such that it would be stronger than its neighbours and unconquerable by its enemies. This thought was very much in Greek minds given the frequent warring between Athens, Sparta and the other Hellenistic city-states. But more importantly, such a society would be just to all its citizens, giving to and taking from each their due, with each citizen working for the benefit of the whole. All actual societies, Plato believes are mere imperfect copies of this ideal vision, since they do not promote the good of all.³⁵ This gives support to his aversion for democracy where the people rule. From his stratification of the society, it is obvious that he considers equality of all as an aberration of human nature and threat to social justice and order.

He believes that in a democracy, even the horses and donkeys would jostle you in the street and that it is not class prejudice that leads the rational man to favouritism but rather that there is something absurd and irrational about treating people as equals. This is because in the same manner, there would be something nonsensical about treating animals as though they were men. In addition to this, he is of the opinion that it is not just a matter of custom that we treat men and animals differently because horses and donkeys really are very different from men. Culturally, we have been brought up to treat them differently, and in this sense, our way of behaving is the product of conditioning and education. However, the knowledge a man has of mathematics is the product of

³⁴ Nicholas D Smith. 1999. Plato's analogy of soul and state. *The Journal of Ethics* 3: 33

³⁵ Philip Stokes. 2006. *Philosophy 100 essential thinkers*. New York: Enchanted Lion Books. 3

conditioning and education, but the truths he learns are truths nonetheless. This is the case with our attitudes towards animals. The way we treat them is not merely conventional since it conforms to nature. To treat animals and men in the same way would not just be another way of doing things, as it would be absurd. We accord different rights to men and animals simply because men and animals really are very different.³⁶

Colwyn Williamson and Stuart Brown aptly summarise Plato's thought on democracy this way. The democrats talk a lot about freedom, says Plato, and they give the impression that democracy is the only acceptable way of life for a man who loves freedom, but what they are actually up to is the destruction of the very fabric of society. Social life is based on order and democracy disrupts all order. Family life for instance, is founded on a natural relationship between parents and children and this relationship disintegrates if the children assert their rights and show neither fear nor respect for their parents. He believes that relations between the sexes disintegrate under the impact of democratic ideas as women get out of hand, acting like men and demanding the same rights. Patriotism counts for nothing, and immigrants and foreigners are put on an equal footing with citizens. There is a crisis of law and order, and the slightest attempt at imposing discipline on anyone is regarded as intolerable tyranny. Eventually, even slaves imagine themselves to be quite as free as the owners who paid for them.³⁷

Given Plato's notion of the souls as a simple substance and his characterisation of harmony in the soul and justice in the society through each part doing its own and not meddling in the functioning of the other parts, one is tempted to ask how Plato could account for justice in a non-partitioned soul. This is because in such a case there could be

³⁶ Colwyn Williamson and Stuart Brown. 1978. The social order and the natural order. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 52: 109. Retrieved April 25, 2018 from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106791>

³⁷ Colwyn Williamson and Stuart Brown. 1978. The social order and the natural order. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*. 52: 110. Retrieved April 25, 2018 from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106791>

no parts to do their own function.³⁸ This concern is addressed in the explanation that, given that the soul is a simple indivisible whole, it expresses itself in three forms. None of these parts can be detached the one from the other. We cannot identify and extract any of the ‘parts’ and view it as distinct from the entire whole. Leibniz’s view of the monads holds close relationship with this conception of the soul. For Leibniz, monads are metaphysical entities which he refers to as souls when embodied in beings. Basic to Leibniz’s ‘monadology’ is the conception that a monad is a unified, windowless and independent substance which is gifted with different levels of perception. Therefore, everything that is true of a monad already inheres within it and it therefore cannot enter into any causal relation with any other monad.

Social Order and Authenticity in Kierkegaard

Lescoe defines existentialism as “a type of philosophy which endeavours to analyse the basic structures of human existence and to call individuals to an awareness of their personal existence.”³⁹ It is an attitude and outlook which emphasises human existence and the qualities which are distinctive in individual persons rather than focusing on man in the abstract or using the prisms of nature or universality. The idea is to recognise every person, situation or context as unique and full of peculiar consequences. Oshita, Asira and Ncha aptly summarise the general idea of existentialism as “a movement that believes in subjective choosing over objective reasoning, concrete experience over intellectual abstractions, individuality over mass culture, human freedom and responsibility over in-authenticity.”⁴⁰

³⁸ Nicholas D Smith. 1999. Plato’s analogy of soul and state. *The Journal of Ethics* 3: 45

³⁹ Francis Lescoe. 1974. *Existentialism: with or without God*. New York: Alba House. 9.

⁴⁰ Oshita O. O, Asira E. A, and Ncha G. B. 2016. Thoughts on existentialism, social solidarity and conflict management in Nigeria. In Oyeshile and Ofor. eds. *Ethics, governance and social order in Africa*. Ibadan: Zenith BookHouse Ltd. 275.

Kierkegaard is generally considered to be the first existentialist philosopher who is opposed to Hegelianism because of its abstractness and remoteness from man in his social life. He believes that the individual must be solely responsible for “giving meaning to his life and for living life passionately and sincerely, even in the midst of the absurdities and in-authenticities of life.”⁴¹ To do this, he must constantly examine himself. For Socrates has said that, “the life not tested by criticism is not worth living.”⁴² This is commonly interpreted as ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’. Not to examine oneself then is inauthentic and to be inauthentic is to have a life not worth living.

Existentialism became a popular movement after World War II and has its main tenet as “existence precedes essence”⁴³ which means that the actual life of an individual is what constitutes his or her essence. This view is a rejection of predetermined essence as expressed in Leibniz’s monadology. This is because humans are conceived to consciously create their own values and determine what meaning they want for their lives as against the closed and programmed life expressed in the monadology. This means that a person defines himself or herself by being true to oneself and then living in accordance with this self. So, one is expected to act always in freedom and be ready to take responsibility for one’s actions. Inauthenticity on the other hand is the refusal to live in accordance with one’s freedom, the surrendering of a person’s will and freedom to social pressures, to behave as one is expected to instead of, as one ought to⁴⁴.

⁴¹ Walter, L. 1968. *Kierkegaard’s attack upon Christendom*. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 37.

⁴² Tarnas, R. 1991. *The passion of the Western mind*. New York: Harmony Books. 35.

⁴³ Uduigwomen, A. F. 2006. *Introducing ethics, trends, problems and perspectives*, Calabar: Jochrisham Publishers. 64.

⁴⁴ Stumpf, S. E. 1971. *Philosophy, history & problems*. 4ed. New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company. 500.

Inauthenticity originates from “the pressure to appear to be a certain kind of person, the pressure to adopt a particular mode of living, the pressure to ignore one’s own moral objections in order to have a more comfortable existence.”⁴⁵ Individuals who do not understand their own reasons for acting, or who ignore important facts about their own lives in order to avoid uncomfortable truths are said to be inauthentic. Sartre who sees man as absolutely free is of the view that ‘bad faith’ which is equivalent to inauthenticity in Kierkegaard, hinders people from finding meaning in freedom.

As much as this existentialist view is against Leibniz’s metaphysics, it also runs contrary to Hobbes prescription of the surrendering of individual wills to a constituted social authority as found in the Leviathan. An interesting aspect of Kierkegaard’s existentialism is his description of the three stages of existence which has close relationship with Plato’s tripartite psychology.

The three stages of existence according to Kierkegaard are; the aesthetic stage which is the one in which an individual lives for the pleasures of the moment or personal gratifications. This in Plato corresponds with the appetitive part of the soul as well as the social class of the artisans. Kierkegaard noted that individuals in this stage take life as that which should be experienced and enjoyed in the here and now without considering the long-term consequences. This kind of life eventually becomes a source of boredom for which there is no reason to go on living. Since there is no special purpose for existence, the individual sinks into despair.

The ethical stage is the one characterised by the stability of life in duty and in family. This in Plato is equivalent to the spirited part of the soul as well as its corresponding social class which is the class of the soldiers. Individuals in this stage recognise the despair of aesthetic life and therefore desire to find better meaning in life. Ethical individuals develop a system by which they make choices and build relationships. The act of making decisions and developing an ethical system brings one

⁴⁵ Steven, C. 2010. *Existentialism, the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta ed. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/existentialism/>.

closer to self-awareness. The ethical way of life involves an intense, passionate commitment to duty, to unconditional social and religious obligations which lead to a loss of individual responsibility. Therefore, the ethical stage for Kierkegaard is characterised by inauthentic existence, a situation where “existence alienates man. The individual’s private ego and its genuine intentions, endeavours and responsibility give way for anonymous and faceless public ego.”⁴⁶ This also represents the extent to which a person is unfaithful to one’s own personality. It is commitment to the dictates of the society by trying to meet up with the expectations of others. Being as others would approve of that a person should be.

The religious stage is the one characterised by faith, “which is always a dreadful certainty where individuals experience both suffering and faith.”⁴⁷ This in Plato is roughly equivalent to the rational element of the soul as well as to its corresponding social class which is the class of the rulers. Kierkegaard believes that it is only at the religious stage that one truly understands the self. This is where the individual can experience a life of authentic freedom and live an authentic life. This stage requires the suspension of the ethical. He is of the view that it helped Abraham to achieve an authentic commitment to God even when the mission looked absurd. Therefore, this stage is possible through the leap of faith into a religious life. The ethical and religious stages correspond therefore to inauthenticity and the authenticity of existence respectively.

It is noted that just as love or desires drive the individual in Plato’s psychology and theory of the state towards their designated functions, in Kierkegaard, it is despair that leads the individual from one stage to another. This despair is the despair of sin, a dread that becomes certain of a hidden relationship with God. To sin is to be in despair at

⁴⁶ Eugene, A & Stephen C. 2019. The concept of authentic and inauthentic existence in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger: the quarrel of communitarians and libertarians. *Review of European Studies*. Vol. 11, No. 2. 3

⁴⁷ Wyatt, C. S. 2010. *Existential Primer: Soren Kierkegaard, the original leap of faith*. Available online.

not being willing to be oneself, not willing to be authentic. Therefore, sin is the potential weakness that leads to despair. Faith on the other hand is expressed via authenticity and integrity.⁴⁸ It is the suspension of the ethical through the leap of faith that is necessary for authentic existence in Kierkegaard's conception.

Man is daily facing his inability to express his true self and live life to its fullest. His innate desire to move from the state of his potentiality to actuality is inhibited by social constraints. He moves from being a subject to being an object in the society. This self-estrangement or the alienation of the self as Marx would say is an,

Internal process, based on one's attitude to oneself. The state of alienation is the state of anxiety. Anxiety is the uncanny apprehension of some impending evil, of something not present, but to come, of something not within us, but of an alien power.⁴⁹

Therefore, there is the need for man to authenticate his inauthenticity. The need to make meaning out of his existence, to be able to live as he ought to and not as he is expected to. Starting with despair in Kierkegaard's view, the problem is how to become oneself again, the 'reintegratio in statum pristinum' which means 'becoming again oneself before God'⁵⁰. The problem is how to go on from inauthentic being to authentic being.

For Kierkegaard, all essential knowledge concerns existence. All knowledge, which does not relate itself to existence, in the reflection of inwardness, is essentially viewed as contingent and inessential.

⁴⁸ Wyatt, C. S. 2010. *Existential Primer: Soren Kierkegaard, the original leap of faith*. Available online.

⁴⁹ Rempel, G. 1959. *Soren Kierkegaard and existentialism*. London: Routledge. 2.

⁵⁰ Rempel, G. 1959. *Soren Kierkegaard and existentialism*. London: Routledge. 2.

Objective reflection and knowledge has to be distinguished from subjective reflection and knowledge. The objective way of reflection leads to objective truth, and while the subject and his subjectivity becomes indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent, and this indifference is precisely its objective value; its objectivity is either a hypothesis or an approximation. Subjective knowledge requires personal appropriation. In subjectation, truth becomes appropriation, inwardness or subjectivity. In fact, the only reality which an existing being can know otherwise than through some abstract knowledge is his own existence. Here it is necessary that the existing subject should plunge itself into its own subjectivity⁵¹.

Only ethical and religious knowledge is therefore essential knowledge. They are essentially related to the fact that the knowing subject exists, they are in contact with reality. In them truth and existence coincide. Therefore, for Kierkegaard, to authenticate our inauthenticity requires our movement towards God.

In making a few allusions to Heidegger's notion of authenticity, it is noted that he believes man was "thrown into the world without asking to be there."⁵² Man in his everyday mode of Being is not properly his authentic self. Most of the time he loses the self in what he is busy with. In other words he understands the self in terms of what is ready-to-hand within the world. On the other hand, man;

Essentially belongs to Dasein to be with other Daseins. But here again the everyday mode of Being-with-one-another is such that Dasein is absorbed in the neutrality of the 'They'

⁵¹ Rempel, G. 1959. *Soren Kierkegaard and existentialism*. London: Routledge. 2.

⁵² Stumpf, S. E. 1971. *Philosophy, history & problems*. 4ed. New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company. 500.

(*das Man*), instead of confronting its own Dasein. In both cases the inauthentic prevails over the authentic. Heidegger calls 'fallenness' the tendency Dasein has to forget its own Self or to move away from it.⁵³

So, to become his true self, to be authentic he must make appropriate decisions. He must recognise and affirm his own unique self with his responsibility for his every action.

Authenticity is a description of a condition of self-making where man asks himself the question, how do I succeed in making myself, or will who I am merely be a function of the roles I find myself in? To be authentic is also a way of committing oneself to a certain course of action, a certain way of being in the world. Therefore, the focus on authenticity leads to a distinctive disposition towards ethics and the making of value judgments. Therefore, there is a very important need to ask the question that, what is the place of morality in our quest to live authentic lives at the expense of others and social norms? For this reason, J. Golomb argues that "the existentialist notion of authenticity is incompatible with a morality which values all persons"⁵⁴.

Here also we are confronted with the notion of choice which is an indication of freedom. This is because one cannot choose without being free and freedom to choose carries with it the burden of responsibility. When we choose, we are morally responsible for the consequences of our choices. Therefore, no matter how well we express our freedom and autonomy, we still remain bound by societal norms which go to show that absolutely authentic life is impossible.

The norm of authenticity refers to a recognition of the fact that I am a being who can be responsible for who I am. The choices I make should be able to direct my steps from my absorption in the inauthenticity that characterises me in my everyday

⁵³Kearney, R. 1994. *Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy*. London and New York, Routledge. 41

⁵⁴ Golomb, J. 1995. *In Search of Authenticity*. London and New York: Routledge. 23

engagement in the world. To be Authentic therefore is an indication of holding unto one's integrity. If we want to live an authentic life, we will have to devise our own reasons for living. Our task will involve exploring, imagining and experimenting with various ideas until we arrive at a desired goal. Authenticity has also been described as a

Revelatory state, where one perceives oneself, other people, and sometimes even things, in a radically new way. Some writers argue that authenticity also requires self-knowledge, and that it alters a person's relationships with other people. Authenticity also carries with it its own set of moral obligations, which often exist regardless of race, gender and class.⁵⁵

If living an authentic life is a way back to God as Kierkegaard has said and according to Heidegger, it is a process of affirming one's own unique self with his responsibility for his every action, then, the sense of morality which is very necessary for harmony in a society is the basic path back to authentic life. Morality cannot be overemphasised as it is very necessary in the resolution of social problems. When each individual expresses his authenticity with the consideration of the other with the consciousness of 'when I choose, I choose for others' or with the Kantian notion of willing that our actions become universal norms then, this kind of authentic behaviour would eliminate unnecessary social problems.

Terrorism and the Challenge of Peace, Security and Social Order

From the spectrum of inter-subjectivity as a means of attaining veritable peace and social order, it is widely accepted that security and peace in nations are contingent upon security and stability in the world. With the growing inter-dependency in the present globalised world, the actions of one state have the capacity to influence and alter the

⁵⁵ Golomb, J. 1995. *In Search of Authenticity*. London and New York: Routledge. 23

actions and policies of other states. Moreover, not surprisingly, a threat in one part of the world is now capable of challenging the peace and stability of the whole world.

The term security could be explained in relation to three important existential factors. They are; the protection of life, protection of property and job security. Life is unarguably the most important on this list of preference as the others can simply be described as handmaid to the sustenance of life. This is because without life, neither property nor job would be important and to sustain one's life, man must be situated within the context of work (job). Work helps one to generate the means with which property can be acquired for the sustenance of life. This means that when job is taken away, life is apparently taken away. Therefore, security should be defined in a broader sense which encompasses life, property and job.

Some misconceptions are identifiable in the manner the term security is sometime being defined. According to the National Security Strategy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of November, 2014, the document noted that;

Over the past two to three decades, many countries around the world, especially in developing economies, equated the security of the regime in power with national security. That era was largely dominated by military power with the state using the instruments of coercion. However, since the early 1990s, there has been a gradual shift in focus from what can best be described as the soft side of security, to issues that affect the majority of the people.⁵⁶

The Federal Republic of Nigeria conceives of and defines security comprehensively and holistically. It treats the following closely interlinked and interdependent issues as fundamental values, they are; peace, security, stability, sovereignty, democracy, the rule of law, freedom of enterprise and respect for human

⁵⁶ National Security Strategy Federal Republic of Nigeria November, 2014. p.2.

rights and fundamental freedoms. National security has been described as the concern of government about the stability and safety of a state. National security policy could equally be seen as a measure taken by a state to ensure its survival and national policy. The essence of national security is the protection of the national interest or value of a state and upholding what the state believed to be valuable to it and its people.⁵⁷

According to Baldwin, security and its analysis is applicable to any level, be it individual, family, society, state, international system, or the whole of humanity.⁵⁸ Rothschild is of the view that the concept of security is extended from the security of nations to the security of the international system, or of a supranational physical environment. In a more general sense, it can be said that security involves military, political, economic, social, environmental, and human security.⁵⁹ All these are for the benefit of man, the environment and the future generations.

For security to be achieved in an area occupied by terrorist there has to be a counter terrorist approach that is not only military but collective, one that synergises intelligence from a broad spectrum of individuals, institutions and agencies in the area. From the National Security Strategy of 2014, the Armed Forces of Nigeria has the mandate to establish a Unified Command with a Joint Commander in a Unified/Joint Command Headquarters. This Command is said to comprise a joint Special Forces component capable of conducting a wide range of operations. With respect to terrorism, the overall objective of the strategy is to ensure public safety and it revolves around five main streams which are; Forefall, Secure, Identify, Prepare and Implement.⁶⁰

⁵⁷Rothschild, E. *What is Security*. June 4, 2017. 67.
<http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/>.

⁵⁸ Baldwin, D. A. 1997. The concept of security, *Review of International Studies* 23. 1: 9.

⁵⁹ Emma Rothschild.1995. What is security? *Daedalus* 124. 3: 55.

⁶⁰ National Security Strategy Federal Republic of Nigeria November, 2014. p.31.

The strategy consists of the following components; Identifying all terrorists and their sponsors and ensuring that they are brought to justice, Preparing the populace so that the consequences of terrorist incidents could be mitigated; Forestalling terrorism in Nigeria including engaging the public through sustained enlightenment/sensitisation campaigns and de-radicalisation programmes; Securing lives and property, public and key national infrastructure/services including Nigerian interest around the world; Implementing a framework to effectively mobilise and sustain a coordinated cross-governmental effort in pursuance of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy.

Nigeria's National Security Strategy is intrinsically linked to the political, economic, social and strategic transformation of the West African sub-region and the whole of Africa, through the African Union, as well as the rest of the world. Therefore, in order to achieve security in times of terrorism, the policy must include concerted and inter-subjective efforts from within the country and the neighbouring countries as well.

The case for collective security according to Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, rests on the claim that regulated, institutionalised balancing predicated on the notion of all against one provides more stability than unregulated, self-help balancing predicated on the notion of each for his own. Under collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when necessary, band together to stop aggression.⁶¹

Collective Security Theory is aimed at the avoidance of conflict among states. If the basic ideas underpinning this theory were to be restated in one sentence without equivocation then, one would be saying that, its aim is to rethink security in a collective and holistic manner. Yost David corroborated this position by positing that the terms 'collective security' and 'collective defence' are inventions of the past century. He believes that the two concepts are a long-term formal commitment among groups of countries in order to protect the security interests of the individual members within their

⁶¹ Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan. 1995. The promise of collective security. *International Security*. 20. 1: 52.

joint spheres of interest. He therefore conceives of the concept of ‘collective security’ as geared towards security in a broad manner with the view to avoiding grouping powers into opposing camps, and refusing to draw dividing lines that would leave out any of such powers.⁶² For this reason, its ultimate goal is to steer relations to calmer seas and to prevent rhetoric of daily politics from undermining cooperation.

Security is indispensable for both individuals and states, as they need to protect themselves from threats. It is primarily an issue of a nation’s relations with other states or group of states. This relationship among states creates a security dilemma in the presence of conflict. According to Palmer and Perkins, “Collective Security clearly implies collective measures for dealing with threats to peace.”⁶³ The theory is considered as one of the most important and effective method for the maintenance of international peace and security globally. Under this arrangement, all the nations involved in the collective security arrangement commit themselves to the maintenance of international peace and security. Advocates of collective security hold the belief that, in a situation where any single nation becomes a threat to international peace, all the nations join resources together and take collective action against the offending nation.

The above situation is very likely the reason why Schleicher posits that, Collective Security is an arrangement among states in which all promise that, in the event where any member of the system engages in certain prohibited acts like war and aggression against another member, the entire members come to the latter’s assistance.⁶⁴ Collective security works in such a way that,

⁶² Yost, David. S. 1977. *NATO Transformed: The alliance’s New Roles in International Security*. London: Leicester University Press. 149. <http://www.answers.com/topic/collective-security-2>

⁶³ Palmer, D. & Perkins, H, C. 2013. *International relations*. CBS Publishers and Distributers. 22.

⁶⁴ Schleicher, C. P. 1963. *Introduction to International Relations*. New Jersey: INC. 3.

The enemy is a threat to regional or international peace and security. If the system of collective security is international in its reach, a threat can originate in any region, anywhere on the globe. Any nation within the regional or international system that commits aggression, imperils the peace, or grossly exceeds the bounds of civilised behaviour violates the norms of that collective security system and is subject to enforcement action. No nation is excluded from the responsibility of maintaining peace and security regardless of where, within its collective security system, the threat originates.⁶⁵

Security is a modern device of power management at international level. It has been designed to serve as deterrent to all possible attacks and under this device, all the nations take collective action against the aggressor.

From the perspective of Thomas Hobbes, the history of the world is the history of conflicts and wars arising from the struggle for scarce resources for human and societal survival. In the past centuries it was war of nation against nation, kingdom against kingdoms, class against class and from Thomas Hobbes description; it was the war of all against all.

Leaders in the past were driven by greed and the desire to conquer as well as administer political cum economic control over perceived weak kingdoms and dynasties. Between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the early 1900s, European countries formed part of a balance-of-power system. This is a system in which states pursue security within an anarchic context by joining alliances in order to prevent a single centre of power that is, a particular group of states from dominating the international system and becoming expansionist. Within a balance-of-power system states can change alliances to

⁶⁵ Stefan Aleksovski, Oliver Bakreski and Biljana Avramovska.2014. Collective security: the role of international organisations: implications in international security order. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*. 5. 27: 275

promote equilibrium between centres of power. The balance-of- power system, however, failed with the outbreak of the First World War and as a result of its horrific nature and aftermath, collective security was pursued through the League of Nations.⁶⁶

Modern states have in pursuance of security, not only relied on alliances and coalitions, but also on the rules-based system of collective security, which was a creation of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and subsequently, the United Nations (UN), in an effort to establish and maintain international peace and security. Collective security is based on the principle that an attack on one state is an attack on all states in the particular system and that, all states have to stop the aggressor.⁶⁷

There are profound advantages to institutionalising a security system that promises a collective security that ameliorates the security dilemma, thereby enhancing stability, and reducing the likelihood of unintended spirals of hostility. Such gains have to be collectively favourable to all member states. If such gains are identified, member states must be disposed to focusing more on them rather than on relative gains. This condition would facilitate cooperation, coexistence, inter-subjectivity and social order.

It is also necessary to note that a state will focus more on collective or absolute gains when it believes that the relative gains of others will not come back to haunt it. This belief is in turn based on deep-seated assessments of the intentions of those states enjoying relative gains. By building confidence among member states about each other's intentions, collective security thus mitigates the constraints imposed on cooperation by relative-gains considerations. Collective security would not allow its members to focus exclusively on absolute gains, but states would be less concerned about relative gains than in a self-help world. Collective security institutions would help states define their

⁶⁶ Evert Jordaan. 2014. Collective security in Africa: the tension between theory and practice. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 39. 1: 160-162.

⁶⁷ Evert Jordaan. 2014. Collective security in Africa: the tension between theory and practice. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 39. 1: 160-161.

national interests in ways that contribute to international stability.⁶⁸ This is what the notion of inter-subjectivity is all about. It employs an inclusive, synergistic and collective approach in dealing with social issues.

Corruption and the Disruption of Social Order

Corruption just like any moral issue cannot be discoursed in isolation. It is necessarily an action that has a meaning and its effect in relation with the order. This is why it is described as a social problem. The problem of corruption is not new to human societies and it is not peculiar to any particular people as all nations of the world are threatened by it in one way or the other. One thing that is clear about this problem is that it did not originate as an intrinsic part of any group of people as almost all aspects of different cultures frown at corruption in its totality.

A simple way to understand what corruption is without going into a very serious conceptual clarification is to enumerate some of the acts that constitute corruption. Examples are listed in Nigeria's 'Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission' (ICPC) Act 2000, which empowers the Commissions to investigate, prevent and prosecute offenders who engage in: "Money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt practices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human trafficking, and child labour, illegal oil bunkering, illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes, and prohibited goods."⁶⁹ The above activities therefore constitute what corruption is within the Nigerian legal context.

⁶⁸ Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan. 1995. The promise of collective security. *International Security*. 20. 1: 59.

⁶⁹ Paul D. Ocheje. 2001. Law and social change. a socio-legal analysis of nigeria's corrupt practices and other related offences act. *Journal of African Law* 45. 2: 173-195.

All these acts have in one way or the other contributed to the problem of social order bedeviling the nation. This is because resources that would hitherto be used for developmental purposes of the people now reside in the possession of a few corrupt individuals. As a result of this, unemployed idle hands found labour in crimes which pose serious security challenge for the nation. So, corruption fosters injustice which the deprived fights against by resorting to crimes which bring about social disorder. This is why Odera Oruka says that,

Those who live below the economic baseline of humanity are denied the right to liberty. The average person in the uncivil republic has no complicated thought and opinion. They have one concern: they are hungry and jobless. This is what he or she wants to express but which they cannot express because they lack the means and right to liberty.⁷⁰

But, for the deprived, the lack of proper means of self-assertion does not prevent them from speaking up for themselves forever. Sooner or later, they come to the realisation that rebellion and sometime violence is inevitable if their voices would be heard and this leads to the disruption of an existing social order.

Corruption in Africa and in Nigeria in particular is said to have reached cancerous proportions, a condition which is both directly and indirectly responsible for the widespread social disorder in the continent. As corroborated by Hope and Chikulo, “the corruption problem in Africa reflects the more general, and now legendary, climate of unethical leadership and bad governance found throughout most of the continent. The pandemic of corruption in Africa, and its extremely negative impact on socioeconomic development and the fight against poverty in the region, have become matters of global

⁷⁰ Damien, K. 2005. *Buddhist ethics: a very short story*. New York: Oxford University Press. 81.

concern.”⁷¹ We see from this expression that the leaders themselves have become the problem rather than the solution. They are sometimes described as vampires according to Voltaire;

These vampires are corpses, who went out of their graves at night to suck the blood of the living, either at their throats or stomachs, after which they returned to their cemeteries. The persons so sucked waned, grew pale, and fell into consumption; while the sucking corpses grew fat, got rosy, and enjoyed an excellent appetite...[they] sucked the blood of the people in broad daylight; but they were not dead, though corrupted. These true suckers lived not in cemeteries, but in very agreeable palaces.⁷²

The economic exploitation of a group by their leaders or another group could lead to security issues. The problem of insecurity in the form of terrorism is one of the greatest threats to social order around the world. Those who often become terrorists for instance have been found to have been through some form of unsavory life experiences. Borum is of the opinion that, certain life experiences tend to be commonly found among terrorists and hardened criminals. Histories of childhood abuse and trauma appear to be widespread. In addition, themes of perceived injustice and humiliation often are prominent in terrorists biographies and personal histories. None of these contribute much to a causal explanation of terrorism, but may be seen as markers of vulnerability or as possible sources of motivation.⁷³

The major causes of terrorism are basically linked to economic, social, political or religious factors. When many able bodied individuals cannot have a decent living as a

⁷¹ Hope, K. R. and Chikulo, B. C. 2000. *Corruption and development in Africa*. Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd. 22.

⁷² Voltaire. 1901. *A Philosophical dictionary*. vol.10. Paris. 34.

⁷³ Borum, R. 2004. *Psychology of terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida. 40.

result of joblessness and the majority of people in a society cannot afford the bare necessities of life in the presence of a few who live in opulence, this uneven distribution of wealth in the society could on the long run lead to a revolt or protest that involves the use of violence. So, the economic exploitation of a group by another could lead to security issues. Ethnic discrimination, cultural domination and social marginalisation of a group of people no matter their social stratum, will necessarily metamorphose existentially to a stage of dissatisfaction which could lead to violence and disruption of social order.

At the level of inter-cultural relations, all traditional societies are disrupted by more powerful, more modern ones when those two societies meet. The more modern and dynamic society undermines the traditional society's values, practices, and allegiances. Yet as the traditional order is threatened, the new one remains alien and often inaccessible. The deliberate frustration or exclusion of a certain class or group of people from the process of governance through corrupt means is by all means political oppression and is capable of fuelling criminal activities which pose challenge to social order.

Some of the very important fruits of unemployment which is an offshoot of corruption are conflicts and under-development. Development is conceived in different ways based on the context in which it is being considered. Basically, one can say that it constitutes a forward movement, a progression or an unfolding of new ideas. For W. Rodney, "development in human society is a many-sided process. At the level of the individual, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being."⁷⁴ Without employment, the ability to reach this stage of social and economic freedom is very slim.

Development involves the quantitative and qualitative progressive change in the lives of people. It has to do with human beings and their economic, political, environmental, and social welfare. If poverty is widespread in Africa, then social disorder

⁷⁴Rodney, W. 1973. *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*. London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications. 1.

is prevalent. This corroborates Bessie Head asserted that, “Poverty has a home in Africa like a second skin. It may be the only place on earth where it is worn with an unconscious dignity.”⁷⁵

Conclusion

From a social perspective, humans as monads are at the same time both individuals and social entities. Against Leibniz’s monadology, this position shows that no one lives completely in isolation, a situation which would require no rule or concern for the other.

In conceptualising the notion of social order, we were able to express the close relationship between the concepts of morality, culture and social order, noting that neither of these concepts can be discussed in a vacuum. This is because morality which implies the presence of the other is at the foundation of culture for the sake of social order. Social order is possible when there are sets or system of linked social structures, institutions, relations, customs, values and practices which conserve, maintain and enforce certain patterns of relating and behaving. It is a product of the decisions of individuals in a society to relinquish their wills, rights and freedom to a single authority for the purpose of gaining peace and security of their lives and property. This understanding is what was implied in Thomas Hobbes idea of social contract.

While attempting to trace the historicity of Hobbes idea of social contract, we ensured it was not divorced from an understanding that he was writing from his social milieu. This is because we necessarily talk about the world from the way we view the world. So, his social experiences shaped his worldview and consequently his thoughts. Plato for instance may not have conceived of the world in the state of nature to be as brutish and ungovernable as Hobbes had thought, but he definitely believed that the world or the society was not a perfect one. This led him to structure a stratified society

⁷⁵ Head, B. *Poverty and social disorder: a socio-political understanding of Nigerian civil society* by Ukabga, at the 11th Annual Conference of the international society for African philosophy and studies (ISAPS) BMS Enugu, 10-12 March, 2005.

that will deal with the ills and injustices in his society. He stated in his tripartite psychology that to have a perfect society, everyone must be engaged in his own specific function because a thing's specific function he said "is that which it alone can do or which it can do better than anything else."⁷⁶ He believed that if the rulers, the guardians and artisans are engaged in their specific functions that there will be order, justice and peace in the society.

Socrates decided not to escape from prison but to drink the hemlock because he believed he was in a social contract with the society and that the free choice to remain a member of society is what binds each member of society to the contract's terms. In this sense therefore, human beings volunteer to belong to society simply because it is rational and in their self-interest. Socrates had enjoyed peace and security from the society and since that same society decided to kill him, he saw nothing wrong with it. This is the position of Hobbes when he said that the authoritarian government was meant to ensure peace, he decides what is right or wrong and whatever he does is right even if he decides to kill anyone.

From an existentialist perspective, man daily faces the inability to express his true self. His innate desire to progress from his potentiality to actuality is inhibited by social constraints. He moves from being a subject to being an object in the society. This self-estrangement or alienation is an "internal process, based on one's attitude to oneself. The state of alienation is the state of anxiety. Anxiety is the uncanny apprehension of some impending evil, of something not present, but to come, of something not within us, but of an alien power."⁷⁷ Therefore, there is the need for man to authenticate his inauthenticity. The need to make meaning out of his existence, to be able to live as he ought to and not as he is expected to.

⁷⁶ Plato. 1985. *The Republic*. London: W.W Norton & Company. 51

⁷⁷ Rempel, G. 1959. *Soren Kierkegaard and existentialism*. London: Routledge. 2

Man in his everyday mode of Being is not properly his authentic self. Most of the time he loses the self in what he is busy with. In other words he understands the self in terms of what is ready-to-hand within the world. On the other hand, man;

Essentially belongs to Dasein to be with other Daseins. But here again the everyday mode of Being-with-one-another is such that Dasein is absorbed in the neutrality of the 'They' (*das Man*), instead of confronting its own Dasein. In both cases the inauthentic prevails over the authentic. Heidegger calls 'fallenness' the tendency Dasein has to forget its own Self or to move away from it.⁷⁸

So, to become his true self, to be authentic he must make appropriate decisions. He must recognise and affirm his own unique self with his responsibility for his every action. Golomb argues, "The existentialist notion of authenticity is incompatible with a morality which values all persons"⁷⁹.

Here also we are confronted with the notion of choice which is an indication of freedom. This is because one cannot choose without being free and freedom to choose carries with it the burden of responsibility. When we choose, we are morally responsible for the consequences of our choices. Therefore, no matter how well we express our freedom and autonomy, we still remain bound by societal norms which go to show that absolutely authentic life is impossible.

If living an authentic life is a way back to God as Kierkegaard has said and according to Heidegger, it is a process of affirming one's own unique self with his responsibility for his every action, then, the sense of morality which is very necessary for harmony in a society is the basic path back to authentic life. Morality cannot be

⁷⁸Kearney, R. 1994. *Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy*. London and New York, Routledge. 41

⁷⁹ Golomb, J. 1995. *In Search of authenticity*. London and New York: Routledge. 23

overemphasised as it is very necessary in the resolution of social problems. When each individual expresses his authenticity with the consideration of the other or with the consciousness of 'when I choose, I choose for others' or with the Kantian notion of willing that our actions become universal norms then, this kind of authentic behaviour would eliminate unwarranted social problems like terrorism and corruption.

This chapter exposes the fact that security and peace in nations are contingent upon security and peace in the world. By the same token, social order in nations is contingent upon social order in the world. With the growing inter-dependency in the present globalised world, the actions of one state have the capacity to influence and alter the actions and policies of other states. Moreover, not surprisingly, a threat in one part of the world is now capable of challenging the peace and stability of the whole world. It is for this reason that the culture of individualism which is implied in Leibniz's monadology is considered as a challenge for social order.

CHAPTER FIVE

BEYOND LEIBNIZ: INTER-SUBJECTIVITY AND THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL ORDER

Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to look into the problem of inter-subjectivity in Leibniz's metaphysics especially in his principle of monadology through the application of Aquinas' Principle of Participation. The chapter anticipates a conclusion that the basic prospect of the Principle of Participation is its ability to ensure interaction but it lacks the ability to unite individuals to form a collective (monadic) whole. This is because interaction and participation are concepts that are necessarily implied in the notion of society. Yet, they do not guarantee social order, thus, the need to go beyond Aquinas as a means of going beyond Leibniz.

Thus far, we can say that the implication of Leibniz's deterministic and individualistic metaphysics is that social, economic, political and environmental changes, considering that humans, being monads are windowless are as a result of internal activities of individual monads. It also implies that the concept of social stability as derivable from order in social institutions is apparent and grounded on pseudo-metaphysics since monads do not interact. Therefore, social order and harmony is believed to be pre-established. The determinism of the monadology therefore denies the relevance of human agency as willed, active and rational. This, the research holds is suggestive of an escapist defense of human moral responsibility. This is because social monadology holds an objective view of reality that recognizes the importance of unity and shared culture as basis of social order. It argues that society should be understood as a system of interdependent parts which explain how society can minimise conflict through socialisation and social control as different institutions operate in complementary manner to produce overall social stability. This chapter will therefore address issues relating to unity and social solidarity as a means of fostering social order. This is because, if the notion of unity, social inclusion and solidarity is promoted, cycles

of exclusion and social conflicts will begin to disintegrate. This would constitute an important step towards a more unified, inclusive and ordered society.

The Challenge of Social order in a Nation

In the theoretical debate about nationalism, three positions can be identified, namely the primordialist position, the modernist position and the constructivist position. Primordialism sees the nation as having origins in a far away, distant, primordial past, or at least stresses the remarkable continuity between the ‘pre-modern kinship-based ethnic community’ and the modern nation. Therefore, it does not see nationalism as a product of the French Revolution, but something that is much older. This community was self-evident, since each community has its own distinctive language. Modernists view the nation in terms of its functionality to the modernisation processes of the industrial revolution. They see the nation-state as the political, economic and cultural unit which was conducive to the spread of commerce and industry and was in turn generated by the spread of commerce and industry. The constructivist just like the modernists believe that the nation and nationalism is a product of modernity, with the biggest difference that they believe it was a deliberate project by the state elite to maintain control over a rapidly changing and industrialising society. They constructed the ideas of the natural nation by selective reinterpretation of the nation’s historical symbols in mythical terms of continuity, which in most cases is far from accurate with the actual past.¹

In Nigeria for example, the problem of social order has often been traced to the amalgamation of the different peoples to form a single nation. In the country, one of the several types of violent conflicts that constantly plague the socio-political history and consequently, order of the nation is the sort of conflict that is based on religious differences amongst, political, ethnic and economic differences. Religious conflicts often occur between the dominant religions which are made up of Christian and Muslim population in the Northern part of the country but at the same time, pockets of violence

¹ John Coakley. 2016. Is there a primordialist theory of nationalism? UK: Queen’s University Belfast. 3

are known to take place in other areas. The ultimate cause of this problem as hinted earlier is rooted in the unsolicited amalgamation of disparate groups and systems to create Nigeria in a manner that disregarded the existing disparities in cultural values and preferences. The system failed to make nation-building part of the foundation of the forceful process of state-building thus, failed to achieve true unity. The pseudo-union created has resulted in several existential problems which now constitute the problem of social order in the nation.

Nigeria can be described as a collection of many nations with varying ideology on so many issues, especially culture and religion. The Northern and Southern parts of the country were colonised separately until 1914 when the two regions were amalgamated. The different ethnic groups still hold a lot of allegiance to the dictates of their cultural practice and even though the modern system of government will not give room for the cultural imperialism that was formerly the practice, each ethnic group tries to make effort to corner as much as possible any tangible benefit that exist in the name of Nigeria to their region at the expense of other regions. Therefore, allegiance is to ethnicity and not to the country.²

This shows that there was no Nigeria from the very beginning. Ikelegbe noted that, the aftermath of colonialism in Nigeria has affected Nigeria's socio-political development, especially with respect to amalgamation which brought about the false marriage where different entities were joined to live as one. Miss Flora Shaw suggested the name Nigeria which means 'Niger Area' to Frederick Lugard whom she later married. The amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates of Nigeria in 1914 marked a turning point in the evolution of the Nigerian state. In fact, Nigeria as a

² Ichima Egor. 2014. The basis of security challenges in Nigeria: implications for foreign investors. *British Journal of Marketing Studies* 2. 3: 65.

political entity was created in that year. The end result was not to actually have a new territory per se, but was for economic exploitation.³

This is the reason Obafemi Awolowo a former Nigerian leader is of the view that, “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are ‘English’, ‘Welsh’ or ‘French’. The word ‘Nigerian’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not.”⁴ So, While the politicians tried to cope with the colonial legacy that lumped incompatible ethnic groups together into one country, the military elites staged coups, making a mockery of democracy in Africa’s most populous and promising country. The corruption, ineptitude and confusion that marked the military era plunged Nigeria into economic problems, poverty, and ethno-religious conflicts until the 1990s and beyond.

The history of Nigeria is replete with a whole lot of existential problems ranging from economic to security and so on. The effects of rapid population growth on the economic development of Nigeria have been identified as major cogs in the wheel of economic development in Nigeria and reasons for internal security threats since 1960.⁵ Along with this, Nigeria has a long history of electoral malpractices that have been frustrating the wishes of the people to choose those who exercise political power.⁶

The insecurity in the South-South region of the country started when the people of the region complained that oil exploration activities was impacting negatively on their

³ Ikelegbe, A. quoted in Paul Eric. 2016. The amalgamation of Nigeria: revisiting 1914 and the centenary celebrations. *Canadian Social Science* 12. 12: 66.

⁴ Ichima Egor. 2014. The basis of security challenges in Nigeria: implications for foreign investors. *British Journal of Marketing Studies* 2. 3: 65.

⁵ Bolatinwa, M. and Balarinwa, M. K. 1987. *Population and economic consequences. population education monograph*. Lagos: NERD Press. 6.

⁶ Chukwuma, C. S. 2006. *Can Nigerian be the China of Africa?* Lagos: Adegozo Ltd. 6.

environment, especially as regard land and water contamination which inhibit their means of income which is agriculture and fishing. The people of the region were not getting enough revenue from the oil wealth and feared that other regions benefit more from it. In response to these allegations, the federal government initiated a lot of programs to ensure that the region is developed, more revenue from the federal government was given to the region and even a special ministry called ministry of Niger Delta was formed specifically for the region.

As expected, some other regions especially the north, felt too much attention was given to the South-South region at the expense of other parts of the country. This malice couple with other social economic factors like high rate of unemployment, high rate of illiteracy and the selfishness of politicians makes youths in the North Eastern part of the region to carry arms against the state, but on an ideal that is cultural to them which is religion.⁷

The history of Nigeria tells a tale of a people who a widely divided on economic lines. There is a huge constantly widening gap between the rich and the poor. Poverty which is a situation or condition of hopelessness and a condition of being wretched, a state in which people live below a predetermined standard value in terms of income and conditions of living. A good number of Nigerians live below poverty line and majority of them live in rural areas with no infrastructure, food, shelter and so on. This situation pushes them into all forms of vices which threaten social order and the security of the state.

The amalgamation of the various very different ethnic and religious groups to form Nigeria has not yielded a favourable experience for the nation other than the satisfaction of the economic need of the colonisers. One of such experiences is the controversial Census results which were usually found not to represent the actual situation on the ground. It was replete and coloured with controversy based on regional

⁷ Ichima Egor. 2014. The basis of security challenges in Nigeria: implications for foreign investors. *British Journal of Marketing Studies* 2. 3: 66.

or geopolitical and ethnic factors. The failure of successive government to conduct a successful census has resulted in poor economic planning and subsequently, poor economic growth, poverty, crimes and insecurity.

The first five years after the civil war were declared the period of reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. Despite the attempted reconciliation, the religious face of the civil war persisted even after the war had ended. It continued in the form of a religious cold war.⁸ Inter-ethnic and religious communal clashes are still very endemic phenomena in Nigeria. Otite noted that, a cursory examination of the communal protests statistics confirms the negative role of primordial factors of religion and ethnicity. Of recent and even currently the communal protests cut across geo-political regions in Nigeria. For instance, the Ijo (Ijaw) Itshekiri and Urhobo with several other conflicts has become a perennial problem for the national government yet to be resolved.⁹

The experience with revenue allocation has been a long-standing issue in Nigerian federalism. Being a plural society there has been agitation from the oil producing geo-political region that a fixed percentage of revenue accruing to the federation account directly from Natural resources are set aside as derivation for the region, perhaps this is to compensate communalities which suffer severe ecological degradation arising from the exploitation of mineral resources in their areas. Local communities experience the impacts of oil industry daily since the oil companies operate close to their homes and farms, polluting their land, water and air. A long line of pipelines cross the villages in these areas many of which are old, corroded and poorly maintained thereby regularly causing massive oil spills. In most of the cases, the companies do not clean up the spills but leave pools of oil to contaminate the forests, farmlands and creeks, killing all life. Although, the oil companies and the Nigerian government have promised to clean up and maintain healthy practices but such promises

⁸ Uka, E. M. 2008. Ethnic, religious and communal conflict in Nigeria: implications for security. *Bassey Andah Journal* 1: 7.

⁹ Otite, O. 2000. *Ethnic pluralism, ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Nigerian*. Ibadan: Shaneson C. L. Ltd. 14.

are yet to see the light of day.¹⁰ This is the major reason for the constant clashes between the people and the government.

Religious intolerance is another major experience created by the process of amalgamation. From many opinions, a nation created by bringing together of a people already divided along ethnic and religious lines is one that is bound to fail considering the volatility of religion itself. A society in which religious tolerance is a value should be able to promote individual's desire to change his or her religious belief at any time and propagate it without molestation. Therefore, the frequent religious conflicts experienced often in Jos, Kano, Kaduna, Sokoto, Katsina in Northern Nigeria between Muslims and Christians are clear indications that there is nothing like national integration in Nigeria.

Since the emergence of democracy in 1999, Plateau State, North Central Nigeria has become a permanent flashpoint of violent clashes. The State which had hitherto been one of the most relatively peaceful in Nigeria has been deeply enmeshed and suffused in political and ethno-religious conflicts characterised by genocides, bombing, maiming and killings of several persons, loss of business investments, and properties worth several billions of Naira.¹¹ So, very prominently on the list of religious crises in Nigeria is Jos in Plateau state. Very recently in June of 2018 a fresh conflict explicitly took the form of farmers-herdsmen conflict while implicitly it was Christian (farmers) -Muslim (herdsmen) conflict. This led to the death of several farmers who were believed to be responsible for the killing of a number of cows that invaded their farms.

Sunday Okungbowa and Aluforo Epelle in 2011 corroborated this position of conflict along ethnic and religious divide in Jos by affirming that, the mixtures of

¹⁰ Baumuller H. Donnelly E. Vines A. Weimer M. The Effect of Oil Companies' Activities on the environment, health and development in sub-Saharan Africa, *European Parliament*, August 2011, available from <http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/177587>

¹¹ Sunday Okungbowa Uhumwuangho and Aluforo Epelle. 2011. Challenges and solutions to ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria: case study of the Jos crises. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 13. 5: 109.

ethnicity and faith have taken the strife to unimaginable, deadly heights. Whole villages have been levelled. Neighbours who had lived in harmony for decades have turned on one another with murderous fervour that has led to the loss of thousands of lives. Numerous buildings and other valuables have been razed. Social and economic life is at its lowest. The city and indeed state that used to hold a lot of attraction for tourists now find it hard to sustain even the love of the indigenes. Fear has become a common denominator.¹²

According to Nwolise, a country may have the best armed forces in terms of training and equipment, the most efficient police force, the most effective custom men, most active secret service agent, and best quality prisons, but yet be the most insecure nation in the world. He attributed this to bad governments, alienated and suffering masses, ignorance, hunger and unemployment. Thus, a society with political injustice, economic deprivation, social discrimination, religious or ethnic antagonism, human right violations and so on, is greatly insecure and for him, this is insecurity from within.¹³ It is notable that Nigerian security system is more reactive than proactive, waiting for crises to break out before rushing to put off the fire. The strategy may have worked in the past but it is no longer working today. The practice of sending Special Military Task Forces for internal security duties, even if they work in the most professional and saintly manner, is only meant to put off the fire. It should only be a short-term intervention measure because by their training and operational system, the military is not in a position to find solutions to civil crises.

For a developing country like Nigeria, national security is synonymous with national development, and the reality on ground is that we treat them as separate subjects which is not only counter-productive, but is fraught with dangers of underdevelopment.

¹² Sunday Okungbowa Uhumwuangho and Aluforo Epelle. 2011. Challenges and solutions to ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria: case study of the Jos crises. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 13. 5: 110.

¹³ Nwolise, O. B. C. cited in O. G. F. Nwaorgu, *Ethnic suspicion in Nigerian politics in Philosophy and Politics*. Maduabuchi Dukor. ed. 112-113.

Policymakers do not appreciate this important fact, and are not taking the necessary steps and building the institutions that could truly ensure justice, accountability and development in the country. This is why all measures designed to address insecurity remain futile. The involvement of the developed world in all spheres development is very important. Situations where world powers, for strategic reasons, blind themselves to gross human rights violations, bad governance, corruption, social injustice and inequality among their third world allies do no one any good.

In the end, it nourishes the conditions that endanger the global peace as seen with Boko Haram crises and the challenge of maintaining refugees in neighbouring countries . Therefore, helping developing states like Nigeria by insisting on good practice by its leaders through good governance, genuine democratisation process, and accountable political leadership, is a collective international obligation.¹⁴

The first open and violent religious conflict between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria was the burning of Christian Churches in October 1982. The action of the Muslims was probably fuelled by the laying of the foundation for a Christian Church near a mosque in Kano. As noted by Matthew Kukah, “although there was no evidence of hostility visibly shown by the visit of the Archbishop to Kano, it was not accidental that the site where he laid the foundation stone for the building of the new Church became the scene of the violence that erupted in Kano six months after the visit. The violence was targeted at Christ Church in Fagge, Kano Metropolis.”¹⁵ The reality of this situation is even more recurrent today than ever before as seen in Jos, Benue, Kaduna, Bauchi and so on.

¹⁴ Aliyu Mukhtar Katsina. 2012. Nigeria’s security challenges and the crisis of development: towards a new framework for analysis. *International Journal of Developing Societies* 1. 3: 115.

¹⁵ Uka, E. M. 2008. Ethnic, religious and communal conflict in Nigeria: implications for security. *Bassey Andah Journal* 1: 8.

According to Garcia, Kohl, Ruengsorn and Zislin, Nigeria's main challenges include, reducing poverty, diversifying its economy from the oil and gas sector towards more labour intensive sectors, and improving health and education. The current reality on ground is that oil has increased economic volatility and inflation while those living in poverty being the most vulnerable to volatility and inflation. To add to it, instability of government revenues and a crowding out of agriculture which provides the source of income to the poor have made the situation worsen. The oil industry does not employ a sizeable number of unskilled workers, thereby contributing little to reducing poverty.¹⁶

For most Nigerians however, the pressing problems of everyday survival remain the highest immediate priority. Since the oil boom of the 1970s, Nigeria's economy has been in crisis despite continued expansion in oil production. Without the establishment of an accountable government, the chances of addressing pressing problems like the deterioration of living conditions seems unlikely. Weak governance, impunity, systemic failures, illiteracy, income inequality, unemployment and corruption have entrenched this culture manifesting in poor orientation, low standard of living and high rate of social ills, political unrest and abuse of religion. Politicians and government officials tend to be selfish, greedy and corrupt, enriching themselves by looting from the common wealth of the country.¹⁷ These problems stand in the way of peace and social order in the nation. In order to reorder this prevailing situation, the seeds of solidarity and unity must be sown in the nation as a matter of policy.

¹⁶ Garcia, Rose Mary. Richard Kohl. Ann Ruengsorn. and Julia Zislin. 2006. *Nigeria: economic performance assessment*. Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 18.

¹⁷ Victoria Voelwoen Danaan. 2018. Analysing poverty in Nigeria through theoretical lenses. *Journal of Sustainable Development* 11. 1: 24.

Solidarity and Unity in the Quest for Social Order

In the absence of shared culture among a people, conflicts would arise concerning the values and norms that should guide their collective life. For this reason, people would simply not be able to cooperate and sustain a shared life for there would be social disorder. Therefore, a society cannot be cohesive and stable unless its members share a common culture, including a common system of meaning and significance, a shared conception of the good life at personal and collective levels, and a shared body of customs and practices. This calls for social solidarity which includes the ability to participate and the possibility to influence decisions and have access to decision-making processes. Solidarity creates mutual trust among individuals, which forms the basis for shared responsibilities towards the community and society. Therefore, all individuals should participate in the common life of society in order to build up common ties of interest and attachment with the rest of society.¹⁸

John Danaher's distinction between economic exchange and solidarity exchange seems very insightful for a better understanding of the essence of solidarity which allow for a type of social bonding to take place that transcends the formal and superficial bonding that takes place in the case of economic exchanges. In his example, he says, imagine Alan wants to buy a car, and Bill wants to sell one. Alan will buy for £1500, and Bill will sell for £1000. After meeting, and haggling, they settle on a price of £1250: Bill gives his car to Alan, and Alan gives the money to Bill. This represents an efficient exchange. Alan gets the car he wants for slightly less than he was willing to pay; Bill gets rid of the car for slightly more than he was willing to accept. It is a win-win. One thing (a car) is directly exchanged for another thing (money). The expectation both parties have of getting something in return for what they offer is built into the very notion of the exchange. So much so, that if you didn't get something in return you would have a legal right to sue for compensation. Therefore, in economic exchange, A engages

¹⁸ Bhikhu Parekh. 2005. *Unity and diversity in multicultural societies*. Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies. 7.

in an economic exchange with B, if A gives something to B out of a feeling of need or want, believing they have the right to receive something of roughly equivalent value from B in return, and having the ability to enforce that right.¹⁹

As example for solidarity exchange in contrast with economic exchange, he supposed that, Alan has a rare blood type, but his life is one of good fortune and good health. He feels grateful for the gift that he has been given, but is aware that there are others less fortunate who might need his rare blood type. He decides to donate his blood. In this manner, he manifests gratitude for his good fortune, and pays forward the gift he has been given to others. There may, of course be the faint worry behind all this that Alan may one day need a blood donation himself, but equally there is the hope that he never will. The blood is given, freely and willingly, with neither the desire nor the demand to receive anything equivalent in return. Therefore, in solidarity exchange, A engages in a solidarity exchange with B, if A gives something to B out of a feeling of gratitude, not necessarily directed at B, and without believing or having the right to receive something equivalent in return.²⁰

The above shows that solidarity exchange is better able to create social bonding than economic exchange would do. This suggests that, in the quest for unity and social order, it is more important to emphasise solidarity exchange than economic exchange. Tonnies' describes real solidarity as a sense of unity that is imposed upon the people from without through the mechanisms of the state as a means of fostering a community where the relationships between individuals are founded on concordance and mutual understanding.²¹ Tonnies therefore recognises the important role of leadership in social solidarity. A form of leadership which is able to create the bond required for promoting

¹⁹ John Danaher. 2016. Human enhancement, social solidarity and the distribution of responsibility. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 8.

²⁰ John Danaher. 2016. Human enhancement, social solidarity and the distribution of responsibility. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 8.

²¹ Tonnies, F. 2002. *Community and society*. Saint-Petersburg: Vladimir Dal. 18.

the values, relations and institutions that enable all people to participate in social, economic, cultural and political life on the basis of equality of rights, equity and dignity. Tonnies lays on leadership the burden of fostering stable, safe and just societies that are based on the promotion and protection of all human rights, as well as respect for and value of dignity of each individual.

In moral philosophy and normative ethics, solidarity can refer to the concept of membership in a community or the collective, inter-subjective bonds that hold autonomous moral agents together, both engendering and limiting their capacities for solitary moral reflection.²² This means that solidarity entails social inclusion, a process through which efforts are made to ensure equal opportunities for all, regardless of background so that they can achieve their full potential in life. It is a multi-dimensional process aimed at creating conditions which enable full and active participation of every member of the society in all aspects of life, including civic, social, economic, and political activities, as well as participation in decision making processes.

Solidarity encourages the common interest of a people and creates an environment that makes it possible and desirable for them to act in unison. With modernisation, the appeal of a closed society has become very minimal and uniting people from diverse cultures has become the founding principle of many nation states. Throughout history, many leaders have introduced nation building policies that socialise citizens to establish a shared national identity and minimize divisions across diverse groups.

Emile Durkheim identifies family, religious, political and professional groups as the most reliable methods of social integration that would make it possible for a man to find support in norms and values. However, he opined rather that the first three groups, cannot become the factors of social solidarity because, family gradually loses its role as the educator and nurturer of members. Religion in modern society can no longer unite

²² Max Pensky. 2008. The ends of solidarity. Albany: state University of New York Press. 2.

the people as earlier religion used to be the foundation of discipline. The prevalence of intra and inter religious conflicts around the world speaks volume in corroboration of Durkheim's position. According to him, the only social group that can facilitate the engagement of individuals into a collective is represented by professional group. Therefore, he believes that professional associations being the inseparable components of civil society can support social solidarity and the unity of the society; they can put sense into the lives of the individuals and regulate their behaviour.²³

Bhikhu Parekh describes cultural diversity as an inescapable fact of modern life. Culture as a people's way of life handed down from generations is a system of meaning and significance through which a group of people understand and structure their individual and collective lives. It defines the meaning or point of human activities, social relations and human life in general, and the kind and degree of significance or value to be attached to them. A culture's system of meaning and significance is embodied in its beliefs and practices, which collectively constitute its identity. To say that almost every modern society is culturally diverse or multicultural is to say that its members subscribe to and live by different though overlapping systems of meaning and significance. Cultural diversity in modern society Bhikhu Parekh contends has several sources which are traceable to ethnic, religious, cultural and other communities, with their more or less distinct ways of life. Some of these communities were long denied collective self-expression in the name of nation building or a hegemonic ideology, and are now keen to exercise their newly won freedoms. Modern men and women, being profoundly shaped by liberal individualism, take pride in forming their own views and making their own choices. They naturally arrive at different views of life. This is reinforced by the breakdown in the traditional moral consensus, which both requires and makes space for

²³ Durkheim, E. 1991. *The division of labour in society: method of sociology*. Moscow: Nauka. 28.

individual choices. Globalisation too exposes each society to different currents of thought, and its members respond to these in different ways.²⁴

A culturally diverse society without the elements of social cohesion is a breeding ground for conflict. Social cohesion refers to the elements that bring and hold people together in society. In a socially cohesive society, all individuals and groups have a sense of belonging, participation, inclusion, recognition and legitimacy. Social cohesive societies may not be necessarily homogenous but by respecting diversity, they are able to coexist harmoniously. This implies that social exclusion is a major cause of social disorder. It is a situation where individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from participating in all aspects of life of the society in which they live, on the grounds of their social identities, such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, culture or language.

According to Busatto,

Inclusion is community. No one becomes included by receiving hand-outs, even if these hand-outs are given by public bodies and with public resources. No one becomes included by being treated by a program in which they are no more than a number or a statistic. Inclusion is connection to the network of community development, it is to become more than a speck of dust, to have a forename and surname, with one's own distinctive features, skills and abilities, able to receive and give stimulus, to imitate and be imitated, to participate in a process of changing one's own life and collective life.²⁵

²⁴ Bhikhu Parekh. 2005. *Unity and diversity in multicultural societies*. Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies. 3.

²⁵ Busatto, C. 2007. *Solidary governance for creating inclusive societies*. A contribution to the Expert Group Meeting on 'Creating Inclusive Society: Practical Strategies to Promote Social Integration'. Paris. 4.

The relationship between community and the individual is effective for social solidarity when it encourages a mutual benefit for both the community and the individual. That is, when people rely upon each other and the success of their interactions.

In order to foster international relations and integration, the United Nations at the World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen in 1995 declared that freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility are key values that must be respected. It stated that, men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice and that democratic and participatory governance based on the will of the people best assures these rights. The importance of equality is greatly emphasised in the statement that no individual and no nation must be denied the opportunity to benefit from development in a manner that guarantees equal rights and opportunities of women and men. In solidarity, global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice. Such that those who suffer or who benefit least deserve help from those who benefit most. Human beings must respect one other, in all their diversity of belief, culture and language. Differences within and between societies should be neither feared nor repressed, but cherished as a precious asset of humanity. Emphasising that a culture of peace and dialogue among all civilisations should be actively promoted. The natural environment which serves as home to man was also given important concern in the declaration as its sustainability guarantees human survival. Therefore, prudence must be shown in the management of all living species and natural resources, in accordance with the precepts of sustainable development. Since it is only in this way that the immeasurable riches provided to us by nature can be preserved and passed on to future generations. It encouraged that the current unsustainable patterns of production and consumption must be changed in the interest of our future welfare and that of our descendants. Shared responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally. As the most

universal and most representative organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role.²⁶

Unity is a drive towards social order and stability of a people. Any society might be ruined if the issue of unity cannot be resolved intelligently. For this reason, unity cannot be achieved when a society is not inclusive. The World Summit for Social Development defines an inclusive society as a society for all in which every individual, each with rights and responsibilities, has an active role to play. Such an inclusive society must be based on respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, cultural and religious diversity, social justice and the special needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.²⁷

Conclusion

Effective governance as stated in the previous chapter is what Aquinas identified as the key to promoting social inclusion and combating social exclusion, as it improves access to basic services, mobilizes human and financial resources, and strengthens social and human capital. Likewise, broad-based participation, contributes to good governance, to fostering transparency, accountability, legitimacy and to making quality decisions with higher levels of implementation and compliance.

The highest known levels of social order on the planet are found among the social insects like ants, wasps and bees. Ants manage to coordinate their activities to obtain food, deal with garbage, and dispose of their dead. They also behave in self-sacrificing ways. The worker caste females are subservient to the needs of their mother and are content to surrender their own reproduction in order to raise sisters and brothers. Not only do worker ants give up the prospect of having their own off spring, but they also risk their lives on behalf of the colony. Just leaving the nest to search for food is to

²⁶ UN. 1996. The Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action

²⁷ UN. 1996. The Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action

choose danger over safety. Human societies are less ordered than those of the social insects are. Yet even with humans, there is wide variation. Sometimes human groups can attain relatively high levels of social order even under difficult circumstances. Societies with high levels of social order are better able to cope with problems. They are better able to provide education, control crime, reduce war, limit terrorism, improve public health, address global warming, and so forth.²⁸

In the absence of a shared culture among a people, conflicts would arise concerning the values and norms that should guide their collective life. For this reason, people would simply not be able to cooperate and sustain a shared life. Therefore, a society cannot be cohesive and stable unless its members share a common national culture, including a common system of meaning and significance, a shared conception of the good life at personal and collective levels, and a shared body of customs, practices, habits, attitudes and collective memories.

²⁸ Johnson, Steven. 2001. *Emergence: the connected lives of ants, brains, cities, and soft-ware*. New York: Scribner's. 17.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

The first objective of this research is to look into the idea of inter-subjectivity alongside Leibniz's monadologism. It revealed that the monadology portrays elements of determinism and individualism and runs contrary to the description of gregarious humans as monads. It was noted that his description of the monads as windowless though, logically coherent with his conception of substance, does not practically represent social beings who are far from being solipsistic. Solipsism here means, the expression of the individuality of the monads with the implication that reality only exist in the self and that there cannot be an existence external to the self.

This research has rightly argued that God is at the centre of Leibniz's metaphysics since, in his metaphysical claim for the existence of monads, he believes, is sufficient reason for God's existence. The perfect harmony that exists among monads which do not communicate with each other for him is a pointer to the fact that a supremely intelligent being must have orchestrated it. This is because whatever follows from the idea or definition of anything can be predicated of that thing. Since the most perfect being includes all perfection, among which is existence, existence follows from the idea of God therefore existence can be predicated of God.¹ The presumed harmony in the world led Leibniz to opine that God created the best of all possible worlds because necessary truths, including modal truths such as; that unicorns exist are possible, must exist somewhere as acts of thought or ideas in the mind of an omniscient, necessarily existent God who contemplates them.²

In the 'Monadology', Leibniz held that, "as in the ideas of God there is an infinity of possible worlds, and as only one can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which determines him to one rather than another. And this reason can be no other than fitness, derived from the different degrees of perfection which these worlds

¹ Craig, E. ed. 2005. *The shorter routledge encyclopedia of philosophy*. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. 555.

² Gale, R. M. 2002. *The blackwell guide to metaphysics*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 331.

contain, each possible world having a claim to exist according to the measure of perfection which it enfolds. And this is the cause of the existence of that Best, which the wisdom of God discerns, which his goodness chooses, and his power effects.”³ But, if this world which is God’s own creation and choice is the best of all possible worlds, then it would be unnecessary to talk about social order and our idea of good and evil becomes questionable. With the evidences of evils and catastrophes in the world, it will be difficult for anyone to say that this is the best of all possible worlds that a being, most benevolent can offer.

For Leibniz, “evil is a necessary and unavoidable consequence of God’s having chosen to create the best of all possible worlds. However bad we might think things are in our world, they would be worse in any other.”⁴ Therefore, Leibniz is saying that we cannot understand the necessity of what we consider evil if we only look at a particular act of evil. This is because some things that appear evil to us sometimes ultimately turn out to be good and that the omniscient God who has made it so has sufficient reasons for it.

To agree with Leibniz as against Descartes that the mind and body do not interact is to opine that the relationship between the mind and the body is attributable to a pre-established harmony orchestrated by God. This is a view that is a rejection of the principle of causality. In the same manner, the claim that monads do not interact with each other at all and that they are determined to act in a particular way in synchronisation with other monads is an indication that there is no free will in the universe. Also, that this world which is God’s choice is the best of all possible worlds is opposed to our

³ Leibniz, G. W. & Hedge, F. H. 1867. The monadology. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. 1. 3: 53.

⁴ Craig, E. ed. 2005. *The shorter routledge encyclopedia of philosophy*. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. 556.

existential experiences for which Gasset in his ‘The Revolt of the Masses’, said that, “the world to-day goes the same way as the worst of worlds that have ever been.”⁵

This research recognises the attempts that have been made to draw the relationship between the metaphysical and the physical but without much success. An example of these attempts is evident in Descartes’ opinion that the mind and the body do interact and that man is essentially a thinking being who possesses a body. But, he encountered a problem trying to show where this interaction takes place. This study has attempted to rethink this relationship and established that there is a nexus between these disparate fields and have identified that the metaphysical could impinge on the social realm against Leibniz’s proposition of a world solely composed of monads which are metaphysical beings that are windowless and deterministic in nature.

This research emphasises that our knowledge of the social world has metaphysical basis. Democracy is a social construct which in the final analysis has its basis in metaphysics. This was noted to be so because democracy is founded on the notion of inalienable rights. This means that without the recognition of human inalienable rights, there can be no democracy. These rights are described as inalienable because we have them essentially before coming into existence they are not given or transferred to anyone; rather we have them a priori. All forms of knowledge as well are noted to have their foundations in reality beyond the physical because their justifications cannot be possible without making recourse to their metaphysical foundations. This is because; just like foundationalism, justifications of knowledge claims are metaphysically self-evident in their final analyses. For ideas to cohere and therefore serve as justificatory factors, each idea must have its own foundation which is also metaphysically self-evident. This presupposes that our knowledge about the world is metaphysically based and that beings which constitute our knowledge of the world must derive their beingness from beyond the physical domains.

⁵ Gasset, J. O. Y. 1932. *The revolt of the masses*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Inc. 44.

In the world of social monads, inter-subjectivity is the missing element in Leibniz's monadologism. Therefore, a reconstruction of the monadology in a way that suits the social world requires an introduction of the principle of participation and inter-subjectivity. This principle enables a conception of humans as gregarious beings who necessarily go out of their ways seeking social lives. But, as noted in the fourth chapter of this research, the principle of participation alone cannot guarantee social order hence, the need to go beyond Aquinas by the introduction of solidarity and unity as a means of addressing the problem of social order.

This research aptly identified that social monads which are inter-subjective and possess freewill are diametrically opposed to Leibniz's individualistic and deterministic monads. This is because, Leibniz's monads amongst what has already been said about them, have distinctive behaviours which are that they neither affect nor are affected by other monads, they are self-sufficient and are programmed to behave or perceive the world in their own peculiar ways.

The goal of Leibniz in the 'Monadology' is to show that the world is not only metaphysical in nature but that it is occupied by windowless, solipsistic and metaphysical beings which he calls 'monads'. He held that the idea of social or physical interaction is incompatible with the life of the monads because collision in bodies is fundamental to all physical change and motion. For this reason, he "rejected completely hard bodies, because any collisions would involve completely abrupt changes of speed and thus, a breach of continuity."⁶ Since the monads are unaffected by external forces, there was no way interaction could be possible. Therefore, interaction is apparent because the monads exhibit pre-established harmony. This research argued that, although, Leibniz did not put forward his monadology as a theory to achieve human solidarity for the reason that he believes perfection has been pre-inputted in the monads

⁶ Russell. L. J. 1977. Leibniz on the metaphysical foundations of science. *Studia Leibnitiana*. B.d.9.H.1: 102. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40693820>.

at creation, it still raises some concerns because humans are monads with windows and freewill.

The second objective of this research is to critically evaluate the metaphysical basis of the history of philosophy and to clarify social concepts like communalism and individualism with the view to expressing that they have metaphysical basis. Leibniz is of the opinion that since we cannot find sufficient reason for the existence of anything in the material world. We must find it elsewhere, out of the totality of finite things and so in something infinite, eternal and metaphysical. With reference to causality, he stressed that in a series of changing things if we imagine that it goes back in infinite regression, the reason is traceable to the superior strength of certain metaphysical inclinations, the same reason for which causality itself is said to be rooted in metaphysics.⁷

This research identified that the world is metaphysically necessary because physical necessities are derived from metaphysical necessities. That the physical world is metaphysically necessary is evident in the disintegration or disaggregation of bodies. Bodies in the Platonic and Leibnizean sense are not monadic souls themselves; rather, they are embodied by souls. This is why when bodies disintegrate, they are by extension the diffusion of some quality or nature. By hypothesis, the quality or nature is no longer there to be continued or extended, and so per impossibile, for Leibniz we will be left with an utter and complete metaphysical vacuum.⁸ This is why, “whether the world, including the physical body exists or not, pure consciousness remains as a ‘phenomenological residue’”⁹ This metaphysical or phenomenological vacuum or residue explains the foundation of all being both physical and metaphysical. Therefore, as said earlier, the reason for the existence of any reality must be found out of the totality of finite things and so in something infinite and eternal.

⁷ Leibniz G. W. 2004. The ultimate origin of things. Bennett. J. ed. 1&2

⁸ Glenn, A. H. 1992. Leibniz’s phenomenalisms. *The Philosophical Review* 101.3: 532.

⁹ Hiroshi, K. 2000. *Monad and thou: phenomenological ontology of the human being*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 40.

Leibniz believes that science becomes real and demonstrative by means of principles such as principles of sufficient reason and the identity of indiscernibles whereas before it generally consisted of empty words. What we have then in regards to the metaphysical foundations of science, is an account of the basic principles of science derived from concepts and principles of the widest possible generality.¹⁰ A posteriori demonstration proceeds from experience of an effect to its cause and produces knowledge of the nature of the effect while a priori demonstration proceeds from cause to effect and produces knowledge of why the effect obtains. The notion of causality or cause and effect is basic for scientific advancements and causality itself is rooted in metaphysics. Therefore, science just like other means of knowing is rooted in metaphysics.

The metaphysical foundation of community is seen in the relationship between the individual and the community because the society is being, writ-large. This relationship is metaphysical because human actions or activities with, for or against another have consequences far beyond the physical realm. From an African perspective, all beings including humans either increase or experience a diminution of force in the process of interaction or communication and the concept of this force cannot be explained without the aid of the science of ontology.

The third objective of this research is to evaluate Aquinas' principle of 'Participation' which served as a springboard that lead to a proper conception of social order as it argues in favour of inter-subjectivity. It argued that the notion of teleologism in Aquinas' Principle of Participation in relation to the notion of inter-subjectivity provides an understanding that the notion of participation is socially and ontologically teleological. That is, nature for the purpose of realising human ends continues to supply

¹⁰ Russell. L. J. 1977. Leibniz on the metaphysical foundations of science. *Studia Leibnitiana*. B.d.9.H.1. 102. Retrieved Sept. 28, 2017, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40693820>.

the society with all such as is needed to make the people comfortable and viable.¹¹ This gives the assurance that humans as beings which possess reason are those who are able to plan and order their actions for the sake of an end and are able to set themselves in inter-subjective relationship for the sake of an end whereas those beings without reason have to be set in motion by someone or something else, because they do not grasp the concept of an end.

The proper meaning of leadership therefore is that it is a process of social influence in which the leader seeks the voluntary participation of the subjects in an effort to reach societal goals. This understanding is from the contingency theory which is essentialist in terms of both the leader and the context as both the essence of the individual and the context are knowable and critical towards peace and harmony. Therefore, the best form of government in Aquinas is in a state or kingdom where one person has the power to preside over all. At the same time, this individual has under him others who also have governing powers in such a way that all share in a government of this kind, both because all are eligible to govern, and because everyone is involved in determining the rules. Aquinas therefore makes a distinction between the laws that apply to a particular people that is, laws that are basic for social coordination and collaboration especially in relation to economic transactions from the universal natural laws which are norms that are meant to regulate moral life.

This is why one of the telos of leadership identified is to create an atmosphere of inter-subjectivity by uniting men's efforts in such a way that will be beneficial for the individual and the group through cooperation that are greater than what each man could obtain by himself. Happiness as another telos Aquinas defines as "the attainment of the perfect good."¹² It follows that anyone who is capable of achieving the perfect good can

¹¹ Ada M0-J, Ada J. A, Egomo J. E. 2012. Saint Thomas Aquinas theories on man, society, government, law and applicability of these ideas in the administration of Nigerian secondary schools. *World J Young Researchers* 2. 5: 8.

¹² Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa theologiae*. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Trans. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex. Part I-II. Q.5. A. 1.

attain happiness. It was noted that humans who are in potentiality throughout their lives are actively involved in various occupations that would lead to happiness and therefore strive for happiness through many activities. Happiness for Aquinas is the perfect and sufficient good which excludes every ill and fulfils every desire. The notion of happiness is considered as the end towards which humans pursue. This is because, the reality of the natural law is evident in the actions of humans as rational creatures and they derive their inclinations to act towards an end from the eternal law which is imprinted in them by virtue of their participation in it. As for Locke, the end of government is the happiness and good of humankind for which there is no alternative.

The fourth objective of this research is to examine the extent to which Leibniz's monadologism pose a challenge for the quest of social order and the need to introduce the concept of solidarity and unity which are not guaranteed in the principle of participation as veritable means of aiming at social order. In conceptualising the notion of social order, the research argued that there is a close relationship between concepts of morality, culture and social order, noting that neither of these concepts can be discussed in a vacuum. This is because morality which implies the presence of the other is at the foundation of culture for the sake of social order. Social order is possible when there are sets or system of linked social structures, institutions, relations, customs, values and practices which conserve, maintain and enforce certain patterns of relating and behaving. It is a product of the decisions of individuals in a society to relinquish their wills, rights and freedom to a single authority for the purpose of gaining peace and security of their lives and property. This understanding is what was implied in Thomas Hobbes idea of social contract.

While attempting to trace the historicity of Hobbes idea of social contract, this research ensured it was not divorced from an understanding that he was writing from his social milieu. This is because we necessarily talk about the world from the way we view the world. So, his social experiences shaped his worldview and consequently his thoughts. Plato for instance may not have conceived of the world in the state of nature to be as brutish and ungovernable as Hobbes had thought, but he definitely believed that the world or the society was not a perfect one as Leibniz proposed. This led him to structure

a stratified society that will deal with the ills and injustices in his society. He stated in his tripartite psychology that to have a perfect society, everyone must be engaged in his own specific function because a thing's specific function he said "is that which it alone can do or which it can do better than anything else."¹³ He believed that if the rulers, the guardians and artisans are engaged in their specific functions that there will be order, justice and peace in the society.

Socrates decided not to escape from prison but to drink the hemlock because he believed he was in a social contract with the society and that the free choice to remain a member of society is what binds each member of society to the contract's terms. In this sense therefore, human beings volunteer to belong to society simply because it is rational and in their self-interest. Socrates had enjoyed peace and security from the society and since that same society decided to kill him, he saw nothing wrong with it. This is the position of Hobbes when he said that the authoritarian government was meant to ensure peace, he decides what is right or wrong and whatever he does is right even if he decides to kill anyone.

With the dilemma of living in the society, individuals daily face the inability to express their true self. Their innate desire to progress from potentiality to actuality is inhibited by social constraints. They move from being subjects to being objects in the society. This self-estrangement or alienation is an "internal process, based on one's attitude to oneself. The state of alienation is the state of anxiety. Anxiety is the uncanny apprehension of some impending evil, of something not present, but to come, of something not within us, but of an alien power."¹⁴ Therefore, there is the need for individuals to authenticate their inauthenticity. The need to make meaning out of their existence, to be able to live as they ought to and not as they are expected to. In doing this, one cannot rule out the place of morality as it is very necessary in the resolution of social problems. When each individual expresses his or her authenticity with the consideration of the other or with the consciousness of 'when I choose, I choose for

¹³ Plato, 1985. *The Republic*. London: W. W Norton & Company. 51

¹⁴ Rempel, G. 1959. *Soren Kierkegaard and existentialism*. London: Routledge. 2

others' or with the Kantian notion of willing that our actions become universal norms then, this kind of authentic behaviour would eliminate unwarranted social problems like terrorism and corruption.

This research exposes the fact that security and peace in nations are contingent upon security and peace in the world. By the same token, social order in nations is contingent upon social order in the world. With the growing inter-dependency in the present globalised world, the actions of one state have the capacity to influence and alter the actions and policies of other states. Moreover, not surprisingly, a threat in one part of the world is now capable of challenging the peace and stability of the whole world. It is for this reason that the culture of individualism which is implied in Leibniz's monadology is considered as a challenge for social order. The problem will be on the right part towards being addressed when the elements of solidarity and unity are incorporated. This is so because communication or inter-subjectivity are necessarily implied in the principle of participation but, these do not guarantee solidarity or unity which are necessary for social order. Hence, this research considered the need to go beyond Aquinas' principle when it expressed that the society is rooted in metaphysics and that from a social cum metaphysical perspective, every people form a social web in a hierarchical order with each other thus, making each individual person a strand in that web; a web that is built on unity and solidarity as a means of achieving social order.

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